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DOES MY NEIGHBOR EXIST?¹

Kant has said that there are some questions which should never be asked, and there is apostolic authority for the injunction to "avoid foolish questions". Only the fool has said in his heart that he is alone in the universe; but since philosophy has seriously raised the question of the existence of my neighbor and of the way in which I may come to know him, it may be not without interest to notice (i) how the problem has emerged, (ii) the importance of the problem for modern philosophy, and (iii) some leading solutions that have been offered.

I. Our social environment is no doubt the most important factor in our every-day life. The belief in the existence of other men's consciousness, as Clifford has said, "dominates every thought and every action of our lives." On the other hand there is a sense in which we not only die alone, as Pascal says we do, but live alone as well. One man's thought and feeling is not directly accessible to the consciousness of another, and each man has an unsharable feeling, to use James' language, "of the pinch of his own individual destiny as he privately feels it rolling out on fortune's wheel."

Yes! in the sea of life enisled,
With echoing straits between us thrown,
Dotting the shoreless watery wild,
We mortal millions live alone.

How for the philosopher this "unplumb'd, salt, estranging sea" is to be crossed or bridged is the question before us in this paper.

Some of the problems of philosophy are perennial and

¹This paper was read at a conference of former students in the division of Philosophy, Psychology and Anthropology at Columbia University, April 18th, 1916.

recurrent, coming up in every period of reflective thought. The relation of the One to the Many has been a persistent problem from the dawn of Greek philosophy until James discovered a "pluralistic universe" and Bradley preached the doctrine of a monistic Absolute composed of finite centres. Again, from the time of the Eleatics and of Heraclitus till now the pendulum of philosophic thought has kept swinging from one extreme to the other: Being—Becoming, Being—Becoming.

The question of the existence and knowledge of other selves did not emerge as a problem of philosophy till comparatively recent times. Berkeley, whose profound influence upon subsequent thinkers is coming more and more to be recognized, may be said to have started the discussion; while the elements of the problem did not escape the attention of so acute a thinker as Augustine. In his treatise on the Trinity (viii. 6), speaking of the knowledge of a righteous man, Augustine says: "We say, indeed, not unfitly, that we therefore know what a mind is, because we too have a mind. For neither did we ever see it with our eyes, and gather a special or general notion from the resemblance of more minds than one, which we have seen; but rather as I have said before, because we too have it. For what is known so intimately, and so perceives itself to be itself, as that by which also all other things are perceived, that is, the mind itself? For we recognize the movements of bodies also, by which we perceive that others live besides ourselves; since we also so move our body in living as we observed those bodies to be moved. For even when a living body is moved, there is no way opened to our eyes to see the mind, a thing which cannot be seen by the eyes." If any moderns can be found who are so foolish as to be Solipsists, Augustine may teach us that the animals know better; for he goes on to say: "Neither is this, as it were, the property of human foresight and wisdom, since brute animals also perceive that not only they themselves live, but also other brute animals interchangeably, and the one the other, and that we ourselves do so" (Shedd's translation).

Limiting the objects of knowledge to ideas and spirits, Berkeley is often accused of giving no account of the way in which we come to know the existence of other (finite) spirits, and even of cutting off all possible avenues through which such knowledge could come. He does face the question, however, in a passage which his editor, Fraser, describes as "one of the most important sections in the book". In his *Principles of Human Knowledge* (Pt. i, sec. 145) Berkeley says: "I perceive several motions, changes, and combinations of ideas, that inform me there are certain particular agents, like myself, which accompany them and concur in their production. Hence, the knowledge I have of other spirits is not immediate, as in the knowledge of my ideas; but depending on the intervention of ideas, by me referred to agents or spirits distinct from myself as effects or concomitant signs." Berkeley recognizes that the communication between minds is not direct, and that the ideas of bodily motion in two different minds are numerically distinct. He says (sec. 147): "It is evident that in effecting other persons the will of man has no other object than barely the motions of the limbs of his body; but that such a motion should be attended to, or excite any idea in the mind of another, depends wholly on the will of the Creator." My body, conceived as an idea impressed on my mind by the Divine Spirit, has no power to excite an idea in the mind of another. A kind of double miracle would be necessary, in the view of Berkeley's critics; the Divine Spirit must not only impress on my mind the idea of my body, but must on occasion excite in the mind of another the idea of my bodily motion, from which the existence of my mind may be inferred.

In the opinion of Fraser, Berkeley left the question of the knowledge of other selves just where he found it; but this was not the view of some critics who accused him of Egoism, the equivalent of the modern Solipsism. Thus Thomas Reid strenuously contends (Essay vi, ch. 5) that we cannot communicate except through the senses, "and until

we rely on their testimony, we must consider ourselves alone in the universe". Bishop Berkeley did not duly consider that "by depriving us of the material world, he deprived us at the same time of family, friends, country and every human creature. . . . Ideas [ideas of my own mind] are my only companions. Cold company, indeed! Every social affection freezes at the thought."

J. S. Mill, in his *Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy* (vol. i. ch. 12), addressed himself to our problem, and remarked: "I conclude that other human beings have feelings like me, because, first, they have bodies like me, which I know, in my own case, to be the antecedent condition of feelings; and because, secondly they exhibit the acts and external signs, which in my own case I know by experience to be caused by feelings. . . . In my own case I know that the first link produces the last through the intermediate link [feeling], and could not produce it without. . . . The generalization merely postulates that what experience shows to be a mark of the existence of something within the sphere of my own consciousness, may be concluded to be a mark of the same thing beyond that sphere." Here again the critic will insist that if body and bodily motion have no existence except as ideas in my mind, I have no right to infer the existence of other minds which are not in my consciousness and are independent of it.

German as well as English idealists have been charged with Solipsism, as when Lotze in his *Metaphysics* (Bk. i. ch. vii. sec. 95) says that Fichte did not draw the only logical inference that could be drawn, namely, Solipsism. And if you admit the existence of others, then why not of real things?

For the more recent phases of the discussion Clifford's essay on "The Nature of Things-in-Themselves" (1878)² was epoch-making. Clifford proposed the term "ejects" for these other minds to distinguish them from the physical objects or phenomena presented to consciousness. The discus-

² In his *Lectures and Essays*, p. 274 ff.

sion was advanced by Bradley's chapter on "Solipsism" (xxi) in his *Appearance and Reality* and by Fullerton's chapter on "The Existence of Other Selves" in his *System of Metaphysics* (1904). Solipsism is defined by Schiller as "the doctrine that all existence is experience, and that there is only one experient. The Solipsist thinks that he is the one."³ On its face it is an absurd doctrine, and it would be hard to find anyone who professed it in its purity.⁴ The Solipsist of course ceases to be one when he tries to prove his doctrine to his neighbor, but to accuse one's neighbor of Solipsism has become a recognized and respectable method of philosophical warfare. Thus a critic of Pragmatism says: "The various individual minds in the pluralistic universe of Professor James are more helplessly separated than are the monad beings in Leibnitz's partially pluralistic universe."⁵ On the other hand, in the words of Schiller, "that the 'absolute idealist' is a Solipsist need only be barely stated. . . . He is a Solipsist because he believes that the Absolute is the sole experient, and that he is himself the incarnate Absolute."⁶ Schiller even attributes "solipsistic leanings" to the New Realism, but it should be observed that writers of various schools find it easier to attribute Solipsism to those who differ from them than to establish their own innocence of the charge.

II. Enough has been said already to show that the question of our title, whether foolish or not, is one of undeniable importance in philosophical debate. The Berkeleyan idealist must face the question, or his right to assume a knowledge of spirits will be challenged and the fabric of his idealism will be threatened. The Kantian idealist in like manner

³ *Mind*, N. S., vol. xviii, 1909, p. 171.

⁴ Solipsism might be found in such a statement as the following from H. R. Marshall: "The 'now' of consciousness is all that exists, whether of me or of the universe for me." See Macintosh, *Problem of Knowledge*, p. 103.

⁵ J. E. Russell, "Solipsism and Radical Empiricism", *Phil. Rev.*, vol. xv, 1906, p. 610.

⁶ *Mind*, N. S. xviii, 1909, p. 171.

will be called upon to justify his assumption of other minds, which he uses to establish the universality and therefore the a priori character of his categories. "Reality", it has been said, "means objectivity, *i.e.*, validity and coherence for other selves than our own";⁷ and unless these other selves are given philosophic standing there can be no satisfactory "refutation of idealism" in the Kantian sense, or of subjective phenomenism.

In general it may be said that the world of social intercourse is as important for the philosopher as it is for the man in the street, and the philosopher's ability to account satisfactorily for this basal fact in human life may be taken as the touchstone of his theory. The absolutist must find room in his system for finite selves or centres, for without these there will be no spiritual content in his Absolute. The pragmatist, if he holds that reality is experience, must show how other selves can exist outside of and transcending his experience. The pampsychist, holding that all existence is soul-like and that physical facts are but symbols of soul activities, will be concerned to justify his belief in social intercourse on the human plane. Finally the pluralist should find the threatened spectre of Solipsism especially disquieting.

We are not surprised, then, to see sober and weighty writers, who do not delight in riddles of the sphinx, giving their attention to what Royce describes as "that most familiar and most profoundly metaphysical of the problems of common sense, the problem: What reason can any one of us give for holding that the mind of his neighbor is real at all?"⁸ The problem seems to lie heavy upon the philosophical conscience of the time, and it may repay us to glance a little more closely at some typical solutions which have been offered.

III. These solutions may be conveniently classed under six heads; (1) the non-rational, (2) the anti-metaphysical

⁷ D. G. Ritchie, *Philosophical Studies*, p. 187.

⁸ *Problem of Christianity*, vol. ii, p. 314.

or scientific, (3) the moral, (4) the social, (5) the theistic, and (6), the common-sense or realistic.

(1) The non-rational solution, despairing of giving any reasonable account of our conviction that other selves exist, appeals to sentiment, faith, or some other sub-rational or suprarational process. Clifford, for instance, very frankly says: "How consciousness can testify to the existence of anything outside of itself, I do not pretend to say; I need not untie a knot which the world has cut for me long ago. It may very well be that I myself am the only existence, but it is simply ridiculous to suppose that anybody else is."⁹ Flournoy dismisses the question with a shrug of the shoulders: "To admit that there are no other *Egos* than my own . . . brrr! the bare idea of this solitude gives me a chill in the spine; and I am not astonished that all the phenomenalist philosophers are in fact unfaithful to their system."¹⁰ W. McDougall maintains that "Solipsism is an impossible attitude for a sane man. We affirm that each of us can escape from Solipsism only by an act of faith or will that posits a real world of which he is a member."¹¹ Similarly C. A. Strong, saying that the philosopher who denied the existence of other minds would never gain a hearing, adds: "We may therefore (employing a procedure like that of the philosophers of common-sense, but with how far less risk of being challenged?) take the knowledge of other minds for granted, and use it as a test of epistemological principles."¹² Philosophers who refuse to philosophize when the central and most important department of knowledge is concerned, can have but little quarrel with the advocates of common sense who assert the reality of the material world, or with the mystics who claim to have an immediate assurance of the presence of God.

(2) Starting from the basis of a "sound idealism", but eschewing metaphysics as "built either on air or on quick-

⁹ *Lectures and Essays*, p. 276.

¹⁰ Quoted in Ladd, *Philosophy of Mind*, p. 34.

¹¹ *Body and Mind*, p. 180.

¹² *Why the Mind Has a Body*, pp. 219, 220.

sands",¹³ K. Pearson believes that the sole gate-way to knowledge is the "scientific method", that is, the classification and description of perceptual facts. In this scheme of things, my neighbor who is admittedly not a perceptual fact, and can claim to be a "metaphysical" reality if there is any such reality, appears to be an unwelcome intruder. "The greatest assumption of everyday life—the inference which the metaphysicians tell us is wholly beyond science—namely, that other beings have consciousness as well as ourselves, seems to have just as much or as little *scientific* validity as the statement that an earthgrown apple would fall to the ground if carried to another star. Both are beyond the range of experimental demonstration, etc."¹⁴

Not content to leave his fellow-men in this anomalous position, Pearson seeks to rescue them from the "arid field of metaphysical discussion", and to bring them within the confines of science. To Clifford's statement that another's feelings "cannot by any possibility become objects in my consciousness", he replies that "were all physiological knowledge and surgical manipulation sufficiently complete, it is conceivable that it would be possible for me to be conscious of your feelings, to recognize your consciousness as a direct sense-impression; let us say, for example, by connecting the *cortex* of your brain with that of mine through a suitable commisure of nerve substance. The possibility of this verification of other-consciousness does not seem more remote than that of a journey to a fixed star."¹⁵

Assuming the brain connection to be physiologically possible, the psychological result is highly problematical. What A would experience if his brain were joined to B's would probably be a sense-impression of a physical process in B's brain; or conceivably there might result a sort of fusion or confusion of consciousness—literally two souls with but a single thought, but neither soul conscious that its thought

¹³ *Grammar of Science*, 3rd ed., part i, p. 17.

¹⁴ P. 15.

¹⁵ P. 50.

was shared by the other. That any conceivable connection could make B's thought and feeling, as B's, a matter of direct experience for A is not only improbable, but is very likely impossible. This is the opinion, at any rate, of Ward who believes that "immediate experience of another subject is beyond any knowledge that we have or can conceive; in fact it might, I think, be fairly maintained that the very idea involves a contradiction."¹⁶ Similarly Bradley says that "to be possessed directly of what is personal to the mind of another, would in the end be unmeaning".¹⁷ If human society cannot become the object of science until the possible success of Pearson's experiment be proved, philosophers run the risk of being condemned to solitary confinement in the prison of Solipsism.

(3) A solution from the standpoint of ethics is suggested by Stratton in his *Psychology of the Religious Life*. Of the demand for a world of moral relations, he says: "Were it not for its prompting, there is no compulsive reason, according to our present knowledge, for believing in the existence of other minds. If in fashioning our idea of the world, we were to surrender wholly to the scientific spirit; making no assumption that was not absolutely needed to explain, getting our facts into the snuggest possible arrangement, never multiplying essences beyond mere causal necessity—if we were to accept without shadow of reserve this rigid scientific method, each, so far as we now can see, would rest convinced that his was the only mind in the universe." But ours must be a world of mutual recognition and regard. "An ineradicable sense of the value of others requires that they, too, be real"; and it is added that "the enlargement of the universe according to the ways of religion is, in the main, but a further yielding to this rightful impulse."¹⁸

¹⁶ *Realm of Ends*, p. 236.

¹⁷ *Appearance*, p. 343. R. B. Perry thinks that "the same soul or nervous system, or whatever was filling the office of subject, might come to fill also the office of object." *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 298.

¹⁸ Pp. 364, 365.

(4) It is a paradox to say that all knowledge, including the knowledge of other selves, is a social product; yet this is virtually the view of some thinkers of high authority, such as Ward and Royce. Starting from the world of social intercourse as the world best known to us, Ward maintains that all reality is to be regarded as a community of conscious monads *en rapport* with one another and open to one another's influence. To the question how we reach the knowledge of other selves, Ward, in common with most philosophers, gives the common-sense answer: "We infer other consciousnesses through the actions of their bodies. . . . Only the bodies and their movements are presented as objects, the indwelling selves (or souls) and their experiences are not thus presented."¹⁹ Quoting a statement of Ritchie, that experience cannot testify to anything more than the existence of the subject—"the existence of a plurality of selves is an inference, a hypothesis to explain the phenomena"—Ward remarks: "But drawing inferences and framing hypotheses presupposes a self-conscious intelligence already possessed of that objective experience, which by implying its own universality and necessity, implies also a plurality of selves. On this assumption then we come to deadlock or find ourselves revolving in a hopeless circle."²⁰

The trouble is, obviously, that the knowledge of other selves is both a result of experience (through a knowledge of bodily movement) and a presupposition of experience. Ward believes, however, that we can escape from the circle and that "the escape is simple, once we recognize that experience from the outset involves both subject and object, both self and other, and that the differentiation of both factors proceeds *pari passu*".²¹ But is the escape so simple after all? The appearance of simplicity perhaps comes from equating the expressions, "both subject and object", "both self and other" (selves?). The object, according to

¹⁹ *Realm of Ends*, pp. 28, 29.

²⁰ P. 129.

²¹ *Ibid.*

idealism, is a part of the subject's consciousness, while the ejective or other self is transcendent. The escape from the deadlock seems precarious, and if it is closed the community of conscious monads will disappear, and a barren Solipsism alone remain.

While the eloquence of Ward's argument in his transition from pluralism to theism will be welcomed as a valuable contribution to theistic literature, we may recognize the hazard of staking the fortunes of theism, as Ward would have us do, upon a theory of knowledge which finds it difficult to justify rationally our belief in our fellowmen.

For Royce in his *Problem of Christianity*, as for Ward, the existence of a world of social intercourse is of fundamental importance. The conception of the community is central alike in his interpretation of Christianity and in his construction of the real world. While criticizing the common-sense view of James, Royce admits that we learn the secrets of another's mind "only through his expressive movements",²² but later develops a threefold argument for the social origin of the knowledge of other selves. First, the fundamental cognitive process, says Royce, following Pierce, is not perception nor conception but interpretation, and interpretation is a triadic process. There are two ideas which are compared and interpreted by a third mediating idea. Thus there is needed for knowledge a community of interpretation. But, second, appeal is made to the social character of our knowledge of the physical world. Belief in the reality of the physical world is held to be inseparable from our belief in the reality of a community of interpretation. "For common sense, the physical objects, especially when they appear to us in the field of sight and touch, are regarded as essentially common objects, the same for all men."²³ "The physical world is an object known to the community, and through interpretation."²⁴ The state of

²² Vol. ii, p. 21.

²³ Vol. ii, p. 246.

²⁴ Vol. ii, p. 324.

the case seems to be that we know other minds through their bodies, but can know these bodies only as "common objects", as objects "known to all men".

But the argument for the social origin of knowledge is supplemented by a third consideration. "I postulate your mind, first, because, when you address me, by word or gesture, you arouse in me ideas which, by virtue of their contrast with my ideas, and by virtue of their novelty and their unexpectedness, I know to be not any ideas of my own."²⁵ "The reason, then, for 'postulating your mind' is that the ideas which your words and movements have aroused within me are not my own ideas, and cannot be interpreted in terms of my own ideas."²⁶ It is hard to see how this third argument brings support to the theory of the social origin of the knowledge of other minds. If these ideas excited by my neighbor's gestures are "not my own" merely in the sense that the ideas of a tree or a table or a flash of lightning are not my own, as not due to my own volition, there is, so far, no more reason in the one case than in the other for the postulate of another mind. If, however, these ideas "not my own", excited by my neighbor's bodily movements, are ideas of *his* affection, or interest, or displeasure, then the inference to another mind is made on the common-sense basis of the observed movements of his body. The theory of "social" origin must in this case be modified or there will be no escape from the old circle.

(5) W. E. Hocking would agree with Ward and Royce that the world of knowledge is a common world, but the other knower in his case is not my neighbor nor human society but God. "As it seems to me", he says, "this present World of nature *is* known to me as being, in just this sense, a common World: it seems to me, indeed, that it is not otherwise known—that is, that a knowledge of Other

²⁵ Vol. ii, pp. 319, 320.

²⁶ Vol. ii, p. 322.

Knower is an integral part of the simplest knowledge of Nature itself."²⁷ Again he says, in italics:

*"It is through the knowledge of God that I am able to know men; not first through the knowledge of men that I am able to know or imagine God."*²⁸

Abandoning the cosmological argument for the being of God, Hocking pins his faith to a form of the ontological argument, which "reasons that because the world is not, God is".²⁹ "It is because we cannot infer from nature to God along causal or other natural lines, and only because of this, that the idea of God implies existence."³⁰ Hocking's theistic solution of the problem of the knowledge of other selves is a part of his larger theory that it is only as we bring to experience, as a sort of "concrete a priori" principle, the idea of God that we can have knowledge either of the world or of our fellowmen. By his theistic argument for God as Other Knower, Hocking thus seeks to correct or supplement the theory that knowledge is "social" in its origin, where social is used in its ordinary sense.

(6) The common-sense solution of our problem is that we come to a knowledge of other minds through the observation of their bodies and bodily movements. The argument is well put by Bradley, although he denies reality in the full sense to both body and soul. "I arrive at other souls", he says, "by means of other bodies, and the argument starts from the ground of my own body."³¹ The known connec-

²⁷ *Meaning of God in Human Experience*, pp. 268, 269.

²⁸ Pp. 297, 298.

²⁹ P. 312.

³⁰ P. 313.

³¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 225. In his *Essays on Truth and Reality*, 1914, Bradley says: "The whole Universe is directly aware of itself in each finite centre, but so as not there to be aware of the contents of any other finite centre *as they are experienced immediately by itself within that other centre*. The highest all-embracing experience is never reached in any finite mind. How this is possible, I repeat, is inexplicable" (p. 349 n.). From the standpoint of our discussion, the elements of Bradley's doctrine, allowing for its extreme difficulty, appear to be as follows: The Self cannot be asserted as a reality. There are, however, finite centres; these finite centres reflect the Universe; and the

tion between my thoughts and purposes and my own bodily movements is supposed to hold in the case of the movements of other bodies. Baldwin has shown how closely the knowledge of self, of society and of the physical world are connected. "To get the mental and the social, one must get the trans-subjective also, the physical."³² Again he says: "To deny the trans-subjective reference, while retaining the subjective point of view, therefore, is to cut off the *inter-subjective*—to deny knowledge of other persons or communication with them."³³ In an earlier work Baldwin has said: "The subjective becomes *ejective*; that is, other people's bodies, says the child to himself, have experiences *in them* such as mine has. They are also *me's*; let them be assimilated to my me-copy."³⁴ It is significant that a number of writers accept provisionally the common-sense view of the matter, even where this view is afterward modified in the interest of a metaphysical theory. And the common-sense view will of course gain in prestige to the extent that the other solutions of the problem we have examined are regarded as unsatisfactory.

From our survey of the problem of the knowledge of other selves two corollaries suggest themselves.

I. All systems of idealism which deny the extra-mental reality of body seem to deprive themselves of the only accessible avenue of communication between minds, and thus are threatened with the philosophical bugbear of subjectivism or Solipsism. To say, moreover, that knowledge is a

Universe is probably composed of nothing beside these finite centres (with no marginal content in the absolute Experience). Each finite centre, however, while reflecting the Universe so composed, has no means of knowing that its neighboring centre exists. Bradley appreciates the difficulty, and adds to the note already quoted: "I fully understand that the logical result of applying here an 'Either—or', is either a denial of any self or else an assertion of Solipsism, whichever of these alternatives you please. But I do not see how it can be right to suppose that I accept either of these alternatives" (p. 349 n.).

³² *Genetic Theory of Reality*, p. 183.

³³ P. 182.

³⁴ *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, 4th ed., 1906, p. 14.

social product, or that "the validity of knowledge is finally social", does not meet the difficulty, but raises the previous question: How do we come, then, to the knowledge of society? There is no doubt that the emergence of the problem of the existence and knowledge of other selves has placed the dominant idealism rather on the defensive. If we reduce bodies to states of consciousness, there is no medium of communication between minds. It is not surprising that Realism, even if it has been often refuted, as Ward maintains, has been emboldened by the situation to utter in a very audible whisper its *E pur se muove*.

2. The knowledge of other selves is bound up closely not only with the knowledge of the world, but with the knowledge of God. If it is true that "Solipsism necessarily denies validity to the principle of causation",³⁵ the converse is true, namely, that the inference we make to the existence of other minds depends upon that principle. If causation be reduced to mere customary sequence in the phenomenal series, then the other selves are not reached, as they lie beyond or below the series of sense-impressions. But if a real cause be recognized in the self, to account for the expressive movements of the body, then the way may be open to apply the principle of causation more widely in the metaphysical sphere. If my own self and my neighbor's self are regarded as real and as real causes, then the causal inference may possibly be extended so as to issue in a cosmological argument, in which an Infinite Cause could be substituted for an infinite series of phenomenal causes. The study of the problem of other minds might thus lead to a cosmological argument instead of to the form of ontological argument which Hocking has adopted.

The existence of other minds is sometimes spoken of as a postulate which "works well", but it is surely more than a methodological postulate, true or useful for some purposes but not true for others. These other selves have, at any rate, as secure a standing in reality as anything finite can

³⁵ W. McDougall, *Body and Mind*, p. 134.

have. If a postulate, their existence is a postulate of the metaphysical order, and the question recurs as to the reason for making such a postulate.

The extreme "behaviorists" in psychology may seek to escape the problem altogether by abandoning the introspective standpoint and reducing consciousness to a relation between physical objects and the nervous system. Such an escape, however, is scarcely possible; for any body of knowledge, such as the behaviorist psychology, implies a knower, and surely, again, I am not the only knower in the universe.

The distinction between body and mind, made in the common-sense solution of our problem, may be called dualism; but it need not be a crass dualism, if the physical order is regarded as the medium of communication between minds. The primacy of the spirit may be maintained. We may still believe that

... of the soul the body form doth take;
For soul is form, and doth the body make;

and we need not be unsympathetic toward the poetic interpretation of nature, nor blind to the spiritual aspects of existence.

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WM. HALLOCK JOHNSON.

CHRISTIAN UNITY, CHURCH UNITY, AND THE PANAMA CONGRESS

Christian unity has always been the dream and hope of multitudes of fervent souls of every evangelical family. Of late we hear much more of Church unity, and "Reunion" still more definitely expresses the thoughts of many hearts. These three terms are closely related to each other, but by no means identical, and their *differentia* needs to be clearly kept in mind. Church unity may or may not be a help to Christian unity. That depends on many circumstances, and Reunion prematurely, unwisely, or unspiritually attempted may mar or destroy both Christian unity and Church unity. Nevertheless as long as Christians are Christian they will aspire to a higher and yet higher manifestation of their essential unity in spirit and aim, and a more satisfying expression of that unity in life. It has always been so: it always must be so. The impulse to true unity is a gift of the Holy Ghost. To deny its right would be to deny God Himself,—Himself the sublimest unity, all the more marvellous that His is a Tri-unity. Our Lord's so oft-quoted prayer, "that they all may be one even as we are one," evidently rests back upon the deep essential hypostatic distinctions in the God-head to which no mere Modalism can do justice. Their diversity makes their unity glorious and ineffable. Christ is not speaking directly here of anything but a unity of persons. We may draw the conclusion that if such a unity exists in the Church which is His body, it will manifest itself in due time appropriately; but we are to seek a unity of persons rather than of organizations.

There is nothing in these thrice sacred words of our Redeemer's last prayer which requires us to treat unity of external organization as primary or essential to the oneness for which He prayed; or makes the sin of

schism consist in separate organizations of Christians, or in the number of these organizations. There is a crass mechanical way of applying our Lord's wonderful words and the deep and mysterious principles which they enshrine that mars their beauty. "An enforced, external, deceptive unity, is far from being the thing spoken of here," so Rudolph Stier comments. "That they all may be one" does not mean one in error of doctrine or of life, but oneness in truth and holiness. This fundamental principle we can never safely ignore.

Every public step taken toward the attainment of a higher unity among believers should and does stir the hearts of all true Christians. The Panama Congress has, therefore, rightly evoked sympathetic attention everywhere, following, as it has, and with a certain genetic connection, the Edinburgh Conference held in 1910. It has called forth keen criticism, especially from the Roman Catholic Church, and also from those who are only partly in sympathy with the dogmatic and ecclesiastical peculiarities of historical Protestantism. We who stand fast on the ancient foundations must not be cold-hearted toward the obvious good that comes out of such a meeting, but we ought not to be indifferent to the defects and dangers of such a movement as it represents. On the contrary, desire for real unity and faith that in the end Christ Himself will bring His people into the oneness for which He prayed should make us at once appreciative of the good, but rightly critical of any weakness.

What is said in the following discussion is based mainly upon the printed "Reports of the Eight Commissions" as presented to the Congress, the "Daily Bulletins" issued in Panama for the Congress and the personal memoranda and recollections of the writer. In addition, by the courtesy of the Reverend Doctor Frank K. Sanders, chairman of the committee having in charge the editing of the Reports, the writer has been permitted to have a cursory glance at the advance proof of *Renaissant Latin America: a History*

and Interpretation of the Congress by the Reverend Doctor Harlan P. Beach of Yale University—a vivid and masterly narration. Dr. Beach as one of the leaders of the Congress naturally praises its whole conception, course and probable future influence. His glowing pictures of the delights of Christian fellowship and the frankness and sincerity of Christian love are not exaggerated nor could the general value of its proceedings be questioned though he seems to look at everything *couleur de rose*.

It is easy to say good of such a Congress. It goes against the grain to say anything else. Three hundred missionaries and missionary-spirited men and women, gathered together for prayer and conference as to the things dearest and most sacred, create at once an atmosphere of blessing for all who are privileged to sit with them. Some of them were veterans; some recognized leaders; all felt the kindling touch of brotherhood in the great undertaking for Christ and His Church. The ships that bore most of them became oratories of prayer and holy counsel, going and coming. On our own ship it was not thought best to have many public meetings, but in little groups in the cabins the delegates gathered night after night; not only delegates to the Congress, but Spanish Americans, not Protestants in faith, were drawn into the current and met with us. On the last night in the writer's stateroom, one or two of them spoke fervently of their sympathy and interest.

Bishop Lloyd, who stopped at Jamaica en route, brought a message to the Congress, and we trust a blessing, from the venerable Roman Catholic Archbishop of the West Indies. In the social and official courtesies with which members of the Congress were greeted similar signs were not wanting that among Catholic laymen particularly there was a friendly disposition and a willingness to listen; though on the other hand the Bishop of Panama made his attitude of antagonism very definite in public addresses and official warnings to his people.

The place of meeting contributed, just as Dr. Beach says, no little to its charm. Panama is a thing of beauty and ought to be a joy forever to Americans. Its tropical witchery was upon everyone. The very quaintness of the surroundings had its effect. The strange blending of the old and the new régime added piquancy—for instance, the radio station planted almost “on a peak in Darien” (the actual name of one of the Panama Railroad stations) touched the imagination as with an electric shock.

Out of all this came inspiration, comfort, fellowship, and power to every one, even to those who felt compelled, here and there, to dissent decidedly from some of the methods employed, and even more deeply from certain of the principles which, consciously or unconsciously, seemed to be dominant.

The Congress met at the Pacific end of the Canal,—which thing is an allegory. Its tone from beginning to end was irenic. Even when brethren disagreed, they disagreed as brethren; mutual forbearance was the rule. It might almost be said that what dissonances there were rather added in the end to the harmonies, as by a musical law. The causes producing these harmonies were various. There was a general desire to avoid strife, and a particular shrinking from strife with Romanists. A first plunge into the tropics has a relaxing effect. Spanish courtesy is infectious, and softens the asperities of debate. Of the two hundred and thirty delegates (not counting the visitors), a considerable number were women. This sometimes prevents men from going to extremes. Nor should we forget the deeper reason: The Spirit of God is a Spirit of peace and unity.

Dr. Robert E. Speer, who, though not formal President, was the Chairman of most of the sessions and was the real “Moderator”, has a personality gracious and lovable. Dr. Mott was his “Coadjutor Bishop”, as chairman of the “Business Committee” which was, according to Dr. Beach, “the real heart of the organism.” He was scrupulously

regardful of the comfort and rights of all, under the rules, and when moot points were raised, he took no advantage of the extraordinary powers confided to him by these rules. Nevertheless, there were very sharp and decided differences of judgment manifest in the Congress. They found at times open expression on the floor.

A considerable number of missionaries and others, some of the first rank, did not like the manner in which the preparations of the Conference had been managed and still retained a conviction that the Edinburgh Conference had shirked its duty as to Romanism by excluding them from full participation in its discussions. Along with them there was a still more important body of native ministers in Latin America who felt dissatisfied, and said so, and said further that many of their brethren would not come at all for that reason. They were probably not much mollified by the methods of procedure adopted by the Congress. The personnel of the Business Committee, the officers of the Congress, and the scope of their powers were all pre-determined by a Committee of Arrangements in New York. It is true that these were submitted *pro forma* to the Congress for its ratification, but this was done at the close of the first session in the latter end of a hot afternoon, under circumstances which made opposition or even question difficult, if not impossible. Serious objection was evidently not expected.

By these arrangements no man or woman could offer any motion or amendment whatever on the floor of the Congress. It must first be offered to the Business Committee, and only the consent of two-thirds of the Committee of twenty-five (picked out in advance in New York) could bring it to the floor. Nor was the Business Committee required to report at the end of the Congress what papers or proposals had been submitted to it and rejected. A proposal to require this was rejected. There were at least three papers of importance presented which were

thus decently buried in Committee, and the fact of their rejection never reported to the Congress.

The admirable and much beloved Chairman of the Congress was given final power to decide every question of order without appeal to the House. Only his unique personal attractions made this even tolerable. To compensate for it, discussion was encouraged. The records of what was said in criticism or opposition will be part of the records of the Congress, and will so far modify the attitude of the body.

Then another singular provision must be mentioned. The eight long Reports of Commissions, referred to above, were presented. These Commissions consisted of about twenty-five persons each, scattered widely, who for a year or more past have been preparing their reports. Without discussing the methods pursued by them privately, the reports all printed, making something like 800 pages of a fair-sized book, absorbed most of the time of the Congress during its business sessions. The chairman of each Commission, or whoever he selected, had forty-five minutes to defend their position and "findings"; but all other speakers were limited to seven minutes, which as time lessened became five or less. They had also to signify in writing their intention of speaking by two o'clock in the afternoon of the day previous. This killed real debate. A man might ask to speak in the course of the debate, in writing, but it was left with the chairman to decide whether he should speak or not! The chairman did his part fairly and wisely under this monstrous rule, which annulled all ordinary parliamentary usage. The best things in any discussion are often said on the spur of the moment, and by men too modest to ask a day ahead for the privilege of speaking.

When all these particulars are stated, nine men out of ten would say what has been said very sharply since the Congress adjourned, that it was a clear case of the "steam roller". Considered as a method governing a large body, the steam roller has the merit of quick despatch of

business and the easy suppression of cranks. The spirit and intention of this procedure was far removed from unbrotherly discourtesy. On the contrary, the steam roller was managed with such courtesy, gentleness, and skill, that it was almost a pleasure to be thus rolled over. Dr. Speer and Dr. Mott both did all in their power to make the process agreeable. One felt in the air a vague spiritual chloroform. Those known to disagree with the Business Committee were invited to sit with it and given full liberties of debate. But usually nothing came of it. What was to be done was virtually settled in advance by "the real heart of the organism." A Roman Catholic visitor might have smiled to see these Protestants or "Evangelicals" apparently adopting a thoroughly Papal method of procedure and wondered whether it was intended as a compliment to Rome. It was all the more striking that the bone of contention in the Congress really was just this: should or should not the Congress say something definite as to the relation between Protestantism and Romanism, and if so, what should it say?

Dr. Alvaro Reis, an eminent Brazilian minister, appealed to the Congress, as Dr. Beach notes, to define its attitude. The three papers referred to were all on this subject. One was by a Brazilian of eminence; one by the Secretary of an important Mission Board; one by the present writer. The Congress, or rather the Business Committee, decided that it would be better to say nothing as a Congress on this subject, or on any other, with a single important exception as to the arrangements for carrying out the ideas of the Congress. One cannot help wondering whether the *raison d'être* of these days of expensive inaction was not chiefly that it was thought by the Business Committee that it would be better not formally to adopt even the "Findings" of the Commissions, than run any risk of having to face the question of Romanism and take some action as a Congress. Let it be said that there is some precedent for the un-democratic, un-American, un-Protestant character of the method of

procedure above outlined, but it takes more than precedent to justify what is always inherently wrong. The fact that this, or something worse was done at Edinburgh, does not either justify or sanctify it. The Congress threw away its proper opportunity to say, not with bitter vituperation, but with calm, grave simplicity and strength, what ought to have been said not only as to Romanism, but as to rationalism. They are the twin evils which we confront in Latin America to-day. The Congress, as a whole, said nothing about either. It was an army without a flag or a bugle.

The Reports are full of interesting and valuable information carefully collated by those who presumably were most competent to gather the facts bearing on the subject. Though not formally adopted, they are issued to the Christian world under circumstances which must give them a certain modified authority as representing the general feeling on the part of the leaders of the Conference. Missionaries, Mission Boards, Churches and even denominations are all advised that these Reports and Findings have been prepared by a body of experts who have spent a year or two over them at great expense and with much earnest prayer accompanying the process; so that the Commissions are persuaded naturally of the soundness of their own judgments and reasonings, and they are quite sure they are in accord with the best spirit of the best men of to-day, and especially that they fall in with the generally prevalent current that sets toward a higher unity. Dr. Beach glows with enthusiasm over it.

"Indeed the Congress was permeated with the *Zeitgeist* and tingled with the *Geistesdrang* of this epochal-period in the evolution of the missionary enterprise. It was the rich air of recent advance in the science of missions and burned with the ardor which the impelling spirit of Unity and Co-operation is imparting in these latter days."

All this sounds so convincing that a man who cannot lay claim to be an expert finds it easiest to acquiesce,

smothering any misgivings he may have as to the definite value of what is so ably and devoutly written. As a matter of fact, though not of form, the findings and, to a large degree, the argument of these reports were evidently intended by the leaders to have the weight of the body behind them, though the body was not allowed to vote "yes or no." It was said by a noted leader of the Congregational Churches in a former generation, as Dr. Beach will recall, that "the advice given by a Congregational Council, though not binding, was advice that was meant to be taken." So it was here.

No one could sit through the Conference and carry away any other impression than that the conclusions reached were not to be lightly set aside, but bore a kind of general *imprimatur*, somewhat as the finding of a grand jury does to a petit jury. There was "a case" and a "true bill"—a very effective way to get a thing done.

On the last day of the session, the Business Committee proposed a series of resolutions re-constituting and enlarging the Committee on Co-operation in Latin America. The Sixth Section reads as follows:

"That the American and Canadian Section should take steps as promptly as possible to give effect to the findings of the various Commissions in the light of the discussions of the Congress, so far as the co-operation of the missionary agencies of the United States and Canada is concerned."

"To give effect to the Findings" certainly means that these Findings were to be treated as possessing the weight and obligation coming from so distinguished and expert a body of men and women; but these Findings were not voted on and under the rules could not be adequately and properly discussed.

Such a "Continuation Committee" and the powers with which it is clothed foreshadow a missionary policy for the churches. It must, of course, be submitted, to the Mission Boards, but the members of these Boards will find it difficult, not having been present themselves, and

not knowing Latin America as the experts who framed the Commission reports claim to know it, to draw back, or even hesitate, about agreeing to what is proposed. The net result of it all is that we have here a Congress which, while it passes no Acts, makes its mind so emphatically and explicitly known that it will be pretty certain to have its mind become the rule or custom. Custom is stronger sometimes than law.

Then let it be borne in mind that the Panama Congress was not the first of its kind, but one of a large number of Congresses and Conferences, some local, some general. The chief of them was the Edinburgh Conference in 1910. The spirit and method of this extraordinary convocation has been vigorously pushed forward under the guidance of "a Continuation Committee" with Dr. Mott as Chairman. Under him eighteen Sectional and three National Conferences, twenty-one in all, were held in India, China and Japan in 1912-1913. The purpose of these Conferences is clearly stated in the introduction of the massive volume *The Continuation Committee Conferences in Asia* as follows:—"To carry forward the investigations begun by the Commissions [of the Edinburgh Conference] and to preserve and extend the atmosphere and spirit of the Conference."¹ The discussions of this Conference, we are further informed, were "based upon a syllabus of important questions prepared by the Chairman of the Continuation Committee in consultation with secretaries of the Mission Boards, with members of the Continuation Committee and its Special Committees and by correspondence with missionaries and native leaders." It will be seen that this method was a very effective one for securing the purpose aimed at. It gave to Dr. Mott and his coadjutors immense power to shape the findings of the Conferences in a manner accordant with what they conceived to be the best results of the Edinburgh Conference. The findings

¹ *The Continuation Committee Conferences in Asia* published by the Chairman of the Continuation Committee, 1913.

of each Conference, we are further told, should be regarded as an attempt to express the general opinion of those present. "In some cases they are the result of an endeavor to summarize the discussions; in other cases they represent the deliberations of a committee which were accepted by the conference." Such a method puts still more power into the hands of the Committee. Then follows this significant sentence: "While some of the findings do not represent as advanced ground as certain delegates desired to take, they are very significant as indicating the extent to which the leaders of the various bodies were willing to go together." "As a rule, however, they reflect" the report continues, "the unanimous judgment of those present." That is, the "Unity" movement has its Right wing, Left wing, and "Middle of the Road", but all move in the same direction.

After dwelling on the eminence and ability of the missionary leaders who were present, it is finally declared: "This lends great weight to their conclusions and *possibly even greater than were these the official deliverances of legislative and ecclesiastical bodies.*" [Italics ours.]

The great value of many of the detailed suggestions on the immense variety of subjects included in the findings of these Committees ought not to blind us to the fact that we have here a genuine imperium in imperio, a wonderfully constructed piece of quasi-ecclesiasticism erected in the very midst of the ordinary ecclesiastical machinery which is supposed to control Missions and Missionary-made Churches. It indirectly has a powerful effect on the Churches from which these Missions originally proceeded. It is all of the more effective as its true character is not avowed and we believe is not thoroughly realized by its projectors and promoters. It is a growth, the inevitable effort of a certain tendency in missionary activity, a *Geistesdrang*, as Dr. Beach says. Its final effect, if consistently carried out, is the reshaping and reorganizing of all Missions which accept its spirit and method based on one com-

prehensive general principle, namely interdenominational co-operation leading toward and in many cases distinctly aiming at the attainment of Church unity as distinguished from the more general concept of Christian unity in the older usage of that term. This comes out very clearly in the reports, first, of Commission Number VIII on Co-operation and the Promotion of Unity, and even more clearly in the subsequent reports of the twenty-one Conferences above named.

It is difficult to speak with entire confidence indeed, as to exactly in what degree external unity is meant. There is no precise definition of it. We must ascertain it by the general and habitual usage of those who urge it; and they are not perfectly at one among themselves. Nevertheless it is pretty plain that for the most part the Continuation Committee's ideal begins with Co-operation, continues with Federation and ends with Unification. It aims to bring first the missionary organizations at work in the field and then the churches which they represent into some kind of strange huge organism, which all shall recognize as supreme.

"Anon out of the earth a fabric huge
Rose like an exhalation."

In the account of the Peking Conference (page 275) we read: "We hold that the Church is the body of Christ and Christ the Head of the Church, that the Church is divine, universal and one; and that therefore the Chinese Christian Church (including all branches of the Church) may claim a share in these characteristics. There is at this time in the Chinese Christian Church a strong tendency towards unity, and federation is regarded as the first step in that direction." This plainly means that organic unity is the goal to which everything in China ought to shape itself. The principle that underlies this is incapable of limitation. If it is true in China why is it not true everywhere else? "The forthcoming National Conference at Shanghai is asked to pay special attention to the subject

of the Chinese Christian Church, so as to pave the way for the summoning of a National Council of Churches" (page 276). Accordingly when this Conference met, a China Continuation Committee being duly organized, the several steps which ought to be taken are enumerated as follows:

(1) "The uniting of Churches of similar ecclesiastical order planted in China by different Missions.

(2) The organic union of Churches which already enjoy inter-communion in any particular area, large or small.

(3) Federation, local and provincial, of all Churches willing to co-operate in the extension of the kingdom of God.

(4) The formation of a National Council of the Churches in accordance with plans which the Continuation Committee of this Conference (see under Co-operation) shall devise if it deems such a Council necessary.

(6) The fresh study by all Christians of the faith and order held by those who differ from them, in order to promote cordial mutual understanding; and the holding of local conferences from time to time for the discussion of the important subject of Christian unity.

(7) Prayer in public and in private for the whole Church of Christ, with confession of our sins against one another, and intercession for the growth of unity."

The implication in all of this is that we must confess ourselves sinners if we do not agree not merely to seek unity such as Christ desired but the kind of unity herein prescribed. From this the *Geistesdrang* of the whole movement is clear. It is, so our guides say, the universal Christian duty to labor and pray for that particular of unity which is fostered and brought about by Federation leading up toward and finally consummated in Organic Union. The best way to accomplish this is evidently thought to be to co-operate with the Continuation Committee of the Edinburgh Conference, form similar Continuation Committees in every country with a prolific brood of Sub-Committees bewildering in number and variety, all having

the common purpose of piloting us along a well smoothed way symbolized by the magic word "Co-opt," a significant term, the hall-mark of the Unity movement.

It would be very easy to cite from unofficial documents and treatises not only these but much more extreme expressions of this common purpose. The argument for it is stated with great vivacity and vigor by Dr. Arthur Judson Brown in his treatise on *Unity and Missions*. Dr. Brown's many and admirable services to the Presbyterian Church and to the whole Church of Christ entitle whatever he writes to the most careful consideration. His book is summed up on the title page in the sub-title "Can a Divided Church Save the World?" by which is meant, as his book clearly shows, that organic union, and that right early, is a pressing duty (page 280). This may be taken as a somewhat extreme form of a very widespread feeling. The fire was fanned into a flame by the Edinburgh Conference and the Continuation Committee, of which Dr. Brown is a leading member. His position is a radical one. "The normal expression of Unity is Union" (page 78). "It is easy to use spiritual unity as a bandage for the sore of dis-union." "The popular logomachy which splits hairs between unity and union" (page 77). He ridicules (page 81) those who believe that the prayer of Christ that His disciples might be one is consistent with denominational separations by telling of a little girl who asked her mother "If Jesus didn't mean what He said, why didn't He say what He meant!"—the *enfant terrible* at her worst.

The Panama Congress had for its expressed purpose doing in Latin America what the Edinburgh Conference did elsewhere. The same principles, method and general spirit governed it. Many of the same persons were its recognized leaders, but they faced some peculiar difficulties. The Edinburgh Conference had excluded from participation in its proceedings missionaries in Roman Catholic countries, except those laboring among pagan Indians. The chief, but unavowed reason for this, as is perfectly well

known, was the opposition to such Missions felt by high Anglicans who recognize the "Bishop of Rome" as rightly ministering to the Latin American countries as part of his See. This at once raises an ecclesiastical and theological question. The Edinburgh Conference had laid down as one of its unalterable laws, that the Continuation Committee "should from the beginning be precluded from handling matters which are concerned with the doctrinal or ecclesiastical differences of the different denominations." The preliminary preparations for the Congress raised some very delicate questions and created no small confusion and uncertainty as to what might be expected. The Committee having the Congress in charge issued various Bulletins more or less in agreement with each other. The invitations sent out in advance from New York declared "that while frankly facing moral and spiritual conditions in Latin America, the purpose of the Congress was to recognize all the elements of truth and goodness in any form of religious faith. Our approach to the people shall be neither critical nor antagonistic, but inspired by the teachings and example of Christ", and a further paragraph welcomed "the co-operation of any who are willing to co-operate in any part of the Christian programme." This was followed with the specific declaration, underscored as follows, that "*all communions or organizations which accept Jesus Christ as Divine Saviour and Lord, and the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament as the Revealed Word of God, and whose purpose is to make the will of Christ prevail in Latin America, are cordially invited to participate in the Panama Congress, and will be heartily welcomed.*"

The writer was informed at headquarters that the document containing these declarations was sent to one of the official Roman Catholic organizations. Though unaccompanied, indeed, by any letter, this was enough to show the attitude officially taken toward the Roman Catholic Church. Many missionaries and others drew back and it

looked at one time as if the Congress might never assemble, especially when the Bishop of Panama and, under his instigation, the Governor of the Republic of Panama turned an unfriendly face toward it. Some missionaries refused to go; others went feeling unwilling, if the meeting was to be held, not to be present and do what they could to make the most and best of it. So when the Congress met the whole question of Church Unity and the metes and bounds of proper and profitable co-operation between churches was raised in an acute form. We must recognize with a measure of sympathy the difficulty of the situation. Some errors the Congress made were very natural errors. Protestants do not agree wholly among themselves as to all the points to be made against Rome. It is well known that the High Church party in Episcopal churches regard the Bishop of Rome with a courtesy, which he scarcely can be said to reciprocate, and do this in spite of his assumption of powers and prerogatives which they do not concede to him. The great body of Protestants find much more serious grounds of protest. What is and what ought to be the general Protestant attitude toward Romanism? Was its historical attitude a colossal blunder? Is there any need for emphasizing its principles and practices now in Latin America? What changes of relationship, if any, are needed between the existing Protestant bodies in order to make a South American campaign effective? Should we throw down denominational lines altogether and make one great comprehensive Protestant or "Evangelical" Church? What kind of a creed, polity, cultus will such a Church if organized have and hold? What guarantees can we give to believers in the doctrines of grace and devout lovers of the Bible as an infallible book that the plagues of modern Protestant Rationalism will not be added to the plague of Roman Ritualism in the newly planted churches, or in the "unified" church such as Dr. Brown so stoutly argues there ought to be. In a word,

Protestant Christendom came fairly face to face on that

"Narrow neck of land,
"Twixt two unbounded seas"

with the whole matter of the unity of Christ's Church in the peculiar environment of Latin America. It was "proved with hard questions."

In answering such questions large powers were put into the hands of a comparatively few persons who shaped the general policy for the whole body of co-operating churches in a given direction, just as the Edinburgh Conference did. The Panama Congress thus became a spoke in the wheel, a wheel revolving with ever increasing momentum in the direction of unity, not unity in the broader sense but in the narrower and more technical sense of an organic unification of Protestant Christendom, with re-union with Rome as possible in the future. Formal proof of this statement would require us to traverse with great care the reports of the Eight Commissions and especially their "Findings"; but their general tenor is unmistakable.

The Congress was followed by Regional Conferences at strategic points in South America in which the ideas, spirit and aim dominant at Panama were still further pushed forward at meetings of missionaries and native ministers. Whether these Regional Conferences disclosed general acquiescence in the Panama programme, it would be hard to say. There certainly was not unanimous approval. In some places there was sharp opposition, notably at Buenos Aires. It is probable that a majority of those who attended the Regional Conferences, were deeply impressed not only with the excellent spirit which prevailed, as to which there could be no question, but with the general plan that was put before them. The point that should be kept clear and plain is that, whatever the intrinsic merits of the programme outlined for South America, the method by which it is to be attained is dangerous, not likely to reach real unity and quite likely to check real co-operation.

This might not be the case if the only questions to be settled were questions of detail as to method, such matters as delimitation of missionary territory with a view to economy, medical missions, language study, school arrangements for missionaries' children, woman's work, printing reach real unity and quite likely to check real co-operation. and that of great usefulness; but intertwined with this and underlying it as a governing principle is the steady, settled determination that the trend consciously given to whole co-operation arrangement is Unity first; Doctrine, Order, Worship, second. Theological dogma as such is to "take a back seat" to use the vulgar idiom. Ecclesiastical government is a minus quantity. The plus quantity is the Continuation Committee raised to the *n*th power. We must first insist upon organic union on the mission field as necessary for the effective evangelization of the world "in this generation"—or thereabouts—and then the Mission Boards at the "Home Base" and finally the Churches themselves must be held up to an acceptance of this prospectus under penalty of being accounted hinderers of the kingdom or even as resisting the manifest presence of the Spirit of God. In the Report on Co-operation and Unity, we are told "that to seek these things" [co-operation and the promotion of unity] "is the chief reason for this Congress. The other Commissions therefore prepare the way for this ultimate aim." This is quite correct. It was preceded by a sharp criticism on the Boards and Societies which hitherto have been charged with the organizing and erecting of Christian Missions for not sooner realizing this duty. The Missions are next criticised for the same sin and their co-operation with the Roman Catholic Church is declared to be a thing to be at least considered and it is definitely stated that the Commission does not recognize that the mission of the evangelical forces at work in Latin America involved an attack on any other form of Christian faith there existent. What can this mean except that we are not at liberty to criticise the false

doctrines taught by the Church of Rome? It will be noticed that the term "Protestant" is carefully avoided throughout the whole literature of the Congress and "Evangelical" is substituted even where its use is misleading or absurd. We are disposed to think that this change will not be as satisfactory to Roman Catholics as the older term as it implies their unevangelical character.

It ought not to be approved by Protestants for it makes us appear before Romanists ashamed of the name, if not the thing. We have another *usus loquendi* for "Evangelical". Protestant is the historic, natural and correct description of what such a Congress ought to be. If it was not a Protestant Congress, it ought not to have been held. It is one of those straws which show how the wind blows. The whole temper of the rulers and leaders of the Congress was to touch far too lightly on Protestant affirmations. No doubt there were many reasons for this. The discussions which had gone on within the Protestant Episcopal Church, of which the religious and even secular press was quite full, showed that the honored representatives of that body who attended might be much embarrassed by any other course; the high esteem in which they were and are held by everybody made everybody shrink from what would be embarrassing to them. Still further, there is a large body of dissatisfied Catholic laymen in Latin America, whom it is desirable not to drive away. A plausible case can easily be made for what was done. but when all is said that can be said, the fact remains that the chief thing that ought to take us to South America is that we may boldly and effectively repeat in proper form and with due adaptation to the precise situation the very same wholesome and salutary doctrines which our Roman Catholic opponents deny, and with wisdom and discretion to point out clearly and unmistakably the false doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church. This was not done with anything like the thoroughness that ought to have been done. It is of no avail to plead that this was not a

Congress of theologians but was called for practical purposes of missionary administration. Missionary administration involves here ecclesiology and theology.

A careful reading of the Report of Commission No. 2 on "Message and Method" will show that the Council through its Commission did attempt to deal with the Roman Catholic Church by name, giving a very enlightening historical study of Roman missions in Latin America, their origin and progress, and citing with great force and point (Chapter II) "relevant facts in Latin American civilization" in which racial complexity, the Latin character and temperament and other kindred matters are ably treated. There is even a chapter, and an admirable one as far as it goes, on the "Aim and Message of the Evangelical Churches". We are thankful for it and have no disposition to detract from its aim and spirit, but it was not adopted by the Congress, and even if it had been, there are omissions which are grave omissions. Its advice against direct and controversial public attack upon the worship of the Virgin is good advice for many a preacher who must conciliate, but the time comes when he cannot conciliate and be faithful, and in such a gathering as this, which, however it originated, was publicly recognized as a Protestant "demonstration in force," more was needed. Not only the worship of the Virgin, but the whole Papal claim in its roots and essence should have been met and the supremacy of the Bible as the only infallible rule of faith and practice should have been asserted far more powerfully than it was. This could have been done with a full recognition of the loyalty of the Roman Church to many of the great fundamentals of the common faith. The failure to do it was doubtless due to the prevailing disposition to avoid controversy as likely to interfere with the atmosphere in which unity of the kind now desiderated will come about. A still more serious omission, due to the same cause, was the weak and temporizing manner in which the burning question of the day among Protestants is dealt with. The vast majority

of the Congress would have been outraged by any open attack on the historical truthfulness of the Bible; yet the Report just cited in Chapter V has one of those ambiguous and delicately phrased intimations that the old view of the Bible may be set aside, in part at least, if we are to meet modern needs. It is too long to be quoted in full. It quotes Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible* and his *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels* as giving the student "constant help in his effort to present reasonable, modern and constructive arguments for the authority of the Bible and especially of the New Testament, and for its complete trustworthiness concerning the person and work of Christ, the nature and claims of the Gospel of the grace of God." A little earlier the Bible is spoken of as the "Word of God" with the apparent purpose of intimating by the quotation marks that it is simply current usage, not necessarily the conviction of the writers. The New Testament is trustworthy, so the argument runs, concerning the person and work of Christ and the nature and claims of His Gospel but the implication is that it is not necessarily trustworthy about other things; and we find in an earlier chapter on "The Aim and Message of the Evangelical Churches" (Chapter iii) another paragraph on the Bible in which "the modern view" seemed to be still more delicately and suggestively intimated. "Nothing which is declared by Christ to be necessary for salvation can be added to or detracted from, by any other authority, without a deep injury being done to the human soul, and a deep wrong to its eternal interests. Used in this sane, historical and spiritual way, the Bible can become to the preacher and his hearers an unfailing source of power in the delivery of a penetrating and constructive message." We wish to do no injustice. It is not quite clear what is meant; but if we are in the least familiar with the modern controversies about the Bible we know too well what is meant by such phrases as "this sane historical and spiritual way" and "this reasonable modern and constructive argument." They

embody usually the corner-stone of the "modern view" that the Bible is only partly true and that criticism must determine for us what part of it we may believe and what we must disbelieve. One of the most eminent members of the Congress in public discussion declared with transparent honesty that we must, in dealing with Latin America, accept the modern view of the Bible and the doctrine of evolution. It was refreshing to hear an honest and able man say just what he meant. Another said more and worse things though in cloudier phrases.

Here then was the situation—an attitude of timidity before the unabated claims of the Roman power, a tolerant, doubtful—with some an approving—attitude to amendments to the Bible proposed by the modern critics. Is this really the message that Latin America needs? Do we propose to nail this thesis upon the Church door as an addition to the ninety-five theses that Luther put there?

This regrettable situation comes about not by direct intention but as part of the modern shrinking from clear and discriminating doctrinal affirmations and from the strange perversion of Christ's high priestly prayer by the assumption that in order to attain unity of external organization we may wrap in a napkin and lay away the Lord's talent of divine truth committed to us. It all falls in with much that is in the highest degree popular. The *Zeitgeist* and the *Geistesdrang* is a compound made up of enthusiasm for missions on the one hand and enthusiasm for a minimized gospel or a false gospel on the other. Dr. Beach speaks with disapproval of "hyper evangelicals". In the Panama dialect this means "Hyper Protestants". But a watered down Protestantism soon ceases to be evangelical.

These questions which were thus imminent and to some extent raised at Panama, are continually attracting wider and wider attention and must lead in their furthest reach to many topics unthought of at first. Two recent books may be mentioned which show this. The one, *An Intro-*

duction to the Study of Efforts at Christian Reunion by A. C. Bouquet, M.A., of Cambridge University, who discusses with great minuteness the history of sects, not only Christian, but in all religions, aiming at a philosophical basis or method for dealing with Christian sects. The bare facts refute much current sophistry. For example, that a divided Christianity is face to face with "united paganism." He shows that the great world religions, for example, have their divisions; Buddhist sects, for instance, variously estimated from thirty-two to ninety-six, so small a body as the Jains having a proportionate number; and Mohammedanism with at least eight principal divisions and minor ones sometimes said to number one hundred and fifty, though this number is exaggerated just as the number of Christian sects is. When the author comes to speak of divisions within the bounds of Christendom he naturally brings forward the celebrated Quadrilateral and dwells with much appreciation upon the work of "Mr. John R. Mott, an American Presbyterian", and of Mr. Silas McBee with his *Constructive Quarterly*, and, equally naturally, upon "The World Conference on Faith and Order", for which he thinks the outlook hopeful. Much in his book can hardly be regarded as more than scaffolding, but the main idea is of great value, viz., that the problem of unity is not to be approached without preparation in a due knowledge of what the history and philosophy of such divisions really is. What is needed, he thinks, is a real comparative study of all Christian institutions, and that this be undertaken with a thoroughly scientific method. "The pace must not be forced. . . . A clumsy touch may postpone the hope of unity for generations" (page 175); and one point often overlooked is made with great force. "A reunion remains but a paper agreement, unless ratified with the overwhelming applause of the congregations involved" (page 176).

From quite a different point of view Principal Forsyth, of Hackney College, London, in *Theology in Church and*

State, enters into an elaborate discussion of the nature of dogma and its relations to theology in Church and State and the bearing of this on unity. Dr. Forsyth's book is written with an embarrassing wealth of definitions and couched in an elaborate rhetoric peculiarly his own which makes it difficult for other minds to follow him; and the present writer would not be able to agree (if he understands) to a great deal that he says, but there is no little that needs to be said just as he says it. "Dogma," he declares, "is something absolutely essential to a church, which cannot live in a viscous religiosity, a mere spirituality". "For a dogma, a final expansive fact, capable of a statement, did create the Church, and is its permanent foundation" (page 10). "The grasp and statement of its fundamental positive dogma is at least as necessary to a church as its worship, its philanthropy, or its missions. But indeed all religion is dogmatic in its nature" (page 11). He admits the unpopularity of theology, and sees weakness for the church and all its works because of it. "Church unity is finally a theological question, and it is the modern theologian or scholar, with his slow eirenic tendency, that is doing most for it. The unity of the Church is a question of its dogma. The Church has but one object in the world—to make believers in that Gospel. But also dogma is a Church question. It has real value only for those supremely concerned for a Church and its unity" (p. 23). "We must not empty the Gospel in order to quickly fill the church" (p. 25). "No church can be defined without reference to doctrine . . . just as I say the churches can not unite and can but partially co-operate without some understanding on that head" (p. 150). "Church unity I keep urging, is a matter of neither common work, nor of common sympathy, but of common belief" (p. 188). "A church that lives upon its sympathies rather than its beliefs; upon sentiment rather than justification has neither power with God nor permanence with man." Here is matter for thought that may well arrest the attention

of those who thoughtfully desire to bring Christians and Christian Churches into the closest possible relation.

Principal Forsyth would have been an immense force for good at the Panama Congress where such ideas were smothered rather than encouraged. Some of his definitions as to the difference between dogma, doctrine, and theology seem over-refined, but much that he writes is profoundly suggestive of the immense and difficult nature of the task which is being undertaken with the best intentions but with no adequate sense of doctrine. We are constantly bidden now-a-days to "think in Continents." How little regard is paid to the great Continents of thought! This was true at Panama. Speaking quite broadly and making due allowance for exceptions, its key-note was unity by minimizing the doctrinal and ecclesiastical differences between the various members of the Protestant group of Churches and on the ground of missionary expediency aiming at the abolition of these differences by largely ignoring them and, with at least a part of the leaders of the Congress, a distinct purpose of doing the same thing as to the graver differences that separate us from Rome. This unity which Dr. Brown and others are demanding is to be brought about not by the orderly process of an approach by the official authorities of each denomination to other churches, but by special "movements" seizing the existing machinery of Foreign Mission Boards and their elaborate subsidiary organizations, and using them for the purpose of bringing about first co-operation and finally organic union by ingenious indirection. First insist on organic union on the great mission fields and then cry out against the conservatism of any Mission Board or any denomination that hangs out against it. It was almost amusing to see the confidence with which brethren disposed of difficulties over which a Luther or a Calvin would have sweat blood. The Anglican communion and its counter-part on this side of the sea, the Confessional Lutheran Churches, the Pan-Presbyterian family, Methodism with its splendid or-

ganization, the Independent, Congregational and Baptist Churches—these are not fungus growths or flowers that bloom in the spring; they are giant oaks, hardy mountain pines, cedars of Lebanon. They have their roots of doctrinal conviction, ordered government, devotional habit. It is hard to see how any one can seriously believe that they can be picked up and clapped together by a Business Committee or a Congress, or a hundred Congresses. Before the goal is reached the people will have something to say about whether they are to give up things which they believe and love with all their hearts because a Continuation Committee or a concatenated jungle of similar Committees imagines that it can be done. One of the most admired of Baptist secretaries declared with burning earnestness: “the tap root of Romanism is infant baptism”, his hand resting almost on the shoulder of an equally esteemed and beloved brother, a Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church, the expression of whose countenance at this startling declaration deserved to be preserved as a souvenir of the Congress. How could these two brethren, no matter how much they love and respect each other, honestly join in conducting a Union Theological Seminary in which Baptism, its nature, mode and subjects could be discussed. The Calvinistic Churches love their Arminian allies as brethren and know well there is much they can learn from them; but how foolish it is to pretend that they are not divided as to some very important questions. It fell to the writer once many years ago to make an address before a Methodist Conference, presided over by a Bishop of great eloquence now passed into the general assembly and church of the first born whose names are written in heaven. His speech to a class of incoming candidates for the ministry was a marvel of eloquence and power—a thing to thank God for; yet, in the midst of it was a paragraph in which he denounced Calvinism as only he could do; but he added “Calvinists are men of intense conviction and they are, therefore, the grandest men on the face of the earth.”

After his Calvinist guest had spoken the Bishop approached him with generous apologies not having known of his presence. It only remained to beg him not to spoil so fine a speech with any apology, but to wish he might come to the next meeting of the General Assembly and deliver the same speech. He asked in surprise "Why?" "Because we have some foolish people in the Presbyterian Church who think there is no difference between Arminianism and Calvinism and you could probably convince them that there is a serious difference."

It may greatly shock some of the loving hearts that were at the Congress to say that some keen discussion of moot points might not have been amiss in the Congress, provided there was room for free discussion and an opportunity to vote without the permission of a Business Committee. Why should not this have been discussed: e.g., by what methods, with what arguments, under what circumstances should missionaries and missionary teachers take up in detail the Bible doctrine of the Virgin Mary and its counterfeit in Roman Catholic Theology? The Worship of Saints, False Miracles, Purgatory, the Seat of Authority in Religion, the Right of Private Judgment. Why should not some of these questions have been discussed with a view to missionary efficiency and co-operation. They have the most direct and powerful effect upon all missionary work. The Commission Report, *apropos* of Virgin worship, advised all to "preach the mediation of Christ and false ideas will fall away." Sometimes they will—sometimes they will not. St. Paul argued against errors at great length. An earnest missionary long ago compared preaching the gospel in India to a man who would put something into a keg already filled with nails. The only way is to take the nails out one by one. That which has been drilled into the mind in childhood and is conserved by the usages of the "Holy Mother Church" cannot be disposed of easily. South American manners and courtesy we must learn, but Anglo-Saxon

directness and frankness mixed with it would make a thousand per cent better missionary than one who was always avoiding questions that ought to be faced. The Congress by its whole implication seemed to say to missionaries: "Dodge theological difficulties whenever you can," and now proposes that all the churches shall follow suit and make out that there are no differences worth speaking of between Sacramentarian Apostolic-succession men on the one side, and Presbyterian, Congregational and Methodist men on the other; no difference worth speaking of between Paedo Baptism and Baptist Baptism.

The Reverend Lord William Gascoyne Cecil has some excellent counsel in his book on *Changing China* (page 199) as follows: "There can be no doubt that it would be far better if the Christian Church presented a picture of unity to the whole world. It would be far better if we should all think alike; but if we cannot think alike, it would be a great mistake to seek for unity by encouraging people to suppress their convictions. Unity is very valuable but it can never be so valuable as are truth and honesty." His own ecclesiastical and theological position is no doubt indicated in a further remark: "It is most desirable that China should understand that there is a *Via Media* between Rome and Protestantism." This is *apropos* of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel which, as he says, "represents the *Via Media*." This raises a whole network of questions which the unifiers of Christendom must take account of, all of which were in the background at the Panama Congress. The *Via Media* between Protestantism and Romanism is not the method of unity which would be acceptable to most of us on this side of the Atlantic, but there is a very strong and resolute body of Churchmen who think it the only way, as the columns of religious journals in the Protestant Episcopal Church abundantly show. The Kikuyu incident with its peculiar complication raises the same questions. They are questions that cannot be settled by such congresses. Vigorously

as we should dispute the possibility of unifying Christendom on a *Via Media* basis, we must recognize with profound respect the depth and strength of the convictions which lie back of it with such men as Lord William Cecil and many others whose names will readily occur.

It was great praise when the Methodist Bishop above referred to lauded Calvinists because they were men of conviction. The greatest power on earth, is conviction—no, the second greatest—greater is the power of truth. A man must act on his convictions, but they may be wrong. If it please God to give him the truth, what right has he to enter into pacts with any one on earth that he will suppress the truth, not preach it, cloak it in ambiguous phrases, rob it of any of its power by “weasel words” so that one sentence sucks the life out of its neighbor. This is the thing that we really have to dread in South America, and North America too. It is this lack of conviction of the truth, lack of knowledge of the truth, a half-hearted, shambling paltering habit of mind which is the real foe to unity. Are we to forget what Jesus Himself said in the very prayer that is so often quoted and mis-quoted? “Sanctify them through thy truth: Thy Word is truth.” Let the advocates of spurious unity fasten that verse to the twenty-first “that they may all be one.” Real unity is a divine creation deigning to use human vessels to manifest itself. It will not manifest itself, it will not as the Pragmatists say “work,” except by the truth and in the truth, though sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth. In no other way can Christ’s unity be attained. All other is a counterfeit and base metal. May God give us grace to refuse anything but the coin of the King’s realm! It is argued that we Presbyterians cannot afford to have Theological Schools in which our own doctrines—the magnificent assemblages of sovereign truths which constitute the Calvinistic system—may be taught, because only a few students for the ministry can be secured; that it is cheaper to combine with some one

else. This is glozed over by dwelling on "the sin of wasting the Lord's money". "Buy the truth and sell it not." Its price is above rubies. The backbone of European Romanism was broken by Calvin. Only Calvinism can break Latin American Romanism. Calvin had his allies very near and dear. Blessed be God for Luther and Melancthon and also for Wesley and the evangelical Revival. But John Calvin did establish righteousness and truth in the earth as no one else. His school at Geneva was "the seed plot of modern democracy," as has been so often said; and the theology which he taught the world,—who can dispute its immense power in procuring both civil and spiritual liberty for mankind.

Dr. Beach entitles his books *Renaissant Latin America*. It is an inspiring phrase. But Latin America will not be saved by phrases. By every analogy of faith and history and human nature and Divine grace there will be no spiritual Renaissance in South America save by the faithful and repeated preaching of the doctrines of grace, the very heart and center of the evangelical Gospel. It is a mockery to apply the word "evangelical" to churches whose ministers are to be taught to minimize these doctrines. Of course it is easier—yes, and cheaper—to do less, and the temptation of the hour is to accept something less and to justify it by plausibilities.

The singularity of the situation at Panama consisted in the fact that as never before missionary leaders were face to face with the question both of Romanism and of Rationalism. It is a three-cornered fight that we must fight. The Romanists are our allies in defense of the absolute truth and authority of the whole Bible. They are sound on the Trinity, the Deity of Christ, the work of the Holy Spirit and the supernatural; and we should welcome their aid in resisting naturalism in all its forms. But on other points we must part company with them and not be mealy-mouthed or mealy-minded in saying plainly what we mean about their errors. They will respect us all the more be-

cause we do so. The Roman Catholic Congress which has just adjourned in New York employed no doubtful phrases. They never do; and the encyclicals of the Pope usually have the same merit. We may dissent from them, but we know what we are dissenting from, and that is the prime need of the hour in Panama and in New York. Not in anger or malice or uncharitableness, but with whole-hearted, whole-minded blood earnestness we must speak forth the whole counsel of God. It is always hard to preach the whole counsel of God anywhere in the world. We cannot preach it all at once. Christ Himself could not tell His own disciples at first all that was in His mind, but afterwards He sent His Spirit. "He that hath an ear let him hear what the Spirit saith unto the churches," and all He saith. How does Paul's tone and the burden of his teaching agree with the "pussy-footing" theology of to-day? Overflowing with love and gentleness, how unsparing and unconditional he is. "If any man preach any other gospel than that which I have preached, let him be accursed." The "modern historical view of the Bible" as it is called—an utter misnomer, for it is neither modern nor historical—places us in a peculiarly awkward position about certain important facts and doctrines plainly revealed in the New Testament. We have long maintained an energetic protest against Mariolatry, and particularly against the decree by which, in 1854, the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary was made part of the Gospel. How will it affect our controversy with Rome on this important subject when they find that we not only deny the Immaculate Conception of Mary, but that some among us deny that He was Himself miraculously conceived?

Dr. Beach has a paragraph alluding to a young Japanese Christian at present studying under Dr. Sanday at Oxford, qualifying for special work in Japan. He will meet genuine learning—the ripest scholarship, but will he find in him a fixed faith in Miracles—in the Virgin Birth? The readers of this REVIEW, remembering Dr. Warfield's discussion en-

titled "Kikuyu, Clerical Veracity and Miracles"², will not have forgotten how plain he makes Dr. Sanday's position. Dr. Sanday is a devout scholar; yet, he qualifies, if he does not deny, what the church from the beginning has confessed—"Born of the Virgin Mary". It cannot be necessary to argue here as to how widespread these doubts are and how common is the attitude even of those who believe in it, that it is not necessary to insist upon it. Dr. Arthur J. Brown for instance in *Unity and Missions* (page 94) apparently would not insist on it if a man avowed his belief in the inspiration of the Bible and the sinlessness and divinity of our Lord. If we go to Buenos Aires or Rio Janeiro and proclaim a gospel in which the Virgin Birth is not insisted on as essential, what effect will it have upon our mission work? The situation already exists and will exist more acutely in Latin America. South America has suffered many things from many physicians of the soul and seems nothing better but rather made worse; but it would be worse now to put her into the hands of the Rationalistic doctors, who handling the Word of God deceitfully and masking old infidelity in Bible phrases, will make her last state worse than her first. The Papal invention of the immaculate conception of Mary is bad enough, but not so bad as the dark suspicions that are left hanging around the exquisite infancy narrations; yet, this is what the minimizing, tolerating, compromising mode of missionary administration now so ingeniously advocated must come to. Not only the Virgin Birth, but the resurrection of Christ, the whole round of miracles of the Old and New Testament, the very thing that South America needs, she cannot have under such a régime as it is now proposed to inaugurate.

In answer to all this, it will no doubt be said that it is too bad to awaken old controversies. Dr. Brown takes this tone as did many other unifiers at Panama and elsewhere. Undoubtedly we must be content, things being as they are, to be at times controversialists in South America;

² PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, October, 1914.

controversialists as the Reformers were, as Augustine, as Jesus and His Apostles were, we in a measure must also be; but we must be more than controversialists. We must do other things also. We must study methods, administrative policies, ingenious conventions for facilitating the easy despatch of missionary business, telegraphic codes, joint printing presses under proper safe-guards, a thousand and one valuable, twentieth century devices. Let us make full use of them and be thankful for all, provided they are not so many stalking horses for pushing forward a false ideal and a fictitious practice of unity. With the utmost sincerity we pay our tribute of admiration to Dr. John R. Mott and Dr. Robert E. Speer, our fellow presbyter. May their tribe increase. Dr. Mott's public honors are well deserved. Dr. Speer's praise is in all the churches, so is that of Dr. Arthur J. Browning and a hundred others; but what they now propose is to achieve the impossible. Christ has made it impossible to have unity without the truth and the blessed ministry of the Holy Spirit by and through the truth. Let us be content to walk in His way, and not choose our own paths. Let a great Romanist admonish us

"I loved to choose and see my path; but now
Lead Thou me on."

It is related of Jonathan Dickinson, the first President of Princeton College, that he had for forty years as a neighbor and friend an Episcopal rector, the Reverend Edward Vaughan, who held the views of his own church as to Apostolic Succession, the Sacraments and the like. He and his neighbor were neighborly and loved each other in sincerity and truth, maintaining at the same time and through years controversy over such points. It fell out, so one tradition runs, that they both died on the same day. Dr. Dickinson died first, and when his neighbor and friend was told that he was gone, he exclaimed, "Oh that I had hold of the skirts of Brother Jonathan". It might thus almost be said of them, that lovely and pleasant in their lives

and even in their controversies, in their death they were not divided. Who can doubt that these two faithful ministers came in spite of their disagreements nearer to the unity which the Heavenly Intercessor besought for them because they were faithful each to his conviction of truth,—nearer far than would have been possible if either had concealed from his neighbor or from himself the fact and the seriousness of their doctrinal divergencies. Let all ministers, missionaries, Congresses and Assemblies learn that there is no other road to the best co-operation and the only real Unity than an absolute fidelity to the truth as God gives us to see it, mixed plentifully with humility and brotherly love.

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THE LIFE AND THOUGHT OF PLOTINUS.

In his *Confessions* Augustine relates to Simplicianus, who had succeeded Ambrose as Bishop of Milan, that formerly he had read certain books of the Platonists which Victorinus, a rhetorician of Rome, had translated into Latin. The wise Bishop did not blame him but congratulated him because he had lighted upon the writings of philosophers into which God and his Word had made their way, and not upon those that were full of fallacy and deceit according to the elements of this world. It is practically certain that the works of Plotinus were among these books. Augustine does not mention Plotinus by name in the *Confessions* but there is abundant evidence that his mind and heart were taken captive by this thinker. In his earlier works his enthusiasm vents itself in extravagant language: "That countenance of Plato, the purest and the clearest in philosophy, flashes forth from the dissolving clouds of error brightest in Plotinus."¹ "Among the Platonists I am confident that I shall find at times what is not repugnant to our holy things."² "When I had read a few books of Plotinus [adopting the reading of five MSS in place of "*Platonis*"] and had compared with them the opinion of those who have handed down to us our divine teaching, I so took fire that I was minded to break all my moorings and would have done so if the esteem I had for certain men had not prevented me."³ It is true that later in life he saw more clearly the differences between Platonism and Christianity and expressed himself more restrainedly. "The Platonists see the end of the journey but are ignorant of the way thither."⁴ "They are as men who see a fair fatherland beyond the sea but are too proud to embark on the humble raft that would

¹ *c. Acad.* III 18,41.

² *c. Acad.* III 20,43.,

³ *de B. Vit.* 4.

⁴ *Conf.* VII 27.

bear them to its shores."⁵ But he never lost his regard for Platonism. He acknowledges that to it he owes his deliverance from materialistic pantheism, and it, especially in the form in which Plotinus presents it, influences his thinking to the last.⁶

What then shall we call Plotinus? Philosopher or religious enthusiast? He was both, for otherwise he would never have influenced Augustine as he did. In him there worked with great intensity that religious instinct which is present more or less in all men. Like all instincts it is somewhat blind. But it impels a man sooner or later to think as well as act. For the content of his thought he seizes on what is nearest, assimilates it, deifies it, makes a creed and elaborates a ritual. Happy the man who in such a case is found by Jesus Christ. But Plotinus did not find Christ but Plato. It was a time when the great thoughts of this philosophy were becoming hard and dry, formalized and vulgar. Plotinus, nevertheless, seized eagerly upon it, filled it with the glow and sparkle of his own genius and, making out of it a religion, passed it on to Augustine to lead in Christianity a continued and a better life.

I

In all religious philosophies it is important to know the founder himself. Plotinus was born (although the date is uncertain) in 204 A.D. at Lycopolis in Upper Egypt. From 232 to 242 he studied philosophy in Alexandria. He joined the Emperor Gordianus in his unfortunate campaign against the Persians, in order, so it is recorded, to learn their philosophy. In 244 he is in Rome at the head of a school which became a rallying place for what remained of heathen philosophy. In 270 he died—66 years old. For the details of his life we depend on the delightful biography written by his pupil Malchus, a native Phoenician, whom Plotinus nicknamed Porphyry, the purple-clad—at once a

⁵ *de Trin.* IV 15.20.

⁶ Cf. *The Confessions of Augustine*. Gibb and Montgomery, pp. xxxix seq.

translation of his name and a reminder of his native place. Malchus tells us that Plotinus seemed to be ashamed at being compelled to live in a body. For this reason he never spoke of his origin nor of his parentage. When asked to sit for his picture by Amelius his pupil he gave the characteristic reply: "It is enough to endure this shadow in which nature has enveloped us without leaving to posterity a copy, a shadow of a shadow." The biographer does not disdain the trivial details that add zest to such narratives. Plotinus refused to eat flesh at his daily meals or to employ animal substances as medicine. His eyesight was so weak that he was unable to endure the strain of revising what he had written with such toil and trouble. His handwriting was very poor and he paid no attention to spelling, concentrating, as Porphyry is careful to add, all his attention on the thought. Sometimes his thoughts came to him so rapidly that he was able to write them down as if transcribing them out of a book, while at the same time such was his power of concentration that he was able to carry on a conversation. So enamored was he of philosophic reflection that he begrudged the time given to sleep and curtailed it as much as possible. His house was always full of boys and girls and the noise and laughter of youth; for many of his pupils when they died left their families in his care. He always attended carefully to the estate and education of these wards. He was always easy of approach, ready to grant audience to those who wished to consult him. He had not a single enemy among the citizens of Rome. Indeed, Porphyry tells us, he was a godlike man, for when one of his enemies tried to bewitch him the curse recoiled on the sender; and on another occasion when the house-slaves were suspected of theft, Plotinus detected the culprit by his superhuman power. His pet plan was the building of a city for philosophers in the Campagna to be called Platonopolis. The project failed because the Emperor Gallienus refused to be practically interested in it. Porphyry confesses that the written style of his master was richer in thought

than clear in expression (with which all who have tried to read the *Enneads* will agree) and that his pronunciation of Greek was very faulty. But he was a well educated man. He knew geometry, arithmetic, mechanics, optics and music; in his lectures he employed expressions borrowed from the Stoics and the Peripatetics; he seemed especially conversant with the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle. Porphyry also cites various testimonies as to the worth of Plotinus as a philosopher. Among them is the praise of Longinus, one of the prominent critics of the time. Not content, however, with the opinion of men, he details the estimate of the gods as revealed in the flattering response of the oracle of Delphi to the question of Amelius as to the whereabouts of the soul of Plotinus.

Porphyry finally informs us as to the method he employed in editing the works of Plotinus. After the philosopher's death there came into his possession fifty-four treatises, written at different times and all unrevised. While all bearing on the general topic of the philosophy of Plotinus, they could not be said to form a single systematic treatise in any ordinary meaning of the term. Porphyry divided the fifty-four into six groups of nine subdivisions each, whence called *Enneads*. Into each *Ennead* he put related subjects arranging them so that the clearest came first. It is no easy task, therefore, to derive a system of thought from the *Enneads*. Varying results are arrived at by differing students, variation that affects not only the exposition of the thought but also the order and relative importance of the elements. We may, nevertheless, make the attempt to become acquainted with that that so impressed Augustine.

II

In *Ennead* III, Bk. 8, Ch. i-ii, Plotinus summarizes his thought. All that exists may be distributed into the following fundamental concepts: Matter, Form, Nature, Soul, Reason, One. Are they substances or processes? The language of Plotinus seems to waver but on the whole he

thinks of them apparently as halting places, centres of activity in a never ending process which he terms "Theoria." No one English word expresses all that Plotinus intends by this name. It is thought but without the passive implication of the English word. It is thought, intense, ecstatic, with all its powers in motion towards the object, yielding to it, overpowered by it, possessed by it, and finding in the consummation of the activity the perfection of its existence. All things, animate and inanimate alike, are striving towards the experiencing of this activity and all in varying degrees attain the fruition of their desire.

Theoria is thus a term of distinctly religious connotation. The sphere in which it is most clearly exemplified is the life of the religious enthusiast, and to assert it as true of the universe as a whole is to view the universe *sub specie religionis* so to speak. To view the universe religiously was no new thing of course, but probably no one before Plotinus had dared to interpret the world on the analogy of religious enthusiasm. The philosopher gives his reasons for this assertion. Let us notice the world called by men Nature. Attend to Nature as she is operative in production. Surely we cannot think of her in this aspect as blindly mechanical. Rather like an artist she is filled with creative activity and constantly guided by the idea of what she wishes to make in any given material. Thus in Nature's operations there must be recognized a creative activity which is pure form and a *matter* which although formless is yet capable of movement and change. The term employed by Plotinus for the latter is *ὑλη* but it is doubtful whether the usual translation "matter" adequately expresses his meaning. Certainly he deviates from Aristotle's thought in the term *πρώτη ὑλη*. For Plotinus matter is a relative term denoting the lowest form, lowest because furthest removed from the One, the origin of which is ultimately the One, not some entity posited dualistically over against the One. Into this matter, thought of as afar and lost, a creative principle enters, and dwelling in it as its Logos makes it

return in the direction of its source and thus initiates a process that forms the world of myriad existence by which we are surrounded. The individual existents of this world Plotinus holds to be conscious, not as men are when awake but when in dream or asleep, and thus in contemplation of what is above them, their guiding Logos, and so constituting a stage of "Theoria."

In the next place Plotinus investigates Soul. Soul is above Nature and may be studied most conveniently in our souls, parts of that collective soul, the world soul. The Soul consists of two parts: one, the better part, remains and rests in the ideal world illuminated by the light from on high; the other or lower part stays below, allied to nature and to the things of sense. In the life of the soul the activity of "Theoria" is also to be seen, if, as was done in the explanation of the activity of Nature, her action be viewed under the analogy of artistic production. The activities of the soul are love of knowledge, impulse of investigation and the like. But the soul as knower is not content to remain apart from the object known but presses on to possession and the nearer the approach to the goal, the more perfect does she become. This activity is again "Theoria."

Above Soul is Nous. For Plotinus this is an immediate and so to speak static intuition of a group of concepts. Exalted above all is the great Nous from which flow all the lesser minds. If power is attributed to it, it is power always in exercise for it is always thinking. Its thought is being and its being is thought and so it is "Theoria" in the complete sense; not the partial approach found in the lower forms but the complete merging of subject and object.

Between these moments of reality there exists a genetic relation. Nous in the course of its activity produces Soul; Soul produces Nature, and Nature in its turn produces the forms which give rise to and organise the lowest, Matter. In every instance this production is the result of a movement to possess and to rest in what is next above, that

is to say, it is a pulsation of "Theoria." Why the activity should at each stage bring into being what is lower and so in need of salvation will be explained later when Plotinus comes to speak of the fall of souls.

At the head of the system is the One, the origin from which all come and to which all strive to return. All spring from it like rivers from their source or a tree from its nature. It gives rise to them but it does not pass into them. All things strive back to it, to know it and to merge with it. This is, as we have seen, "Theoria" and as productive gives rise to the images of contemplation which are like the One. It is for this reason that the Universe forms an organism dominated by the One through the activity of "Theoria" which everywhere brings into being what is more or less, in proportion as it is nearer to or farther away, an image of the One.

Keeping this summary in mind let us now attempt to elaborate the main ideas of Plotinus using passages selected from the various *Enneads*. Our topics will be, the One, the Many, the Descent from the Highest, the Way of Return.

III

The head of the system, as already noted, is the One. In the opinion of Richter⁷ the view held by Plotinus of the nature and relation of this transcendent being saves him equally from the charge, sometimes made, of holding pantheism or teaching emanation. The transcendence of the One makes pantheism impossible; that he is the source of all without being in any degree weakened or diminished precludes emanation in the commonly accepted definition of the term. The question may arise, however, why was not Plotinus content with *Nous* at the head of the universe, why the need of a being beyond and above? The answer is to be found partly in *Enn.* VIII. iii. 9, and more fully in *Enn.* VI. ix. 1-2. Plotinus begins, in a way that reminds us of Aristotle, by analyzing the meaning of the term "one."

⁷ *Neu-Platonische Studien*, pp. 46-47.

Each individual thing that exists may be called a reality because in some sense it is a unity. Destroy this unity and it ceases to be. Various examples are adduced: army, herd, chorus, house, ship, all of them collections; organisms like plants and animals; mental and bodily states and conditions. All such would evidently pass into another state of being if their unity were to perish. The One then is of the highest importance. But where is the home of all the "ones" we see about us? To Plotinus, with his craving for unity, it seemed axiomatic that our universe could not be pluralistic. This impels him to search for THE ONE, the One *par excellence*, parent of all the others. Can Soul be the unity we seek? She surely forms what is not herself into a unity. Plotinus decides this question in the negative because Soul, although high in the scale of existence and so more truly one than what is lower, is not yet unity itself but merely possesses unity as attribute. Is it then possible that this one whom we seek is merely one aspect of reality or existence as a whole? To this question, suggested probably by Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, Plotinus again returns a negative answer. Reality is a complex and so cannot be the One. But may it not be that Nous is the one? No, for Nous does not fulfil the *a priori* conditions; it is an aggregate of concepts, a complex, and so not first. But if Nous implies subject and object, may not Nous be identified with the "apprehender" and be the One we seek? No, again decides Plotinus, for even so its life consists in the apprehension of something higher than itself and for this reason it is not the highest, it is not the One.

The One, it is finally asserted, is a hypostasis⁸ exalted above all things, on which all depend while it depends on none, from which all spring and to which all tend while it neither springs from them nor tends to aught outside itself.

But this argument merely establishes the necessity for the existence of the One; a further characterization is needed. Here a peculiar difficulty is experienced. The One is so

⁸ The actual word used by Plotinus, Enn. V. i. I.

transcendent and abstract that while its presence may be felt, its attributes are with difficulty to be apprehended. Plotinus is evidently aware of the small religious and ethical value of a being concerning which we are able merely to predicate existence. So he makes the attempt to qualify the ineffable.

His first effort has little more than a negative result. In *Enn. V. vi. 1-6*, Plotinus tries to demonstrate that "Theoria" has no place in the existence of the One. The proof is not difficult to grasp. Thinking when analyzed will be found to presuppose a thinking subject and a thought object, Sometimes subject and object are identical; sometimes different. The former case is what Plotinus calls thinking in the primary sense; the latter thinking in the secondary sense. In neither sense is thinking to be attributed to the One. For in the first place the One is most transcendent. Nous, the next below can think in the primary sense of the term but the One, if it transcends Nous and differs from Nous, cannot even have the possibility of dissolving into subject and object, always involved in thinking even of the primary sort. In the second place the unity of the One forbids its having thought. Thinking presupposes a many received into itself, but a manifold in the one is inconceivable. In the third place thinking implies that the thinker stands in need of something. But if the One is in need of anything it ceases to be the One. Again, fourth, the absoluteness of the One precludes its being conscious. Consciousness involves a simultaneous apprehension of discrete elements, and, in the opinion of Plotinus, cannot belong to the absolute. But apart from consciousness there is no thinking and so the One cannot think. Finally, thinking always means the actualization of what was a moment before in potential existence. But there is nothing potential in the One. It is pure actuality and so does not think.

It is evident that this inquiry may increase our awe but will hardly enlighten our minds. So Plotinus makes a further effort to characterise the One so that we may be

able to say that it has rather than that it has not. Three attributes may be found in it: Goodness, Beauty, Wisdom. These he next proceeds to explain.

In the description of the Goodness of the One, Plotinus is unsuccessful in avoiding that negativeness already noticed. When we identify, he says, the One and the Good, we must not think of goodness in any ordinary sense but in the highest, the most abstract sense. The perfect Good stands in need of nothing; neither does the One; in this they are identical. The Good is the first cause and final goal of all things; so is the One; therefore the Good and the One coincide.⁹

In identifying the One and the Beautiful Plotinus is more successful. In this he makes his most original and certainly most attractive contribution to the thought of the world. What is it that men call Beauty?¹⁰ It is found in things seen and heard, in tastes, dispositions and virtues. At times it seems to be an attribute of the thing; at times, as in the beauty of virtue, identical with the thing. What then can it be? Some assert that it is the balancing of part with part in certain proportions, with perhaps the addition of agreeable coloring. To this definition Plotinus demurs as too narrow. It would exclude from the class of beautiful objects such homogeneous things as sunlight, or lightning, or gold; such states as virtue to which the notion of symmetry seems entirely inapplicable. Beauty, therefore, cannot be this but must arise from the presence of *εἶδος* or form. This is the beauty both of simple and complex things; in the former it is the unity, in the latter it confers unity upon the parts. In each case the Beauty is not that of parts but of the whole.

The foregoing applies to Beauty as perceived in things of sense. What is to be said of the Beauty of hyper-sensible things like virtue and wisdom and knowledge? By reason of what characteristic are these things beautiful? Plotinus

⁹ Enn. III. viii. 11.

¹⁰ Enn. I. vi and V. viii.

answers by an illustration. Imagine two blocks of marble side by side. One is rough just as it comes from the quarry; the other is formed into a statue of a goddess, a grace, or a man in whom art has assembled all the features of Beauty. In what consists the difference between the two blocks? The marble is evidently not beautiful simply in being marble but because art has imparted to it a Form. This Form preexisted in the mind of the artist. It did not pass into the matter; rather did it create in the matter another form like unto itself; less than itself to be sure but still similar. Plotinus then applies the analogy to the explanation of Beauty in natural objects. Whence did Helen, whence do the women that vie with Aphrodite herself, derive their Beauty? Is it not also due to a Form that has come from the Creator and become incarnate in the Creature?

Beauty must have a home. By this Plotinus means that the particular examples of Beauty, which, the higher they are traced, the more sublime do they become, must ultimately gather together in the highest, the One. The One, therefore, is understood in the beautiful.

The exposition of Wisdom as an attribute of the One while more convincing than the treatment of Goodness falls short of the explanation of Beauty. In a lofty flight¹¹ of speculative logic Plotinus describes to us the world in which Beauty has its home as a sphere of tireless self-consciousness. This latter is described as Wisdom of the highest kind, not the Wisdom of the lower levels, a series of propositions deduced from axioms and arranged in syllogisms. To Plotinus this last sort of Wisdom would be intolerable if thought of as ultimate, however much it might satisfy those who do not share his "wild, swooning desire of wallowing in unbridled unity," to borrow a phrase from the late Professor James. Increase in unity is the criterion of advance. Each science is a unitary knowing varying according to the level—the lower the science, the less the unity. The highest Wisdom, therefore, is the complete unity. This

¹¹ Enn. V. viii.

view of Wisdom differs from the opinion of Aristotle that a science is always a body of deductions from a highest subject matter assumed as existent. Plotinus on the contrary would define the highest Wisdom as a state of consciousness that passes creatively into other states. This is the Wisdom of the One and it explains to us how creation leaves the One unimpaired in all its unity.

IV

The attribute of Wisdom, then, makes possible an explanation of the way in which the Many have come to exist. Creative Wisdom is the causal link between the One and the Many. How the Many came from the One, Plotinus¹² terms the greatest of all problems, the solution of which must be approached with prayerful reverence. In general Plotinus assumes as necessary that existence (the One) should give rise to existents. In this production, nevertheless, the One must undergo neither diminution nor expansion. To combine these two concepts in one self-consistent formula is not easy but our philosopher uses, as elsewhere, the analogy of thought processes as they occur in our experience. Each mind although a unit gives rise to thought, which is a manifold, without experiencing either diminution or expansion of its unity. Similarly the One remains itself and yet in its self-contemplation produces an image of itself, the first lower order of being, Nous. Nous is a unity—the One could not give rise to anything not a unity—but it is unlike the One in being a *power* (*δύναμις*) of all things, that is, from it there issues in full tide the majestic ocean of manifold existents by which we are environned and to which we ourselves belong.

Let us study in greater detail these lower hypostases. In what men call material things,¹³ we may distinguish Matter from Form. Ascending higher to man we distinguish a material part, Body, from a formal part, Soul. In Soul we

¹² Enn. I. v. 6.

¹³ Enn. V. ix. 3.

distinguish the presentations of *αἰσθησις* and *φαντασία* from that which systematises them, Nous. In Nous is to be distinguished potential and actual Nous. This seems to mean that concepts are not always consciously before the mind. When they are, Nous is actual; when they are not, Nous is potential. Plotinus applies these distinctions to the universe at large. In it exists the world Nous and this being better than the world Soul is of necessity prior (Plotinus has no affinity with the modern evolutionist who assumes that the imperfect is first) and the eternal cause of the eternal universe.

What is to be thought of this eternal Nous? For one thing it is eternally actual, and, therefore, the objects of its thought are not to be conceived as separate but as identical with itself—it is what it thinks. What now does it think? Plotinus answers that what it thinks are the *real* existents, also endowed with creative power to fill the universe with their creatures. Their Forms are reproduced in bodies, and whatever existence transitory things possess is derived from them. These objects of the consciousness of Nous exist simultaneously and this raises the problem of how to conceive their relationship. Plotinus solves this by asserting that the relationship is logical—a relation of class inclusion and exclusion. This settled he abandons himself to the fascinating task of making a catalogue of the eternal categories, just as Aristotle had done before him and as Kant did centuries later. In all such attempts what is of interest is not so much the results but the method of discovery. The method of Plotinus is somewhat as follows. If Nous organises the world of sense, it ought to be possible to work from the things we see, the temporal things, to those we do not see, the eternal. This granted, the fundamental rule is that whatever has a formal existence here, must also have an intuitional existence there in the world of Nous. This causes our philosopher to discuss the topic of formal existence.¹⁴ Things seemingly existent and yet con-

¹⁴ Enn. V. ix. 9.

trary to nature, monsters, congenital deformities and the like, are due to the obstructive and stubborn inertia of the lowest order of existence, are consequently without formal existence and do not exist there. All natural qualities, provided they can be expressed in the harmonic ratios (a reference to Aristotle's explanation of the cause of quality as worked out in his treatise *de Sensu*), exist there. All processes of genesis and the resultant states of production, all quantities, have form and so exist there. Space is replaced there by a sort of rational apprehension of space distinctions, but what this means exactly, Plotinus, as might naturally be expected, does not succeed in making clear.

The imitative arts, Painting, Sculpture, Dancing, Pantomime, have no existence, and in so far at least as they mimic what has merely a sense existence, they do not exist in the higher world. In so far, however, as they lead to intellectual appreciation of sense objects, they do exist there. Musical theory which deals with the numerical relations of tones is there. Architecture, Agriculture, Medicine, arts whose end is to produce, have their place above only in the degree in which they derive their principles from Nous. Rhetoric, Military Science, Finance, State-craft, provided they make the Good and the Beautiful their end, possess existence in that supernal world. Geometry which deals with intuitional things, and Philosophy, first and highest of the sciences, are in immediate relation with that world above. Man, in all essential attributes—so far as they are connected with intuition—is there. Finally, in language that recalls Revelation xxi. 27, Plotinus asserts that disgusting objects, mud, dirt, rottenness, and accidental aggregates are not there, nor anything feeble and ignoble.

Below Nous is Soul ($\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$). Soul¹⁵ is first, in relation to the world the producer of all life in material things, in the earth and in the sea, in the air and in the stars. She adorns these with beauty, orders them and moves them, and apart from her they would be like a dead body. They come into

¹⁵ Enn. V. i. 2 seq.

being and pass away; she abides forever. To the natural inquiry how Soul diffuses herself in all the individuals she produces, Plotinus answers in a parable. As the sun diffuses light through the dark cloud, so Soul supplies life to the world. Her life is everywhere without disruption; it unifies the world and makes it a divine being.

Soul has, second, a relation not only to the world beneath but also to the world above. This relation to Nous makes Soul what she is. In one aspect she streams forth from Nous and leads a separate existence; in another aspect she remains in Nous. This latter aspect is denominated by Plotinus as the better portion of Soul. She is a copy or image of Nous; a concept of Nous and like all concepts possessing or rather being actuality and life—at least this is true of the *better portion*—is ever unfolding herself.

The hypostases are thus sufficiently distinguished. Plotinus, however, is not content to leave them apart. They are bound one to the other by the common life-movement, "Theoria," already mentioned. Let us examine "Theoria" in more detail.¹⁶ Plotinus' problem was analogous to that of the Church during the Trinitarian controversies, how to think the One, Nous, and Soul, as separate and yet together. His conception of their unity is based once more on the exhaustless analogies provided in self-consciousness. Is it necessary for self-consciousness that the knowing subject be composed of parts and that one of these parts know the other? Not at all, because such a perception would result not in apprehending a whole (which is necessary for self-consciousness) but in one thing knowing another. Rather must it be assumed at the outset that self-consciousness means that one simple unitary whole knows itself. Plotinus next adopts the Aristotelian psychology and examines each division of the soul to ascertain whether self-knowledge is attributable to it or not. First, we have the presentative function, *αἴσθησις*, or sense perception, and *φαντασία*, or the reproduction of sense-perception. These are devoid

¹⁶ Enn. V. iii.

of self-apprehension because they have to do merely with things that lie beyond themselves. We have, second, understanding, *διάνοια*, the function of which is to cognize the concepts contained in the material brought by sense-perception and reproduced by phantasy. Surely this faculty has self-consciousness. Plotinus wavers in his decision. If intuition is attributed to it, why not self-knowledge? But he finally decides that while it contains intuition, it is not yet intuition itself, and further that it is mainly concerned with the lower forms of cognition, with external things. The remaining faculty is *Nous*, the faculty with which we chiefly tend to identify ourselves. Now the function of *Nous* in us is mainly passive; to receive concepts from the active *Nous* that stands next to the One. The concepts thus passively received are employed in dealing with external things and are known only in such use. Nevertheless we identify ourselves not with the things known but with the concepts, and it is only when this happens that we know ourselves. This is the self-consciousness of *Nous*. One part does not apprehend another part, for this would mean that the apprehending part would know not itself but something else.

Thus we grasp the idea of a thought activity which, receiving concepts from the higher and employing them in knowing the lower, comes to self-consciousness. It is evident that in this view of the matter the One can have no self-consciousness since it has no higher from which to receive. *Nous*, however, by receiving concepts from the One and applying them to what is below, knows itself. *Διάνοια* borrows from *Nous* and so might be expected to be self-conscious, but Plotinus plainly considers it to be on the way, so to speak, towards self-apprehension but not yet there. The same is true in greater measure of the remaining faculties, and of all the activities of thought beyond human consciousness in non-human nature. The entire universe is thus pervaded with the life activity of "Theoria," an activity that becomes more and more intense the nearer it approaches to the head, the One.

V

As a religious and not merely a philosophic thinker Plotinus was deeply impressed with the evil in the world and the consequent need of salvation. To explain the presence of this evil was, he saw clearly enough, necessary to the completion of his system. His most complete account of the mystery¹⁷ is as follows. There are moments when the soul wakes as it were from a dream and becoming conscious of her true existence catches glimpses of a wonderful beauty and is convinced of her kinship with a better and higher world—of her union with the divine. These “pauses of satisfaction,” as the late Professor Royce calls them, do not last long, however. Soul sinks back into the world of sense and becomes once more afflicted in the body. The question thus forces itself forward, why did the soul ever enter a body?

By way of answer our philosopher examines critically the attempts of Heraclitus, Empedocles, Pythagoras and Plato to account for the body. In Plato's *Timæus* ch. viii he finds a text for his own explanation. Souls come into this world of sense in order that it (the world of sense) may be perfected.

With this passage in view Plotinus investigates the normal relation of soul to body. Soul may mean either the world soul or the individual soul. With some reservations the relation is the same in each case. The soul enters our bodies in order to hold them together since the elements composing them are, so to say, in unstable equilibrium. The world soul, on the other hand, need not enter into matter for this reason since the elements that compose the world are in their proper places naturally. Our bodies are constantly exposed to the dangers of dissolution and so the soul must act as a guardian angel. The world is exposed to no such danger and so the world soul is free from all anxiety. In other words, to speak in parables, the world soul is a king and gives attention merely to the general wel-

¹⁷ Enn. IV. viii.

fare; the individual souls are servants and must attend incessantly to petty details.

The interesting question of the relation of the individual souls to the world soul Plotinus avoids by remarking that the former are related to the latter as the soul of a city, did it exist, is related to the individual citizens.

Dropping the allegory the meaning of Plotinus is that since the world soul lives in the life of intuition or *Nous*, a twofold choice is before the individual soul. It may either sever itself from this world of intuition and descend into the sphere of sense, or it may remain in the world of intuition and share, immune from harm, in the government of the world. Choosing the former it falls into the sense world, enters a material body, and, having to express itself through sense alone, loses its power of apprehending intuitionally. Elsewhere¹⁸ Plotinus emphasizes the fact that this mystery of the fall consists in a free act. As Tennyson put it:

"Our wills are ours, we know not how;
Our wills are ours, to make them thine."

The soul, therefore, has a capacity for development, into the exercise of which there may enter the desire for independent existence. From this desire there results the birth of the soul in time. Once born it may forget itself and its lofty origin and, transferring its homage from *Nous* to the things of sense, become incapable of receiving into itself either the nature or the strength of the One and of *Nous*, that is to say, God.

VI

There remains to be considered the way of salvation as Plotinus conceived it. His general thought is that salvation is deliverance from the sense world into which souls have descended and a return to the One who is their source.¹⁹ As with gold so is it with the soul. Gold becomes soiled with

¹⁸ *Enn.* V. i. 1.

¹⁹ *Enn.* I. vi. 5.

what is not gold; Soul becomes evil by mixing with what is not Soul, sensual desires, unrest, cowardly fear, small mindedness, impure pleasure and the like, all of which soil her externally and adulterate her internally. The gold must be cleansed from dross; the soul must be purified. Virtue is reached when the soul is free from all that is foreign to her nature.

But how is Soul to be purified and caused to return to her fatherland, the world of intuition? One way²⁰ is through the contemplation of Beauty. There are three classes of men. First (he seems to have the Epicureans in mind), are those who regard the things of sense as the only realities and sense pleasures and pains as the only goods and evils. Second (here he refers probably to the Stoics), are those who can rise to something higher for they are men of practical mind and seek virtue, but usually they busy themselves with things of sense and their thought soon sinks. Third, there are men of divine nature who contemplate the intuitional world.

This last class rise into the ideal realm because they are in love with beauty and seek her everywhere. Even in the things of sense they find her but they recognize that here it is merely a borrowed beauty and so they pass up to the beauty of virtue and wisdom, the beauty of Soul. The absolute Beauty is, however, not here for there is a higher still, Nous, the beauty of which approaches the Beauty of the One which is Beauty itself.

Fallen souls may be awakened to a sense of their lost condition in two ways.²¹ Either the worthlessness of the things it prizes may be pointed out to the soul or else it may be reminded of its true nature and worth. This is the analogue of Law and Gospel in Plotinus. He prefers the latter method. Both Soul and Nous are described and the possibility of the Soul's rising and "tracing her better portion" demonstrated from the entanglements of sense to the One.

²¹ Enn. V. i.

²² Enn. VI. ix. 3.

Salvation then consists in the intuition of the One. This process is described with great wealth of detail.²² The very transcendence of the One makes this a difficult task for we are apt to be content with what the One supports rather than with the One itself. We must, therefore, if we would reach the One, free ourselves from the things of sense, from sin, that is to say as Plotinus defines sin, and entering the world of intuition experience the blessed vision. This way is more narrowly described. First we must reflect and be convinced that the soul springs from Nous and thence derives all her excellence. Second we must consider well the nature of Nous, the father of souls, a self-contained manifold, higher than Soul and nearer the One but not the One. Third we must concentrate our mind on this last, the One, in all its ineffable existence. It will be found that the more exactly it is apprehended the less will it appear an empty abstraction, the clearer will it be revealed in all its grandeur and fulness. This effort after the One Plotinus calls the highest love. Spinoza echoed it afterwards in his *amor intellectualis dei*. As our philosopher exultantly puts it, all other loves are not to be compared with it and if, perchance, the desiring soul reaches the goal of her desires and dwells in and with the One, she has happiness and peace in the enjoyment of absolute Goodness, Beauty, and Wisdom. She has in short gained salvation.

This then was the philosophy which Augustine found so attractive. The question, nevertheless, may still suggest itself, how account for the undoubtedly extensive influence of Plotinus? His thought is exceedingly obscure, so obscure that the expositor is continuously in danger of reading his own meaning into the text. His style is forbidding to a remarkable degree. But is not the answer this, that the influence of any philosophy depends not altogether on its clearness but on its vagueness, in other words, on its power of suggestion. Plotinus is the sunset of Greek thinking; but more images appear in the colored clouds of dying day than

²² Enn. VI. ix. 3.

in the clear sky of noon. Again, is it not true that in re-working Plato from the viewpoint of an oriental mystic, Plotinus met the need of his time. We do not mean that he gave the answer; he merely set the question. This probably was what Augustine found in him, a sharpening of the felt but inarticulate problems of his heart. The answer was found, as all of Augustine's faith have found it, in Him who is the Life and Light of men.

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A DISCIPLINE THAT CALLS FOR RECOGNITION

"Of what value to the religious man is the Old Testament in the light of modern literary and historical criticism?"¹ This question will serve to suggest at least in a broad general way the function and method of the discipline that the writer has in mind. The question reminds us that the books of the Old Testament claim to possess or are alleged to possess a unique value for "the religious man"—that is for man as a being characterized by religious instincts that crave satisfaction. The same claim, of course, is made for the books of the New Testament, certain of the Apocrypha, the Koran, the Book of Mormon—not to mention other writings. Hence all of these would come within the purview of the discipline whose function it is to test the validity of this claim in its somewhat varying forms. The distinctive method of this discipline is simply to set the claim—whatever its specific form—"in the light of modern literary and historical criticism"—one or both. The peculiarity of modern literary and historical criticism to which attention is here tacitly directed is the fact that both disciplines rely for their conclusions not upon direct, but upon indirect or circumstantial evidence.

Historical criticism has, of course, to do with the origin of the book whose claim is being tested. And here it should be borne in mind that by the term "origin" is not meant either the time and place of composition of the book and its author's name, or its literary history, but rather its genesis—that is to say, the complexes of influences that by their concurrent action and interaction have both caused the book to be and to be what it is, and that in every particular and to its innermost core: that have determined its contents—and that not merely as to material, but also as to their mental, moral, and spiritual quality; its structure; its literary form and the use made of that form; and its purpose. Central and dominant among these several com-

¹ *Biblical World*, Feb., 1912, p 75.

plexes of influences are those proceeding from the author or authors of the book. And because this is true, the historical study of literature, that is to say, the study of a book in its making, transforming the trite saying "the style is the man" into "the book is the man," gives it a new and stringent significance. It teaches us to see in a book the visualization through written characters of the activities of a given personality at a particular stage in his personal development, as he is acted upon, and himself reacts to and upon, the various influences that are in play at a particular time and place. It teaches us to see in a book an intimate revelation made by its author himself, though unconsciously to himself, of what manner of man he was—the ends he was seeking to effect, his equipment native and acquired, his ethical standards, his methods, and the like. In a word, historical criticism, as applied to books, aims to be, according to the facilities that it can command, nothing less than "a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart" of the author or authors of whatever book it may have under investigation. All this is implicated in the term "origin". Hence, however closely connected the two, when we speak of the findings of "modern literary and historical criticism" as to the origin of a book, we are speaking of something very different from the determination of the time and place of its composition and the name of its author. And it is with conclusions as to origin that the discipline here under consideration has to do. It does not inquire as to whether Deuteronomy, let us say, was written by "Moses the servant of Jehovah" or by some one else; whether it was written by one hand or many; at one time or at different times. Such inquiries do not fall within its province: they belong obviously to historical criticism. Nor does our discipline ask, what manner of man or of men was the author or authors of Deuteronomy? whence did they derive their material, and what use did they make of it? what was their relation personal and official to the events they purport to describe,

the ends they seek to accomplish, the persons whom they seek to influence? These are one and all questions of origin. As such they fall within the sphere of historical criticism. On these and all similar matters our discipline accepts the conclusions of historical criticism, so to speak, out of hand. So far as it is concerned, these conclusions may be correct or they may be incorrect. Our discipline neither affirms, denies, nor challenges them. What it undertakes to do is to determine the value of Deuteronomy to "the religious man" in the light of such and such an alleged origin, whatever that origin may be.

And just as little does the discipline, whose claims to recognition we are considering, intrude itself into the sphere of literary criticism. It is for the latter discipline to determine what literary form or forms have been employed in Daniel, let us say; for what purpose they have been employed; and with what skill they have been used for effecting that purpose. So far as our discipline is concerned the opening chapters of this book may, or may not be history, and its closing chapters may or may not be prophecy. All that it undertakes to do is to determine the significance of one set or another of conclusions touching these matters for the value of the book of Daniel to "the religious man".

Here we cannot do better than pause and inquire more precisely into what is meant when we speak of determining the kind and degree of value "the religious man" is justified in according the books of the Bible. Only atheists deny that the Bible possess an exceptional value for "the religious man". Indeed, it is wholly possible that those from whom I have borrowed the phrase "the religious man" may have intended it to include at least some atheists. If so, then, even these atheists would no doubt hold that the books of the Bible possess exceptional value for man regarded as a being characterized by "religious instincts." Again many deists, if only permitted to put their own meaning on the phrase, would not hesitate to speak of

the Bible as "a message from God to our souls". But they would not hesitate to make the same statement, and in identically the same sense, of a score of other books. Obviously the only issue possible in such a case is one as to the relative value of the Bible as compared with other books ministering each according to its measure to the satisfaction of man's "religious instincts". But with this issue our discipline has only the most indirect and remotest concern. On the other hand, even those who agree in placing the Bible in a class to itself, and in ascribing to it a truly unique value for "the religious man" conceive of it as possessing very different kinds and degrees of value for him. Thus there are those who allege that it is "an infallible rule of faith and practise", and, of course, the only such rule. Others, denying it this particular kind and degree of value, still speak of it as an "inspired" book. It is true that some of this last class profess themselves at once unable and unconcerned to explain what they speak of as "the nature of inspiration"—by which they must mean the ultimate and essential effect of inspiration; but they are very strong upon what they call "the fact of inspiration". Again some allege that the Bible is, or contains, what they call "a special, direct revelation"—defining these several terms with no little care and precision. Others, on the contrary, while they also apply the term "revelation" to the Bible, either leave the term undefined, or else characterize it by the term "progressive". This latter term—"progressive"—however, cannot be regarded as distinctive, because those who allege that the Bible is "a special, direct revelation" also think of it as progressive, though by no means with the same implications as those that attach to the term in the previous case, nor for the same reasons that it is there used. Now, while our discipline concerns itself with these claims severally, it concerns itself finally and principally with the element which, as we have seen, is common to them all—namely, with the claim that the Bible, whether we speak of it as "infallible", or as "in-

spired", whether we allege is to be "a special, direct revelation" or "a progressive revelation"—possesses for "the religious man" a value that is unique, wholly *sui generis*; a value distinct not only in degree, but also in kind from that possessed by any and all other books that undertake to satisfy man's "religious instincts". In the light of their origin and the literary forms employed in them it will determine the value to "the religious man" of the books of the Bible as a "special, direct revelation: but it will go farther and test the validity of its claim to be such. It will determine their value as "inspired": but it will first test the validity of their claim to be "inspired". It will determine their value as "a progressive revelation: but after it has tested their claim to be "a revelation".

Canon Kirkpatrick cites Bishop Westcott as saying that "the student must not approach the inquiry into the origin and relations of the constituent books of the Old Testament with the assumption—sanctioned though it may be by traditional use—that God must have taught His people, and us through His people, in one particular way. He must not presumptuously stake the inspiration and the divine authority of the Old Testament on any foregone conclusion as to the method and shape in which the records have come down to us."² This is perhaps well enough, but it stops far too short. What urgently needs to be said, and heeded, is that prior to the testing of their claim in the light of their origin and the literary forms employed in them, the student of the Old Testament must not assume that God has in any special sense taught either Israel or us through Israel in these books. What urgently needs to be said, and heeded, is that we must be prepared to stake the inspiration and divine authority of the Old Testament and the New also upon the facts as to their origin and the literary forms employed in them. At any rate the discipline now under consideration is prepared to stake its right to recognition upon

² *Hebrews*, p. 493: cited in *The Divine Library of the OT.*, p. 89.

the proposition that we have absolutely no option but to do this very thing.

In vain do one set of scholars plead for what they call "believing" as against what they call "unbelieving criticism", and another set of scholars proclaim that they "assume the inspiration of the Old Testament" in their investigations into the origin and literary forms of its several books. Hyphenated criticism is really not criticism at all. Real criticism implies that we "perfectly exclude our presuppositions" whatever they may be "as part of the case". Literary and historical criticism must be absolutely untrammelled—by everything except the evidence—as to their conclusions. And on the other hand those simply deceive themselves who suppose that they can escape the consequences involved in the conclusions of historical and literary criticism as to the origin and literary forms of the books of the Bible by insisting that they "assume the inspiration" of these books. Is, then, the claim that the Bible is "inspired" to be regarded as immune from criticism? Is this claim itself not to be tested by all the available evidence? Is the light that modern literary and historical criticism may throw upon this momentous claim to be ignored? Or have the findings of "modern literary and historical criticism" no light to throw upon "the value of the Old Testament" and the New "to the religious man"? Or are we to have minds open only to light in reference to the time and place of composition, the authorship and literary history of these books, and the literary forms used in them, but hermetically sealed to all light upon the most important issue that can be raised regarding them? Is this, then, the expression of our boasted "critical freedom" and "critical boldness"?

It only remains to be added in this connection that when we speak of testing the validity of the claims made for the books of the Bible, and of determining their value for "the religious man", we must not overlook the remark of Sir William Hamilton when he says, "But if our criticism

from the internal grounds alone be, on the one hand, impotent to establish, it is, on the other, omnipotent to disprove."³ This statement of Hamilton is not here cited to suggest that when the value of the books of the Bible "to the religious man" is being tested by the findings of criticism as to the origin and literary forms of these books only negative results are possible. Such is not the case. All that is meant is to call attention to the fact that on the main issue—that is on the issue as to whether the books of the Bible are absolutely *sui generis*, whether they are in an altogether unique sense "a message from God to our souls", the result of the test may be merely negative. And now let us return to the discipline whose claims to formulation, and a name and a place among recognized Biblical disciplines the writer ventures to advocate.

The legitimacy of this discipline and its necessity rest upon two postulates neither of which can be denied. One is this: every effort rationally and finally to determine the origin and literary forms of the books of the Bible must sooner or later take account of all the available circumstantial evidence bearing upon these matters. This proposition will hardly be denied. The other postulate is: every effort rationally and finally to determine the value of the books of the Bible for "the religious man" must sooner or later take account of all available light as to the origin and the literary form of these books. Unfortunately enough, nothing has been more common than the indirect, tacit denial of this proposition. And yet a number of considerations concur to place its correctness beyond reasonable question.

For example, it is clearly impossible, apart from a knowledge of its meaning, to appraise the value of a given book to "the religious man"; and, apart from an adequate knowledge of its origin, of its literary history, and of the literary forms employed in the book, how shall we obtain an adequate insight into its meaning? The necessity for the historical study and interpretation of the Scriptures certainly

³ *Logic*, p. 471: cited by Dr. Briggs in *Biblical Study*, p. 92.

does not need to be re-argued at this late date. Nor does the vital relation between a knowledge of the literary forms used in a writing, and a correct exegesis of its contents admit of question. All then, that has been so convincingly written upon these points indirectly but powerfully emphasizes the determining relation that exists between a knowledge of the origin and literary forms of a book and a just estimate of its value to "the religious man".

But again, the books of both the Old and the New Testaments will be found to make certain claims as to their origin and the literary forms employed by their respective authors. True, these claims are not always explicit, though quite frequently they are. But whether explicit or implicit they are none the less real, and to be reckoned with. Explicit claims will occur to every one. Luke i. 1-4, Deut. i. 1-3, and Isa. i. 1. will serve as examples. Thus, the writer of Luke i. 1-4, whatever may have been his name, asserts explicitly that the material in his narrative has been derived from those whom he speaks of as "eye-witnesses and ministers of the word", and that in every instance he has been careful to verify the statements that he has made; so that his narrative of past events is at least as true to fact and as trustworthy "as the fallibility of human testimony will permit". And so the author of Deut. i. 1-3, whoever he may have been, and whenever he may have written, and regardless of whether the phrase "These are the words &c." refers to what precedes or what follows, and regardless also of the "the literary usages" of his time, claims explicitly to be transmitting to his readers words spoken by Moses to Israel at a given time and place, or times and places. Similarly the author of Isa. i. 1, whoever he may have been, whenever he may have written, and to whatever parts of our present book of Isaiah he may have intended his words to apply, states explicitly that these parts of the book proceeded from "Isaiah the son of Amoz" "in the days of Uzziah, Jotham, Ahaz and Hezekiah, kings of Judah"; and that they belong to the literary form known as

"vision"—that is, prophecy. Will any one affirm that such claims as these are not to be taken account of in estimating the value of these books to "the religious man"?

True, under stress of controversial exigency, the late Dr. Briggs permitted himself to say:

"The question of the authorship of the Bible is whether God is its author: whether it is inspired. This cannot be determined by the Higher Criticism"—by which term Dr. Briggs evidently means here historical criticism—"in any way, for the Higher Criticism has only to do with human authorship, and has nothing to do with divine authorship, which is determined on different principles."⁴ Here, it will be observed, Dr. Briggs asserts that there is absolutely no relation, certainly no determining relation, between what he calls the "human authorship"—but which would more accurately and illuminatingly be called the personal origin—of a given writing and the validity of its claim to "inspiration". But evidently in saying this he has for the moment forgotten the dictum of Sir William Hamilton cited above, touching the omnipotence of "criticism from the internal grounds alone" "to disprove". This is apparent from that fact that in another connection Dr. Briggs himself says: "In considering the question of authenticity"—which with Dr. Briggs is simply a synonym for "authorship"—"we have first to examine the writing itself. If the writing claims to be by a certain author, to doubt it is to doubt the authority and credibility of the writing. If these claims are found to be unreliable, the credibility of the writing is gone, and its inspiration is involved."⁵ The present writer would prefer to say, the inspiration of the writing is gone and its credibility is involved. A deliberate misstatement as to the authorship of a writing, while it disproves the trustworthiness of the writer from whom it proceeds and casts a suspicion upon the trustworthiness of all of his other statements, does not necessarily

⁴ *Whither*, p. 89.

⁵ *Biblical Study*, p. 222.

disprove the truthfulness and still less the credibility of all his other statements. Even a liar may tell the truth: and many things that are not true are nevertheless in themselves, and until their truth has been disproved wholly credible. But will any one deny that a proven deliberate misstatement as to the authorship of a writing disproves its inspiration? Certainly the inspiration of the proven misstatement itself is disproved. The God of truth does not inspire men to make false claims. Certainly such a misstatement creates a presumption against the inspiration of the writing as a whole.

Suppose, now, we go farther and ask, Why any statement whatever about authorship? What is the only rational purpose of such a statement? It is not to appraise us of the personality from whom the writing proceeds—not merely of the name of this personality, please observe, but of the personality himself? And why apprise us of the personality from whom the writing proceeds? Whatever it may be in other cases, in the case of a deliberate misstatement—a pseudepigraph—the purpose cannot be merely to increase the popular reputation of the actual author of the writing. Why, then, impute the writing to the personality to whom it has been falsely ascribed? We have had our answer already. For have we not already agreed that a single proven deliberate misstatement disproves the truthworthiness of the writer who makes it and that the virus of his untrustworthiness necessarily imparts itself to his writing as a whole? Here, then, we see one illustration of the closeness of the relation that exists between the personality from whom a writing proceeds and the product of his pen. That relation is not only close, but genetic. “Like father, like son” applies to the progeny of one’s brain as well as of one’s body. The qualities of a writer tend to impart themselves to his writing. Hence to ascribe a writing to a writer of distinction and authority—as the pseudepigraphist did—was to invest the writing itself with the authority and distinction of its

alleged author—or to attempt to do so. Hence, again, to ascribe a writing actually written by a given person, living in a given period, and surrounded by the life of that period, to a person living in another period and related in manifold ways to the life of that period is to render it a tissue of subtle falsehood. Even the truths which such a writing may contain are smirched with falsehood. Is it credible, then, that the God of truth would mediate a message to our souls through “a worthy”—nameless or named—who would introduce His message with a lie—or let us say simply, with a deliberate misstatement—which when discovered to be such would necessarily render His message as a whole untrustworthy, or worse still, would transform His message into falsehood, and contaminate even the truths it contained with untruth?

It only needs to be added that what is true of claims as to authorship is true also, according to their character, of other claims. However they came to be where they now are, and whatever may have been the point of view and motives of the person or persons who placed them there, the words of Deut. i. 1-3 are now an integral part of the text of the Book of Deuteronomy as it lies before us today. The claims set up in those verses cannot be discredited without two results following automatically. One of these is that Moses, the son of Amram, reputed to be the divinely appointed leader and lawgiver of Israel during the period of the Exodus, ceases any longer to be “the responsible guarantor” of the contents of the Book of Deuteronomy. To say that this will not materially affect the value of the Book of Deuteronomy for “the religious man” is to say what many will find it simply impossible to believe, and that on the ground that it flatly contradicts all that they have been so sedulously and insistently taught as to the genetic study of literature. The other equally automatic result must be to discredit either the information and carefulness; or the literary methods and ethical ideals; or the veracity of the person or persons who placed these verses where we

now find them. But to do this is, so far forth, materially to impair the value to "the religious man" of such parts of Deuteronomy as came from those who set up these discredited claims. To say that the person or persons who wrote Deut. i. 1-3 simply acted according to the standards and methods of their day, if true, may and should avail to modify our judgment of these writers themselves. But even if true it cannot modify our judgment of their ethical standards and their methods. The latter we have long since judged upon the basis of their essential character and their uniform effect. Upon that basis they have been irrevocably condemned and, as we all hope, finally discarded.

Nor is it explicit claims alone nor claims to personal origin alone that are potent factors in fixing the value—at least the practical value—of the books of the Bible for "the religious man". Witness the following statement that appeared editorially in a magazine that has for years devoted itself unremittingly to expounding and promoting the literary and historical study of the Bible:

"In the third place, the changed attitude towards the Old Testament books has enabled us to discover far more perfectly than we knew them before the real teachings of these books, and the real history of the Old Testament religion. So long as we read these first books of the Old Testament as the scientific record of how the world came to be, and the ancient nations arose, so long we missed of necessity the great ethical and religious ideas of which the prophet to whom we owe them made them the medium of expression. So long as we assumed that the first books were also the oldest, we read the history of Israel's religion in no small part wrong end to. The tedious documentary analysis, and laborious arranging and dating of documents and books are slowly issuing in a reconstructed history of the origin and growth of Semitic and Israelitish religion, in the light of which this unique divine revelation appears as never before."⁶

⁶ *Biblical World*, Dec. 1906.

To comment in detail upon this remarkable statement would only serve to distract attention from the one point upon which it is desired to center it. That point is the relation, the fundamental and determining relation, that the statement as a whole assumes to exist between one's view of the origin and literary form of these first books of the Old Testament, and one's view of their practical value to "the religious man". The statement, it will be observed, distinctly attributes what its writer conceives to be the inability of certain persons to grasp "the great ethical and religious ideas" of these opening books of the Bible to what he conceives to be their misconceptions in part as to the origin of these books and in part as to the literary form employed in them. And what he evidently flatters himself is his own juster appreciation of "the significance of this unique divine revelation", the writer of the above cited paragraph just as distinctly traces to what he is pleased to regard as his own juster insight into these matters. Let us assume for a moment,—though it may well be but for a moment, and then merely for the sake of illustrating an important, but much overlooked truth—that the *Biblical World* is right, and then notice what follows: Simply this: "the prophet" who made these books of the Old Testament the "medium of conveying his "great ethical and religious ideas" was so unfortunate as not to make plain to his readers the nature of the literary form that he was using, or perhaps one should say that he failed to make plain to them the use to which he was putting the literary form that he employed, with the result that for milleniums his readers mistook his "legends shot through with religious ideas"—let us not say for "a scientific record" of anything, for such a statement would lack even the appearance of historical verisimilitude, but—for an ordinarily honest and reasonably well informed account of actual events; and with the farther result that they "missed of necessity the great ethical and religious ideas" that "the prophet" strove to convey. So close, then, may be the relation between the origin of a book and the use

made by its author of the literary forms which he employs; and its value for "the religious man". And now turning aside from all that is debatable in this statement of the *Biblical World*, so much, it seems to me, is indisputable—namely, the claims that a Biblical writer makes, or seems to make, as to the literary form that he is employing in his book—be these claims explicit or implicit—must necessarily profoundly affect the value of his book for "the religious man". Nor is this equivalent to saying that only this or that literary form is suitable to convey "a message from God to our souls". It is simply to say that a writer may so veil the literary form that he is using as to cause his readers to mistake it for one that is totally different. He may, for instance, so completely clothe legend in the forms of history as to mislead all except the very elect. If he does this consciously and of purpose, he is, of course, a deceiver: and "no lie is of the truth," no matter how "pious" the liar. And even if one could perform such a feat "in the uprightness of his heart", the result would be a cryptogram only intelligible in a polychrome edition, which, to say the least, would be a bizarre form in which to present a "divine revelation".

As further establishing the determining significance of the origin and literary form of the Biblical books for their value for "the religious man", we should not fail to notice that in the Christian Scriptures themselves the value that they possess for "the religious man" is repeatedly made to turn upon their origin and their literary form. Thus, in Dan. ix. 2 we read: "In the first year of his reign I, Daniel, understood by the books the number of the years whereof the word of Jehovah came to Jeremiah the prophet, for the accomplishing of the desolations of Jerusalem, even seventy years." These words preface and explain the prayer of Daniel that follows; the explanation being given, of course, not for the benefit of Daniel, but for that of his readers. It is significant, therefore, not only of his point of view, but of their's as well. Now, the language used

makes it perfectly plain that the weight attaching to the books to which he refers, turned, both in the case of Daniel and in that of his readers, upon the origin to which both he and they ascribed them, and to the literary form to which he and they alike referred them. That "the books" mentioned—or certainly that portion of them specifically referred to—were "the word of Jehovah" was evidently certified to Daniel and his readers by the fact that they came to them from "Jeremiah, the prophet". And that they produced the effect that they did upon Daniel's conduct was due to the fact that he assigned them to the literary form known to us as "predictive prophecy". The same observations, for substance, apply to the language used in the eleventh verse of this same chapter: "Therefore hath the curse been poured upon us and the oath that is written in the law of Moses, the servant of God. Here the character of what is called "the law", as "the law", is determined for Daniel by its origin—that is by the fact that it was mediated to Israel through "Moses, the servant of God". And the words, "the servant of God", like the words, "the prophet", in the second verse emphasize official position and commission as factors of fundamental importance in "origin". And the whole tenor of Daniel's prayer reflects the importance attaching to literary form. His mind recognizes instinctively, and in each case reacts appropriately to certain specific literary forms found in what he calls "the law". Now it is "the precepts", "the commandments", "the ordinances", and now the "history" that determines the tenor and contents of his prayer. Nor are the foregoing statements affected by any particular view of the authorship of the Book of Daniel. Be the author and time of composition of that book what they may, the force of what has been said remains unimpaired. And that the Old Testament abounds in similar passages will hardly be denied.

The same is true of the New Testament. To the determining force attaching to certain aspects of origin, the salutations of the several epistles bear emphatic witness.

Similar witness for other aspects of origin is borne by passages like Luke i. 1-4., Acts i. 1, Jno. xxi. 24, 1 Jno. i. 1-4; to others yet by Heb. i. 1-4, ii. 1-4; and to others by Luke xx. 42. To get clearly before the mind the full force of the New Testament conception of the significance of origin for value, all that is necessary is to attend to the implications of a passage like Jno. vii. 9. "Did not Moses give you the law"? asked our Lord, placing upon origin an emphasis that is as instructive as it is unmistakable. No one in his senses, of course, supposes for an instant that the point and power of our Lord's challenge lie in the name "Moses" merely as a name. But as little can any one doubt that the form of His appeal is not accidental, nor unimportant. On the contrary, by means of this name as symbol and summary our Lord brought to bear upon the understandings and consciences of His hearers the personal and official characteristics and qualifications of him who bore it. Not only so, He brought to bear upon them the probative weight of the whole series of divine providential energies that, so to speak, had found focus and outlet through him who bore the name "Moses". That is to say, like a calcium light, our Lord's challenge reveals the wide ramifications of the term "origin"—ramifications apparently hidden from the eyes of those who have talked most about the "modern genetic conception of history". And not only the ramifications of the genetic influences summarized in the term "origin", but the determining significance of those influences for the value of the writing in which they have registered themselves is strikingly signalized for us. "The law"—if indeed its origin was what is implied in our Lord's challenge—to those whom He addressed, yes, and to us of today, stood for Sinai and the exodus from Egypt, with its attendant miracles; and the covenant with Abraham; stood, in a word, for all the history that was antecedent to, prepared the way for, and reached its predetermined culmination in Sinai and the Sinai covenant. I say that the

written record called by our Lord "the law" stood for all this history because it had its origin in this history, its whole content was determined by the history, it conserved and perpetuated all the essence of this history and much more. Hence the unanswerableness of our Lord's appeal to this "law" as an authoritative "message from God" to the souls of those whom He addressed. Hence also the determining significance of "origin"—once the connotation of the term is fully appreciated—for value. Those who accept the "origin" posited for "the law" by our Lord always have, always will,—yes, always must posit for it the value as "a message from God to our souls" that He posited for it. Such an "origin" stamps it ineffaceably with such a value.

But the Lord's question not only reveals the necessary and determining significance of "origin" for value and the reasons for the indissoluble relation existing between the two, it does more. It likewise reveals—at least indirectly—the significance for value that attaches to literary form. For Him and for those to whom His question was addressed the document known as "the law" was "a record of past events as nearly true as the fallibility of human testimony will permit". It may have been more, but it was certainly that. In other words He classified the record under the literary form known to us as "history". How do we know this? I answer, by the way in which His rational soul reacted to the record. How it reacted is declared by the whole form and force of His question. Upon any other view, such a question would have been inconceivable, because futile, and even imbecile. The rational soul, because it is a rational soul, cannot but react differently to different literary forms. And in the case of any writing the character of its reaction will and must be determined by its conception of the literary form used in the writing, and of the use to which it conceives this form to have been put. Why this must be so will be obvious to reflection. Literary forms have their roots deep in the

needs of the human spirit. In them the human spirit finds self-expression and has communion with its fellows. Hence they must be at least relatively stable and relatively universal both in their essential characteristics and in the appeal they make and the response they elicit. Otherwise they would fail to answer the purpose that gave them being. But fail they do not. No sane mind reacts in the same way to what it conceives to be "history" and to what it regards as some form of "fiction."

As further evidencing the fact that the Christian Scriptures make their value to "the religious man" turn not only upon "origin", but also upon literary form, the language of 2 Pet. i. 16 is in point. "For we did not follow cunningly devised fables," says the writer, "when we made known unto you the power and coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, but we were eye-witnesses of His majesty". The word here rendered "fables" is "*mythoi*". It is a technical term for a particular type of literature current in the days of the apostles, and it is here used in its technical sense. Now it cannot escape the attention of any thoughtful reader that the writer is at pains to distinguish his own composition from this particular literary type. And so soon as we learn what were its characteristics, his reason for so doing becomes clear. The implications of both terms in the rendering "cunningly devised fables" are needlessly offensive. Cleverly wrought out and phrased speculations would, perhaps, come nearer expressing what was in the apostle's mind when he used the word "*mythoi*". At any rate, these "*mythoi*", from which he is so careful to distinguish what he himself has written, were the speculations of acute, ingenious, and what we would now call "religious" minds about God and His relations to the world. Why, then, the apostle's care to put his own writing in a different category? Clearly because for "the religious man", if he be also a sober-minded man, a kind and degree of value attaches to an account of "the power and coming of our Lord Jesus Christ" that is based upon the testimony of

competent eye-witness totally different from any that can possibly attach to the most sober and pains-taking speculation touching such a matter.

But we may and must proceed a step further. It is not only Scripture personages, then, who make the value of the books of the Bible to "the religious man" turn upon their origin and literary form. All the rest of us do the same; all without exception—radical and conservative, the man in the street and the scholar. I do not mean, of course, that all who accept the Christian Scriptures as "a message from God to our souls" assert for the several books of which they are composed a specific origin and a specific literary form. Nor do I mean that all who accept them consciously and formally base their estimate of the value they severally accord these books upon a given view of their origin and their literary form. Least of all do I mean that everybody frames before his mind a clear and logically coherent theory of the various—and only too often obscure and complex—genetic influences, to the combined effect of which each book of the Bible owes it being, literary form, contents, and structure. On the contrary quite a large body of reputable Biblical scholars give little evidence of having done this. But I do mean that in the case of every one of us inspection will prove that our estimate of the kind and degree of value to be accorded the books of the Bible is based formally or implicitly, consciously or unconsciously, upon his view of their origin and their literary form. Certainly, even those who concern themselves least with such matters still think of each several book of the Bible as having been produced during some period, at some place, by some person. No doubt in most cases the period, place, and person to whom the production of the book is referred is conceived of only in the most general and vaguest way. Usually, so far as genetic influences are concerned, at most only one or perhaps two of them—if any—stand out with some measure of distinctness before consciousness. Take, for instance, the Book of Isaiah, and what

is likely to stand forth in the consciousness of the average person in connection with its origin—by which I mean here, has always, the sum total of the genetic influences that have crystallized into the book known by that name—will be the fact that it originated with “a holy man of old” named Isaiah”, or with “a prophet” of that name. Or, if it be a book of the New Testament that is under consideration—an epistle of Paul, let us say—then, that which will stand out in the consciousness of most persons in connection with its “origin” will be simply the fact that it was written by the “apostle” “Paul”: or, if it be the third Gospel, that it comes to us from “Luke”, “the companion of Paul”, and “the author of the Book of Acts”. It is further true that the average man is usually little concerned consciously and precisely to analyze the content, and to determine the significance of the terms “a holy man of old”, “prophet”, “apostle”, “the companion of Paul the apostle”, “the author of the Book of Acts”, “Paul”, “Isaiah”, and the like. At the same time, it will hardly be denied that, for a variety of reasons, even to the average person, these terms are pregnant with latent meaning.

When, however, we turn from the average man to responsible scholars who have some appreciation of the gravity of their task, nothing perhaps is more noticeable than their laborious efforts to discover the “sources” from which the material in the several books of the Bible has come and carefully to assign every part of this material to its proper “source”. Thus, to cite only two of many instances, Dr. Shailer Mathews distributes into at least four main groups the genetic influences to which we owe our Gospels as we now have them. Of these distinct sets of influences, so he tells us, one proceeded from certain “Eastern religions” other than Judaism, one from “Judaism”, one from Jesus Himself, and the fourth from those who came after Jesus—that is the disciples generally and their leaders.⁷ And as is well known, what Dr. Mathews attempts to do for the

⁷ *The Gospel and The Modern Man*, p. 74.

Gospels a host of scholars have attempted to do for them and for the other books of the New Testament. Similarly Dr. Driver thinks that he has discovered that the Book of Deuteronomy is the product of no less than five distinct main groups of genetic influences. These for convenience he designates by the symbols JE, D, D², P, and R. True, for all except the initiated, these symbols, instead of suggesting, serve mainly to conceal even the general character of the several sets of influences for which they respectively stand; but this unfortunate circumstances in no wise affects my contention. And what Dr. Driver has thus attempted for Deuteronomy a large body of immensely active scholars have attempted to do for it and for all the other books of the Old Testament. It is at once curious and instructive to notice some specimens of their activities along these lines. In our recent Bible Dictionaries, for example, one may find not only the least of the books of the Old Testament resolved into two or more "documents", and the larger ones into "a great multitude which no man can number", but—and this is the significant fact—whether the "documents" be few or many; large or mere "fragments", he will also find that the analyst traces them back—one and all—to a "prophetic" origin—the same being sometimes an individual "prophet" and sometimes a so-called "prophetic school". The reason for the unanimity of these different scholars in converging upon this purely fiat "origin" will appear in due time. For the present it is sufficient simply to note the fact they do thus agree upon a common "origin" for these "documents" and "fragments of documents", and that such is the "origin" upon which they fix. While, therefore, there are the greatest diversities of opinion as to one or another aspect of the origin of the different books of the Bible; and while some of these opinions are unreasoned, vague, and even latent; and while others, though reasoned, are not much less vague, and in themselves seem singularly unreasonable, no scholar fails to posit some "origin" for each book.

The same may be said as to the literary form employed in the books of both Testaments. Gen. i-ii. 4a will serve as an illustration. By some scholars this passage is referred to one or another of the literary forms that group themselves under the general head of "free poetic inventions"; while others, like Dillmann, see in it the narrative of "a historian" and not "a poet":⁸ one reads Jonah as an "allegory", another as "a religious romance", and a third as a narrative of actual experiences; and so of all the other books of Scripture. But what none can in any case avoid doing is positing—though, of course, not always, nor even usually formally and consciously—a literary form of some description for the various books and parts of books. No doubt there is here also an abundance of lack of reasoning, of bad reasoning, and of unreason. That, however, is a mere incident and in no wise affects the main fact.

But it is not more certain that each of us posits some origin and some literary form for each several book of the Bible than it is that our judgment as to the origin and literary form of each several book ultimately determines the kind and degree of value that we accord to it. Habitually overlooked, and even confidently denied though it has been, this position will be found to be susceptible of convincing proof along more lines than one.

One or two typical concrete statements will serve as a starting point. Speaking of the Old Testament, Canon Kirkpatrick says: "And from the whole treatment of the Old Testament Scriptures in the New Testament, even more than from explicit statements, it is clear that they are regarded as being of divine origin, and as possessing divine authority; as being, in fact, what we generally understand by the term *inspired*."⁹ And a little further along in the same chapter, he tells us truly enough that "the *fact* of inspiration is an essential article of the Christian faith". And in precisely the same vein, Dr. Zenos tells us that "The

⁸ *Commentary on Genesis*, i, p 28.

⁹ *The Divine Library of the OT.*, p. 87.

question of the divine inspiration of the Scriptures is also of cardinal importance"; and adds that, on the basis of what he also calls "the fact of inspiration" those whom he calls "evangelicals" "have always used these writings as the ultimate court of appeal. . . . have planted themselves on their authoritativeness . . . adopted them as their organic principle and fundamental law, believing that they contain and are the infallible rule of faith and practice."¹⁰

With individual differences, then, as to detail—which do not here concern us—Dr. Zenos and Canon Kirkpatrick, speaking as representatives, agree in making the "*fact of inspiration*" the basis of whatever special value the books of the Bible may possess for "the religious man". This being the case, an inquiry immediately and necessarily arises as to what Canon Kirkpatrick calls, not very happily, "the nature of inspiration", meaning evidently the effects of inspiration upon the record said to be "inspired". On this point Canon Kirkpatrick frankly deprecates any attempt to go into precise details. He says, however,—and for the purposes of this discussion that is all sufficient—that the nature or effects of inspiration must "be inferred from the Scriptures themselves"¹¹ by which he manifestly means from the phenomena presented by the Scriptures. And can any one gainsay his answer or suggest another and more adequate? If not, then the question presses: How are we to ascertain what are the phenomena of Scripture—I mean, of course, its real as contrasted with its merely apparent phenomena, and how are we to construe to our understandings the true and intended significance of these phenomena, except in the light of the origin and the literary forms of the books of Scripture? Apart from the origin of Gen. i. 1-ii. 4a, for instance, who can say what is the literary form employed by its author? As Dillmann correctly discerns, our ability to determine the literary form with which we are here dealing turns upon our ability to answer the question,

¹⁰ *The Elements of the Higher Criticism*, p. 170.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 87.

Whence had the author his information touching the matters of which he treats? If he had it from a competent witness of the creation of the world, then the record will have to be classed either as a "history" or as a "direct revelation" according as emphasis is placed upon one or another aspect of it. If, however, the author went to his imagination for his facts, then the record must be classed as some form of "free poetic invention" or "fiction"—though the word need not be used as derogating from the real merits of his production whatever, on this view, these may be. If, on the other hand, Gen. i. 1-ii. 4a represents the reasoned conclusions as to the creation of things reached by its author upon the basis of his own observations and those of others, then it must be classed, according to other characteristic features, either as "a scientific" account of creation, or else as "a speculation". A knowledge of its origin, therefore, is necessary in order to determine to what literary form this portion of the Bible is to be referred. And is it not equally obvious that it is only after we have determined the literary form, and only in the light of its literary form that we can appraise correctly the value of Gen. i. 1-ii.4a to "the religious man"? No doubt poetry as well as history may be made a vehicle for conveying to us a knowledge of God and of His relations to man. But the very fact that there is, as Canon Cheyne has said, "a truth of poetry as well as a truth of history" implies that we need to take careful account of what kind of truth it is that is engaging our attention in a given writing. And only in a religious *Alice in Wonderland* would any one be found to affirm that a "speculation" touching creation possesses for "the religious man" either the same degree or the same kind of value that would be possessed by a "revelation".

But let us approach from another and a practical side this matter of the determining relation that our view as to the origin and the literary forms of the books of the Bible sustains to our view of the kind and degree of value to be accorded these books. For sometime we have been

made familiar with the doctrine that the Bible is or contains what is spoken of as "progressive revelation". Negatively this doctrine consists of a denial that all the teachings of the Bible are of "equal and perpetual authority"—a phrase which itself needs much more careful exposition than those using it are accustomed to give it. Positively the doctrine summarily stated seems to consist in the affirmation of the "superseding of revelation by larger revelation".¹² To go into the merits of this doctrine lies outside the scope of this paper. The doctrine is mentioned merely to direct attention to the fact that it depends for its very existence upon the assumption that there is an invariable and an indissoluble relation between the origin and the literary form of this or that portion of the Bible, on the one hand, and its value to "the religious man", on the other. Thus, in the course of an exposition of the doctrine, we are told that one trained in it "will use the Bible gladly and intelligently as a source of supreme teaching, because it reveals to him eternal truths. But, because he knows that this truth came but gradually and through men conditioned and limited by circumstances and forms of thought in part or wholly outgrown, he will not confuse revelation in all its stages with final authority,"¹³ nor will he suppose that "revelation is always absolute or of equal authority for all time",¹⁴ but will recognize the fact that "revelation through morally imperfect men may be outgrown".¹⁵ The postulate, therefore, upon which this doctrine of a "progressive revelation" builds is simply this—namely, that such is the relation of the record of a revelation and the personal and other media through which, if made at all, it must be made, that it is impossible to appraise the value of any part of it without taking most careful account of the origin and literary forms of the writings in which it is documented.

¹² *Principles & Ideals for the Sunday School*, pp. 42-43.

¹³ *Op. cit.*, p. 44.

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 41.

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 42.

Whatever one may think of the theory based upon this postulate, the soundness of the postulate itself is beyond dispute.

With the correctness or incorrectness of Julius Wellhausen's views touching the origin and the literary forms of the books of the Old Testament we have here no concern. But as to the relation between these views and the popular estimate of the value of the Bible to "the religious man", it will hardly be questioned that Wellhausen himself is a competent witness. Note, then, the following statement by Sir W. Robertson Nicoll. Referring to a personal experience, he says:

"More than twenty years ago, the present writer, walking with Julius Wellhausen in the quaint streets of Greifswald, ventured to ask him whether, if his"—i.e. Wellhausen's—"views were accepted, the Bible could retain its place in the estimation of the common people. 'I cannot see how that is possible', was the sad reply".¹⁶ In whatever direction we turn, therefore, we find that men's views as to the origin and literary forms of the books of Scripture are determinative of their views as to "the nature" or effects of inspiration, and accordingly of the kind and degree of value to be accorded these books by "the religious man".

How is it with "the fact of inspiration", upon which Canon Kirkpatrick and Dr. Zenos plant themselves, making it rather than, and as contrasted with "the nature of inspiration," the basis of the "Divine authority" and the "infallibility" that they respectively predicate of the books of the Bible? How is "the fact of inspiration" to be established? As all know, a number of methods have been proposed.

There are those, for instance, who make their appeal directly to what is known as the *Testimonium Spiritus Sancti*. But it must not be forgotten that the appeal itself implies the truth of the doctrine of the Trinity. This doctrine, however, is derived exclusively from the Bible.

¹⁶ Cited in *Fundamentals*, vol. viii, p. 13.

Apart from Scripture, we would have to say, "Nay, we have not so much as heard whether there is a Holy Spirit". Shall such a doctrine as this, then, be accepted without regard to the source from which it comes? Is it not plain that "Holy Scriptures", or "holy prophets", or "holy apostles" are a condition *sine qua non* to a sane acceptance of the doctrine of the "Holy Spirit"? And do such phrases predicate nothing concerning what Dr. Briggs calls "the human authors" of the Bible? nothing as to the origin of the Scriptures in the sense of their historical genesis? Moreover the doctrine of the Holy Spirit is itself the result of an interpretational process. But Dr. Richard G. Moulton assures us "that it is vain to search into the meaning of a work until its outer literary form has been determined".¹⁷

In the case of the Old Testament, Canon Kirkpatrick and others base their acceptance of "the *fact* of inspiration" partly upon "internal evidences" and partly upon what may be called "expert testimony" by which is here meant the testimony of persons supposed to be specially qualified to give a decisive judgment. As a specimen of the appeal to "the internal evidences" the following must suffice: "Yet in all this diversity of *many parts and many fashions* there is a unity which binds together the various books into a single whole. It is no artificial and external uniformity, but a natural and organic unity of life and spirit. Natural and undesigned, so far as the several authors of the many books collected in the divine library of the Old Testament are concerned, and therefore all the more attesting itself as supernatural and designed".¹⁸ But can any one read these words and fail to see that the very underpinning of Canon Kirkpatrick's argument from the "internal evidences" is derived from certain alleged facts as to the origin and literary forms of the books of the Old Testament? Let us briefly follow it. Canon Kirkpatrick begins by calling attention to the great variety of literary forms

¹⁷ *The Literary Study of the Bible*, p. 329.

¹⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 85.

found in the Old Testament—"the many parts" of which it consists, and "the many fashions" in these "many parts". Again, he says in effect: See these workmen separated from each other in time and space, working each in his own way, each upon his own particular "piece", none of them consciously collaborating with any of the others, and yet behold the splendid symmetry of the building that has resulted from these apparently desultory and disconnected efforts! Does not such an effect imply the unseen activity of a superintending architect competent to produce the result that we actually see? But what after all is this except an inference from certain phenomena presented by the origin and literary forms of the books of the Bible? What has just been said of Canon Kirkpatrick's appeal to "the internal evidences" applies equally to his appeal to Christ and His apostles as "expert witnesses". What court on earth would admit to the jury expert testimony without first requiring evidence that he who delivered it was an expert? But whence have we our evidence that in this matter of the books of the Old Testament our Lord and His apostles are in reality experts? Is it not from the books of the New Testament? And can their testimony be accepted apart from some knowledge of their origin, or understood apart from some insight into their literary form? Are there none to whom "our Lord" is not "our Lord", and others to whom He is not "our Lord" in the same sense that He is to Canon Kirkpatrick? And as for "His Apostles", who today is so "undemocratic" as to do them any special reverence. We who bend the knee to Jesus today must certainly be prepared to give both to ourselves and to others "a reason for the faith that is in us".

More plausible is the view entertained by many that wholly apart from any considerations touching their origin and literary forms "the *fact* of the inspiration" of the books of Scripture can be established by an appeal to "the efficacy of the doctrine", that is to say, the well known practical effects that have attended the dissemination of the Scrip-

tures. But can it? Is not Dr. Zenos clearly right, when he says: "The Bible is a religious book and has been the source of incalculable religious thought, feeling, and work. It has produced some most remarkable effects upon the world: and it has produced these results because it has been believed to be, or at any rate to contain the authoritative expression of God's will regarding the conduct of man on earth. If it had been believed to be anything else, it is reasonably certain that these results would not have been produced by it. . . . It is idle to hold that the Bible will hold the same place in the estimation of men whatever the results of criticism may be as to its origin."¹⁹ The legend of William Tell will serve for illustration and for confirmation. Commenting upon this legend, Professor John Martin Vincent says: "The fact that the tale was believed for nearly four centuries by the Swiss people is of the most profound significance in their history. As a patriotic influence and an example of heroism and devotion, William Tell was just as powerful as if he had been true. In the eighteenth century a preacher who in an unguarded moment spake of Tell as a Danish fable was nearly burned at the stake. . . . The future is to determine whether Tell is to be as powerful as a parable as he was as a belief".²⁰ Here, then, is an instance of a narrative wearing the livery of "history" and believed to be "history" which, because it wore the livery of "history" and was believed to be "history", produced deep and lasting impressions for good upon an entire people. Is any one so simple as to suppose for a moment that the influence of Tell "as a parable" will be comparable with the influence of Tell believed to be "history"? Whoever heard of a legend—a narrative universally recognized as and admitted to be a legend—having such a hold upon men as to put one who called attention to its being a legend in peril of being burned at the stake for so doing. For the truth, no doubt, and even for what they have

¹⁹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 152, 154.

²⁰ *Historical Research*, p. 154.

mistakenly believed to be the truth, some have even dared to die—aye, would still dare even to die. But whoever heard of one's dying for what he himself and all others recognized to be a "legend"? "Legends" undoubtedly have a value of their own, a value even for "the religious man"; but it is not a value of that high kind.

May we, then, assume in the case of the books of the Bible that there is a "domain of faith" in which, apart from all consideration as to their origin and their literary forms, men may assure themselves of "the *fact* of inspiration"? May we assume that in the case of these books "the religious man" is endowed with some occult faculty that enables him directly to perceive "the presence of the divine Spirit" "in some way guiding and informing" the minds of those who composed them? To many, as to the writer, such an assumption cannot fail to appear to be a counsel both of despair and of confusion. It is but one of many illustrations of how the understandings even of the wise may entangle themselves with facile phrases. Direct vision of the "divine Spirit", as all of us know, is not possible to mortal minds. It is only by its effects that "the presence of the divine Spirit" can be known. His guidance and the information that He imparts register themselves in the phenomena of the record produced under the influence of His "guiding and informing" "presence", and in the characters and activities of those whom He is "guiding and informing"—not otherwise. But were it conceivably otherwise, it would still remain true that our estimate of the value to be accorded the books of the Bible would hinge upon our view of their origin—yes, of their human origin. This is only to say that we would still receive them as "a message from God to our souls" because they were mediated to us by men whom in some way or other we perceived to be under "the guiding and informing" "presence of the divine Spirit".

But here again, we shall do well to turn away from abstract reasonings to consider some typical concrete illus-

trations of how all unconsciously to themselves, apparently, men's belief in "the *fact* of inspiration" evidences itself to be determined by their view of the origin of the books they accept as being "inspired". Thus, contrary to the tradition that runs back at least to the time of the composition of the books of Ezra, Nehemiah, and Chronicles, Canon Cheyne holds that the book of Deuteronomy, instead of originating in the time of Moses and with Moses, originated with certain reformers in the days of Josiah. But even so, he feels compelled to pay unconscious tribute to his own intelligence and to that of his readers by speaking of these reformers as a "pious coterie" and as "prophets".²¹ We need not pause to inquire critically into Canon Cheyne's conception either of piety or of prophets. It is enough simply to ask, Why "pious" and why "prophets", if one's conception of origin is not determinative of one's view of value? And so Dr. Briggs, bent upon putting to confusion those who frankly make their estimate of the value of the books of the Bible in matters of religion hinge upon their view of the human origin of these books—but evidently without pausing to get before his own mind any very clear notion of the connotation of the term "origin", or any very clear idea of the significance of the phenomena of onymity—seems to imagine that he has accomplished his purpose by saying: "We desire to know whether the Bible is from God, and it is not of any great importance that we should know the names of those worthies chosen by God to mediate His revelation".²² Perhaps not—though had Dr. Briggs stopped long enough to formulate for himself some rational account of the problem of onymity, he would doubtless have expressed himself with somewhat more of reserve. But, however that may be, it is manifest from what he says that even he, unconsciously to himself, was governed in his estimate of the value to be accorded

²¹ *The Men of the Bible series: The Prophet Jeremiah; His Life and Times*, p. 63.

²² *Inaugural Address*, p. 33.

the books of the Bible by certain very definite views as to their "origin". Is not as much clearly implied, when he speaks of those through whom these books were mediated to us as being "worthies"—that is, presumably, persons of moral and spiritual worth, and as having been "chosen by God"—that is, persons having a commission and presumably qualifications peculiarly their own? But, if "origin" be merely a convenient term for the sum of the genetic influences to which the books of the Bible owe their being and their specific character, could there well be more essential factors than those mentioned? Once more, attention has already been directed to the fact that those who have elaborated the "endless genealogies" of the books of the Bible which fill our latest Bible Dictionaries are in the habit of assigning every "document" and every "fragment" to some fiat "prophet" or "prophetic" school. This, of course, is not an accident. It is an unconscious recognition of the determining significance of "origin" for value.

But let us return to the case of Canon Kirkpatrick. Like many others, Canon Kirkpatrick, while he stresses what he calls "the *fact* of inspiration", is, as we have seen, chary of what he calls "a clear-cut definite theory" of inspiration. His reason is that such "clear-cut definite theories may come into awkward collision with facts". Now, we need not pause to inquire whether, even if it were desirable, it is always possible to live in a state of perpetual mental fog: nor whether—until its claim to be a "fact" has been fully established—the alleged "fact of inspiration" is any less a "theory" than is the "nature of inspiration"; nor whether, after all, the so-called "fact of inspiration" is not just as truly an inference from "the Scriptures themselves"—that is from the phenomena of "the Scriptures themselves"—as is the "nature of inspiration". For our present purpose it is enough to remind ourselves that vagueness here is a vain thing for safety. For, it can hardly escape attention that the so-called "fact of inspiration" itself, quite as easily as any "theory", may come into disastrous "collision" with

other alleged or really "awkward facts". Thus, as Canon Kirkpatrick truly says: "We are familiar with the old objections to the inspiration of the Bible drawn from its moral character. How, asks the sceptic, can you maintain that a book that contains such crude anthropomorphic representations of God, such imperfect ideas of morality, so much that is revolting to an enlightened conscience, is inspired?"²³ Here, it will be observed, it is not "the nature of inspiration, nor any "theory of inspiration"—either vague, or "clean-cut and definite"—but the "fact of inspiration" itself that is in question. Further, it should be noted, that the reality of "the fact" of the inspiration of the Old Testament is challenged and denied upon the basis of alleged facts as to its origin—yes, and its literary form. For what is the Old Testament, the morality of which is impugned? Is it anything more than an organized collection of visible symbols through which have been mediated to us the moral ideas and ideals of those from whom these symbols have proceeded? "The moral character" of the Old Testament, then, is a mere metonymy for the moral character of those with whom its several books originated. And why do I refer to literary form? Because, whatever else they may be, in the view of those who raise such objections, these Old Testament narratives cannot be "history"—a negative judgment as to literary form, it is true, but with very positive results for our estimate of the value to be accorded the Old Testament by "the religious man".

Even yet, however, we have not heard Canon Kirkpatrick to the end—"the bitter end", one may be pardoned for saying. He continues: "But in the present day we have new difficulties to meet, in view of the results at which criticism arrives as to the origin and character of the books of the Old Testament. In what sense, it may be asked, can this legislation that is now said to be Mosaic in elemental germ and idea only, and to represent not the inspired deliverance of a supremely great individual, but the

²³ *Op. cit.*, p. 88.

painful efforts of many generations of law-makers; these histories which have been compiled from primitive traditions, and chronicles, and annals, and what not; these books of prophecy which are not the authentic autographs of the prophets, but posthumous collections of such writings—if any—as they left behind them, eked out by the recollections of their disciples; these Proverbs and Psalms that have been handed down by tradition, and altered, and edited, and re-edited; these histories which contain errors of date and fact, and have been perhaps ‘idealized’ by the reflection of the circumstances and ideas of the writers’ own times upon a distant past; these seeming narratives which may be allegories; and these would be prophecies which may be histories;—in what sense can these be said to be inspired? ²⁴ Here, as before, it is not any “theory of inspiration”, but the very “fact of inspiration” itself that is in question. And here, as before, the alleged “fact of inspiration” is in question because it comes into “awkward collision with” certain alleged “facts” as to the origin and the literary forms of the Old Testament. Canon Kirkpatrick speaks only the truth when he follows his recital of these alleged “facts” with the statement: “The problems raised are grave”. Grave they certainly are for those who in the face of such alleged facts feel compelled to contrive some “theory of inspiration” sufficiently amorphous and sufficiently elastic to enable them still to hold on to the theory of “the fact of inspiration”. One is not surprised that Canon Kirkpatrick should discourage the attempt to formulate a theory of inspiration to fit such “facts”. Moreover, he would be lacking in proper sympathy for one in imminent peril of making shipwreck of his dearest hopes who could wish Canon Kirkpatrick less success than the latter has in his effort to avoid the inevitable “awkward collision” with “the alleged results at which criticism arrives as to the origin and character of the books of the Old Testament” and his theory that the in-

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 88.

spiration of these books is a "fact". What does he do? For one thing he cites the well-meant, but none too clearly conceived or too carefully phrased, caution of Bishop Westcott commented upon above.²⁵ But surely it is one thing "presumptuously to stake the inspiration and Divine authority of the Old Testament on any foregone conclusion as to the method and shape in which the records have come down to us" and a very different thing to cling to "the inspiration and Divine authority of the Old Testament" in the face and teeth of such "results" of criticism as those alleged by Canon Kirkpatrick. Are we, then, to be open-minded and submissive to the evidence only when criticism is busy with the matter of the origin and literary forms of the Old Testament, but the reverse when criticism turns to consider the significance of its findings touching these matters for the alleged "fact of inspiration"?

But evidently Canon Kirkpatrick's chief reason for clinging to "the fact of inspiration" even when confronted with such alleged results of criticism as those that he enumerates in the passage cited above lies in the fact that "the Old Testament is placed in the hands of the Christian Church as the inspired, authoritative record of God's revelation of Himself to His chosen people, and of His education of that people. We accept it as such on the authority of Christ and His Apostles."²⁶ In a word, to save "the fact of the inspiration" of the Old Testament, when confronted with alleged results of criticism such as those we have been considering, Canon Kirkpatrick falls back upon "the authority of Christ and His Apostles". One can only regret that here the Canon has not followed his own futile advice, and so avoided creating an embarrassing dilemma, if not for others, at least for himself. For evidently he overlooks some things of no small importance. For one thing, he overlooks the fact that there is nothing in the New Testament to suggest that our Lord's endorsement of the

²⁵ *Supra.* p. 604.

²⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 89.

inspiration of the Old Testament either was given or would have been given with any such alleged facts as those enumerated above before His mind. Further still and more vital, Canon Kirkpatrick overlooks the fact that an endorsement, no matter by whom given, does not and cannot impart any value to the instrument upon which it is placed, nor character to the person from whom the instrument proceeds. At most it certifies to the value that the endorser believes the writing to possess, and to his estimate of the character of him whose name the writing bears. Finally, Canon Kirkpatrick overlooks the fact that, because this is true, many an endorser has simply bankrupted himself, without benefiting him for whom he endorsed. So much at any rate is indisputable—namely, that it is alleged facts touching the origin and literary forms of the books of the Bible similar to those cited by Canon Kirkpatrick that have led men like Kuenen, Wellhausen, and F. Delitzsch to volatilize the notion of inspiration “till all distinction between Scripture and other books is obliterated, and the inspiration of Moses and Isaiah is held to be not materially different from the inspiration of Solon or Aeschylus”. Nor will it do to say that the denial of “the fact of inspiration” in the case of such men is due to “philosophic postulates”. Their conclusions as to the origin and literary forms of the books of the Bible have unquestionably been materially affected by their “naturalistic world-view”. But their denial of “the fact of inspiration” is directly traceable to their conclusions as to the origin and literary forms of the books of Scripture. They themselves trace it to this source.

Such, then, is the discipline that, at least since the time of Eichhorn, has been seeking to get itself recognized, formulated, and suitably named: and such are the postulates upon which its claim to recognition securely rest.

But readers who have followed this discussion thus far are likely even yet to find their minds disturbed by two questions. How, they will ask, is it possible that a discipline

so obviously legitimate and necessary as the one whose claims we have been considering could fail to get itself promptly recognized? Before answering this question, it is important to notice that it is one thing for a discipline to get itself recognized and formulated, and another and totally different thing for it to get itself used. It is safe to say that all disciplines have gotten themselves used long before they have gotten themselves formulated or even recognized as distinct entities. And so it has been with the discipline we have been considering. Used long before the time of Eichhorn, it has been used more and more extensively since his time. But men have, so to speak, merely blundered into the use of it—and accordingly have blundered constantly and abundantly in their use of it. They have used it unconsciously; and the result has been great confusion and needless bitterness. Hence the need of getting it formally recognized and organized. How they could thus have used this discipline and yet could have failed to recognize the instrument they were using and the fact that they were using it will become clear from a glance at the origin of disciplines in general. What we call “disciplines”, are neither fortuitous, fiat, nor conventional products. They originate in an inner necessity of the human spirit and develop under the operation of an inner law of their own being. They are, and they are what they are *ex necessitate rei*. Given a felt need or craving of the human spirit, then immediately the latter sets itself to work to meet the need and to satisfy the craving. The result is what we call a “discipline”—that is an organized rational method of mastering a given subject or of affecting a given end in the realm of the spirit. This result, however, is usually slowly and tediously brought to pass. The discipline at the outset comes “without observation”, and gets itself gradually more and more developed through use—the use consisting of many tentative, abortive, and even unconscious strivings of the mind to attain its end or satisfy its craving. Without going into

details it must suffice here to say that disciplines are frequently intimately interrelated and interdependent; they are engaged upon the same subject-matter—though, of course, upon different aspects of it; or, if upon the same aspect, for different purposes; or, if upon the same subject-matter and for the same purpose, still they approach it from different sides. Hence a discipline may and usually does long remain undifferentiated from associated and kindred disciplines, and is longer still in securing recognition as a distinct entity. Even to this day historical criticism—that is the discipline that deals with origins, with all origins of everything and of every kind, and with the genetic relations of things—when engaged with the origin of a book, or of a literary form is habitually spoken of as literary criticism, especially if it uses literary data for determining origin. But, of course, this is a mere infelicity of usage—though, as it appears to the writer, not only a needless, but an embarrassing infelicity. Literary criticism, as it seems to him, is a term that may well be limited to other aspects of books than their becoming and subsequent vicissitudes. At any rate, one reason why the discipline that we have been considering has hitherto failed of recognition as a distinct entity has been because of the intimate relation in which it stands both to historical and to literary criticism. Scholars have started consciously upon an investigation into the origin of a book, or into an investigation into the literary forms employed in it; and when they have reached their conclusions they have either dismissed the whole matter from their minds, or else have more or less unconsciously passed on to consider the significance of their historical and literary conclusions for other features of the book without taking account of the fact that when historical and literary criticism have reached their respective conclusions they have also reached the end of their respective tethers and can go no further. In other words, they have failed to notice that just so soon as we ask, What is the significance of the conclusions of

historical criticism for this or that feature of the book, we must look for the answer to some other discipline than historical criticism, which with the determination of origin has become *functus officio*. Further, in the case of the discipline whose claims to recognition we have had under consideration there have been special reasons why Christian scholars, when investigating the origin and literary forms of the books of the Bible, have found it easy not to raise the inquiry, What is the significance of the conclusions that we have reached for the value of these books to "the religious man"? All Christian scholars were agreed that the value of these books to "the religious man" arises from their "inspiration"; and all were officially committed to "the fact of inspiration". Consequently they felt neither the disposition nor the necessity for raising the question, What is the significance of the results of historical and literary criticism for the inspiration of the books of the Bible? They were, and many of them still are content to "assume the fact of inspiration". And this brings us to the second question that may well have puzzled my readers—namely,

How was it possible for intelligent men to fail to see, and for honest men to ignore, the determining relation that conclusions as to the origin and the literary forms of the books of the Bible sustain to their value for "the religious man"? The answer to this question differs in different cases. That many Christian laymen of high intelligence should be misled was almost inevitable. Nothing would be easier than for them to see in the question of "origin", for instance, a mere question of dates, place and names, and in the question as to the literary forms used in the Bible a mere question as to the abstract propriety of using this or that literary form as a vehicle for a divine revelation. They did not fail to perceive that these questions are matters of historical and literary criticism. So regarding them, their innate common sense, as well as all their training in modern ideas and methods, satisfied them that

it was futile to attempt to hold the Bible immune from historical and literary criticism, and unreasonable to make the inspiration of its several books turn upon a mere matter of date—except, perhaps in very extreme cases and such as did not seem to them actually to occur—or the name of the author, or of the use of one literary form rather than another. And in these illusions they were encouraged by the loose thinking and looser statements of not a few Christian scholars. But what doubtless decided many of them in the belief that the inspiration of the books of the Bible was not and could not be affected by one's conclusions as to the origin and literary forms of these books was the fact that they saw men of equal intelligence, equal honesty, and equal "piety" unite in declaring that the Scriptures were of the highest value to "the religious man" though they differed from one another *toto caelo* upon the question of the origin and the literary form of these books. Nor could even intelligent laymen reasonably be expected to trace this strange agreement to its true, but hidden source. For, though unquestionably true, it sounds in the last degree paradoxical to say that men will often agree in pronouncing the Bible to be of the supremest value to "the religious man" simply because they differ *toto caelo* as to the nature of religion itself. But the appearance of paradox here will disappear before a little reflection.

The case of the Christian scholar calls for a somewhat different explanation. In this latter instance we have a striking illustration of the fact that, where there is a will not to do a thing, men usually find a way not to do it. As we have already seen Christian scholars entered upon the work of the historical and literary criticism of the books of the Bible already committed officially and otherwise to "the fact of the inspiration" of these books. If at times embarrassed by the alleged results of criticism, they contented themselves sometimes by decrying the obscurantism that objected to historical and literary criticism of the Bible; sometimes by saying "faith came before criticism";

sometimes by calling themselves "believing or evangelical" as opposed to "unbelieving or rationalistic" critics; and sometimes simply by saying, "in all our work we assume the inspiration of the Bible". And the futility of all this was hidden from their eyes, because they flattered themselves that their faith in the inspiration of the Scriptures rested upon a foundation that could not be affected by any conclusions of criticism—for example, upon the witness of the Divine Spirit; or the wonderful and beneficent results that have invariably followed in the wake of the acceptance of the Bible; or, best of all, upon "the authority of Christ and His Apostles". Finally, the notorious elasticity of language is responsible for the "blindness in part" that befell not a few of them, this elasticity enabling them to make confession in the vocabulary of the creeds when, as a matter of fact, they were thinking in the terms of modern deism.

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W. M. MCPHEETERS.

REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE

Trends of Thought and Christian Truth. By JOHN A. W. HAAS, President of Muhlenberg College; Professor of Religion and Philosophy. Boston, Richard G. Badger: Toronto, The Copp Clark Co., 1915. Pp. 329.

This volume consists of lectures of President Haas, delivered at Muhlenberg College and repeated at Wittenberg College and at the Hanna Divinity School. The author's aim is to set forth the leading trends of modern thought and to discuss their relation to Christianity. In doing this he exhibits a wide acquaintance with the literature of modern philosophy in Great Britain and America, and a considerable knowledge of modern German philosophical thought. So much ground, however, is covered in so brief a space, that the necessary condensation produces in the reader the feeling, not only that there is a lack of orderly and systematic exposition of the different philosophical systems, but also that the author sometimes fails to enter thoroughly and sympathetically enough into these trends of thought to enable him to give a clear exposition of their meaning. This fact also renders any outline of the contents of the several chapters very difficult.

The volume is divided into two parts. In Part I the author deals with questions which are to a large extent those of scientific method and logic. He points out some of the logical and methodological fallacies involved in various attacks upon Christianity. There are eight chapters dealing with the mathematical method, induction, analogy, conjecture, mechanism, biology, and sociology. These chapters are instructive; but since they confine themselves largely to questions of scientific method in its application to Christian Theology, the real interest of the book lies in Part II.

Part II deals with the various modern attempts at a solution of the problems of the theory of knowledge and of metaphysics. These two questions of course are closely related, and yet they are not kept sufficiently distinct in the author's exposition and criticism to enable one to get a clear understanding of the trends of thought which are discussed. For example, Absolutism is discussed as "a method of approaching the problem of truth," but the main criticisms made against it refer to its metaphysics rather than to its epistemology. This is true of all the chapters in Part II to a large extent.

The first chapter of this Part is entitled "The Finding of Truth." Here at the outset we are met with a confusion of epistemological and metaphysical questions. The "absolutist," Haas says, believes in the existence and absoluteness of truth "before all searching and finding."

He "identifies truth and reality." On the other hand the Pragmatist and Vitalist believe that truth is always in a process of becoming, in which it is made to be truth. Here we have the identification of thought and being, characteristic of the metaphysics of absolute idealism, set over against the epistemological attitude of pragmatism. If this is the alternative, where can we find a place for one who rejects pragmatism, who believes that truth is not made but found, but yet who rejects the metaphysics of absolutism? We may believe that truth exists absolutely and is discovered by or revealed to man, *i. e.* we may reject pragmatism, and at the same time not fall into the clutches of the metaphysics of absolute idealism with its identification of thinking and being. Indeed this latter is the position of Haas, but he has not given any adequate basis for his position because of the above false antithesis which he has set up, and because of his failure to give any adequate discussion of the question—What is truth?

Proceeding from this antithesis as to the nature of truth, the author discusses Absolutism in the next chapter. He outlines very briefly the views of Hegel, Bradley, Royce, and Joachim. Truth is here identified with an absolute experience which is reality, and in which all finite contradictions are taken up and overcome in the whole. This is a fair description of Absolutism, but the real nature of this philosophy can be brought only out when its genesis from what is known as "objective idealism" in epistemology is traced. Absolutism has characteristically taken the form of absolute idealism, and its origin from the passage from "subjective idealism" through "objective idealism" to "absolute idealism," throws much light upon its nature and fundamental features, which President Haas has failed to point out. Moreover it is a question whether Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* should not be regarded as perhaps the most conspicuous criticism of the most characteristic forms of absolute idealism, while Royce's more recent works show so much the influence of "Voluntarism," as to render doubtful his classification here.

When, however, President Haas turns to point out the discrepancy between Absolutism and Christianity, he is on solid ground. He points to its failure to do justice to the personality of God and man, the loss of the idea of individual immortality and of the value of the individual soul, and the inability of Absolutism to give any adequate view of the nature of evil or the distinction between good and evil.

The third chapter is on "Mysticism." This is described as the merging of reason into the intuition of absolute being through feeling. There is no attempt at any precise definition of mysticism, or any discrimination of its various types or any thorough discrimination between it and those features of Christianity which are sometimes termed mystical. But again when the author comes to discuss its discrepancy with Christianity, he puts his finger on essential points such as the pantheizing tendency of mysticism to merge the individual in the Infinite Being, to lose the idea of the personality of God, and to a thorough going subjectivism in its ideas of truth and revelation.

Pragmatism is the subject of chapters four and five, the former chap-

ter describing it, and the latter indicating its relation to Christianity. Pragmatism, says Haas, holds that truth is the result of practice, and that "beliefs are rules for action"; that truth is not a quality which inheres in an idea, but something "which happens to" an idea. An idea is true because it works well in our experience, and if it be asked what working well means, the pragmatist would reply in biological terms of the adjustment of the individual to his environment. After describing pragmatism, Haas shows how it conflicts with fundamental Christian ideas. Here once more his criticisms are just. If truth is constituted or made in human experience, Christianity cannot be a supernatural revelation of truth, for such revelation would be impossible. Christianity, moreover, Haas says, sets forth norms of truth and conduct which cannot be longer valid on the utilitarian and biological pre-suppositions of pragmatism. Moreover, the historical effects of Christianity are the result of its truth, and are therefore an argument for its truth; they do not constitute its truth.

When, however, Haas comes to speak of Pluralism, Personal Idealism, and of the idea of a finite God, it is very doubtful if he is right in tracing these metaphysical beliefs to pragmatism, though they have been held by writers who have adopted the attitude of pragmatism. In point of fact pragmatism is an attitude rather than a metaphysics or even a theory of knowledge. Take for example James and Dewey. Both in a certain sense are pragmatists, *i.e.* both adopt this attitude toward truth. And yet James' epistemology is that of "radical empiricism" or "pure experience" with certain resemblances to Avenarius' "empirio-criticism," while that of Dewey would seem to be a species of realism.

The sixth chapter discusses "Vitalism," selecting Bergson and Eucken as representatives of this trend of thought. The author concludes that Christianity must dissent from this philosophy since it has no definite personal God, no divine-human Christ, no real appreciation of sin and guilt, no real atonement, and no really Spirit-guided Church. The differences between Eucken and Bergson are recognized and stated; Bergson's conception of teleology is sharply criticised in its weakest point; and perhaps this may be said to be the most satisfactory chapter of the volume.

The concluding chapter on the New Realism is not so satisfactory. Anyone who is acquainted with the literature of this movement will realize that it is not an easy task to give a clear exposition of this philosophy. Haas gives a description of its general position which, though fairly accurate, nevertheless leaves the impression that he has not thoroughly appreciated its position, while his criticism of it as being materialistic would certainly be repudiated by its representatives, though it has a certain amount of justification from certain views of some of them. The author's failure here is due to the fact that he has not set forth the movement in its historical relations and genesis.

Since the New Realism may be unfamiliar to some of the readers of this notice, we can get a clearer idea of it by setting it forth in its

historical relations as they are viewed by the New Realists themselves. It is distinctly a movement in the sphere of epistemology. It is a protest especially against Idealism and against the dualistic or representative theory of knowledge, and against the substance idea in metaphysics.

A theory of knowledge may be either monistic or dualistic, and it may be idealistic or realistic. It is well to begin with clear definitions of terms. According to the terminology adopted in the Report of the Committee on Definitions at the meeting of the American Philosophical Association in 1911 (see the *Journal of Phil., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* vol. VIII p 703; and see also MacIntosh, *The Problem of Knowledge*, p. 13), epistemological monism is the view that the experienced object and the real object are, at the moment of perception, numerically identical. Epistemological dualism is the view that the experienced object and the real object are, at the moment of perception numerically two or distinct. Epistemological idealism is the view that the real object cannot exist at other moments than that of perception or of some conscious experience, or independently of such experience. Epistemological realism is the view that the real object can exist at other moments than that of perception or of any other conscious experience, and that it exists independently of any such experience or knowledge of the object. The combinations of these views which have played a large part in modern philosophy are epistemological dualism combined with realism or idealism, epistemological monism and idealism, and epistemological monism and realism. The New Realism is epistemological monism and realism.

We are now in a position to understand the historical genesis of the New Realism. It appears most clearly, as the new realists themselves tell us (see *The New Realism*, by E. B. Holt, W. T. Marvin, W. P. Montague, R. B. Perry, W. B. Pitkin, and E. G. Spaulding, Introduction), in its relations to "naïve realism," "dualism," and "subjectivism." The theory of naïve realism conceives of objects as directly presented to consciousness and as being precisely what they appear to be. Objects are not represented in consciousness by ideas; they are directly presented to consciousness. This view makes no distinction between "seeming and being"; "things are just what they seem." With the discovery of illusion and error difficulties and problems arise. The most primitive method of dealing with the phenomena of illusion and error is to divide the real world into two realms, each real and external, the one visible and tangible, the other invisible and mysterious. This latter, the ghost-land of the savage, or perhaps the abode of the soul after death, is the sphere in which the objects of illusion and error are supposed to have a real existence. But such a world, even if it existed, would explain few of the phenomena in question. They have to be banished from the real or external world, and are held to exist "only in the mind" of the individual experiencing them. When, now, to the above phenomena are added those necessary temporal and spatial conditions of perception which are well nigh universally regarded as aberrations of perception, the conclusion is reached that error is a necessary taint from which every perceptual experience must suffer.

Hence "naïve realism" has been abandoned in favour of "dualism." According to this theory, as represented by DesCartes and Locke, the mind never experiences any external object, but only its own states or ideas. In order to explain ideas of external objects, a world of such objects is inferred which our ideas are supposed in some way to resemble or represent and our ideas are supposed to be the effects of such external objects. We now might find an explanation of illusion, but at the cost of abandoning all knowledge of the external world. The only external world, as epistemological monists of all sorts have pointed out, is one that we can never experience; the only world of which we can have any experience is a purely subjective world of our own ideas. The external world which we are supposed to infer would have to be a perceptible world *i.e.* one that could be experienced, and yet according to this view we can only experience mental states. Even if we could make the inferential leap to an external world, it would *ex hypothesi* be an unknown world; it could contain none of the things which we see and feel and hear. It would be a world more "thoroughly queer," as one new realist says, than the ghost-land of the savage.

Consequently we are led by a rejection of this dualism with its consequent agnosticism, back into "subjectivism," *i.e.* we are led to leave out this world of transcendent objects or so-called extra-mental objects, and to believe in a world in which there exist simply minds and their states. To be is to be perceived. This theory agrees with naïve realism in being monistic in its theory of knowledge, *i.e.* in holding to a presentative rather than a representative theory of perception. But it agrees with the dualistic theory, and differs from naïve realism, in regarding all perceived objects as mental states.

This is the position of Berkeley whose view developed naturally from that of DesCartes and Locke. These last named philosophers had already taken a step toward subjective idealism. Their dualistic or representative theory seemed to break down in regard to the so-called "secondary qualities" of physical objects. These qualities, as we perceive them, are not even copies of external reality, they supposed. Since, then, secondary qualities are relative to the percipient subject, and since this relativity was supposed to imply pure subjectivity, these qualities were regarded as purely subjective. But it was an easy task for Berkeley to point out that the so-called primary qualities were equally relative to a percipient subject, and Berkeley drew the conclusion that these qualities were also purely subjective. The *esse* of everything is its *percipi*. The whole physical world is reduced to the status of ideas.

But Berkeley retained the idea of relations between ideas, and of a spiritual substance or the self or perceiver, and so saved himself from utter scepticism as to the existence of the finite self and God. It was Hume who followed out the logic of the situation. He realized that if we know only mental states, we can know no self, no spiritual substance or subject, much less God an Infinite Spirit. The result is a complete scepticism or phenomenalism. At this point we meet with

Kant. He insists with all idealists that knowledge is "constitutive" of its object. But he seeks escape from subjectivism by a double dualism, *i.e.* by his postulation of unknowable things-in-themselves, and by his distinction between the empirical and the transcendental knower. New dualistic difficulties are thus introduced, and the post-Kantian idealistic philosophy sought to escape these by eliminating Kant's notion of the thing-in-itself, and by the identification of all the transcendental selves with the Absolute Self.

But the difficulties are not overcome, and the New Realists realize this and call attention to it. For if the experience of the finite self embraces the experience of the Absolute, the Absolute loses its absoluteness and becomes reduced to a state of experience of the finite self, or, as one of the new realists puts it, "the existence of the Absolute will then depend upon the fact that it is known by its own fragments, and each fragmentary self will have to assume that its own experience constitutes the entire universe—which is solipsism." On the other hand, if the experience of the finite self does not embrace in any way some part of the experience of the Absolute, then either the Absolute becomes unknowable, or the finite self and its experience is merged in the Absolute Experience and is lost.

Now the New Realist begins by asserting that the fundamental difficulty is the unwarrantable assumption of all idealism that knowledge is "constitutive" of its objects; that because objects when known are related to knowledge, this knowing of them modifies them or even constitutes their being, so that they depend for their existence upon some knower either finite or infinite. All objects, the New Realist asserts, simply exist, and exist in relations. These relations are all external to the things, terms, or objects related, and so do not modify the things related. One thing may stand in a number of different relations, and in each case it is unmodified by these relations. This is called the theory of external relations. Now knowledge, it is claimed, is just one of these external relations in which things stand; it in no way constitutes or modifies its object. Reality, then, consists of things in relation, and knowledge is one of these relations, and is an external relation like all others. Idealism is held to be the result of the fallacy that all relations are "internal" and modify the things related. Idealism is also guilty of the fallacy of arguing from the "ego-centric predicament," *i.e.* the argument that because all things known are the objects of knowledge, therefore the being of a thing consists in its being known.

Thus New Realism seeks to escape from the epistemological fallacies of Idealism. But it will escape also from dualism in epistemology, or from the idea that in perception we have "sensations" or "ideas" which are supposed to represent real objects. Take but one example—that of a so-called secondary quality, a colour. If, argues the New Realist, the green tree is not green, are there any such things as green sensations which are supposed to copy or represent green? What in the world is a green sensation? And if the tree is not green and the sensation is not green, where is the greenness and what is it? The same

criticism is carried through consistently and a monistic or presentative view of perception is maintained. The objects of perception are directly and immediately perceived. They are directly "in consciousness," and external only to the bodily organism.

So far, so good. But we are not at the end of the matter by any means. What does it mean to be "in consciousness," and what is consciousness? For an object to be in consciousness cannot mean that it inheres in a substance, for this substance idea is abhorrent to the New Realist and is regarded as one of the roots of Idealism. Nor can being in consciousness mean for the New Realist to be the object of a knower's awareness, for this is to introduce a dualism which regards consciousness as subjective and its objects as objective, whereas for the New Realist consciousness itself is objective. Moreover consciousness is complex, or, in a word, it is itself just a complex of objects. Thus according to Holt (*Concept of Consciousness* pp. 136 sq.), consciousness is just the objects or complex of things which constitute its content. He thinks that it follows from the rejection of the representative theory, that "my idea of a thing is part of the thing," or "better, that part of the thing is my consciousness of it." In other words, consciousness is practically wiped out, and Holt actually defines consciousness as that part of the world of external objects to which some nervous system responds. We have thus reduced the knower to the complex of his mental states, and we have further identified these with external objects. But what about that thing which the psychologists call "awareness"? Even if it could exist without a subject or self, it cannot be wiped out for here it is with us, and no New Realist, so far as we know, has attempted any explanation of it.

Thus New Realism has sought to solve the problem of knowledge by practically eliminating the knower. It then has realized that the "experience" or manifold of experienced objects which it has left, cannot well be called just "experience" absolutely, as in the "radical empiricism" of James or the "empiro-criticism" of Avenarius, because what is experience without a self which has it? Hence New Realism takes this manifold of conscious contents and calls it objective, affirming that it consists of what the New Realist terms "neutral entities."

But what, then, is the metaphysics which underlies all this, and what is meant by "neutral entities"? It might seem as if, in their eagerness to do away with all dualism in their epistemology, the New Realists had done away with consciousness and had leaped into materialism. But they by no means intend to be materialistic. They fully recognize that some "things" are mental and some are physical, that these two kinds of things have different qualities, and that neither one can be derived from the other. What they wish to avoid, however, is the idea of substance and especially Descartes' idea of mind and matter as two mutually exclusive substances. Holt, for example, insists, therefore, that the ultimate constituents of the universe of being are neither material nor mental. They are of the same "stuff" as logical

and mathematical terms. Minds and material things are specific complexes of these "neutral entities," and although the distinction between the two is not to be done away with, it is not one of substance. The entire variety of the universe of being is supposed to be generated in some way from these "neutral entities" by a logical necessity and process. Their position is largely based upon the mathematical work of Bertrand Russell who is the High Priest of the New Realism, though I am informed that he has since repudiated many of the mathematical ideas upon which the New Realists have devotedly relied.

The difficulties in this view are great. Being, we are told, is neutral. Just because it denotes everything, it connotes nothing. Because mind is something, it cannot be everything. The same thing, of course, can be said of matter. But if being is thus neutral and connotes nothing, it likewise explains nothing. The problems of reality, as Lovejoy has pointed out in criticising Holt (*Philosophical Review*, vol. XXIII pp. 664 sq.), lie on the hither side of the concept of "being" when it is thus conceived. They are the problems of mind and matter and their relation. If some things are mental and some material, and if the things called mental admittedly have different qualities from physical things, what meaning can it have to say that they are of the same substance and to describe it as neutral substance? If the concept Being denotes everything and so connotes nothing, mind and matter nevertheless connote something definitely distinct, and so it is senseless to ascribe to them neutral substance which connotes nothing.

Moreover, the attempted derivation by a kind of logical generation of the entire universe of concrete reality from these so-called neutral entities is wholly artificial, and would seem to endow logic and mathematics with a dynamic power which they do not appear to possess. This attempt has been subjected to a searching criticism by Lovejoy in the review of Holt's book just referred to. Bergson's vital force might get somewhere even if it did not know where it was going, but it is difficult to see how the logical and mathematical terms of the New Realism could get anywhere even if they knew where they wished to go.

We have digressed, we fear, at too great length from President Haas' book in order to give some idea of the New Realism which is a new and not well understood movement in contemporary philosophy. We close by commending these lectures of President Haas to all those who seek a conspectus of modern philosophical thought as a basis for work in Christian Apologetics.

C. W. HODGE.

Princeton.

Religion and Science a Philosophical Essay. By JOHN THEODORE MERY. Author of "A History of European Thoughts in the Nineteenth Century." William Blackwood and Sons, Edinburgh, and London. MCMXV. New York. Charles Scribner's Sons.

The position of the writer of this essay rests on an acceptance of

certain philosophical theories. He argues "that all our knowledge of what we term outer as well as inner things and events is for each of us individually comprised in the moving stream of thought on the firmament of the soul and is to be found nowhere else." He seeks to show that the outer is only a very small part of the "real world" and enters into an argument from the development of the consciousness of a little child. How very dangerous such a method of arguing is must be immediately recognized by the knowledge that our "firmament of the soul" in early childhood is almost entirely made up of the most rudimentary sensations due to our animal nature and that it certainly *does not* reveal to us a world of which the known physical world is but a small part. There follows a long, involved, and confused discussion in which it is shown to the satisfaction of the writer that the two worlds—the inner and the outer exist side by side—the inner being the more real and the larger. The writer's inability to define and his distrust of the scientific method of research lead to endless vagueness. Whether any result is finally attained the reader of the essay must judge for himself. There are certain parts of this little work that are worthy of consideration, but as a whole it would have been far better had it been edited, revised and clarified by less philosophical speculation and surer reasoning.

GORDON M. RUSSELL.

GENERAL THEOLOGY

Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. Edited by JAMES HASTINGS, with the assistance of JOHN A. SELBIE, M.A., D.D., Professor of the Old Testament Language and Literature in the United Free Church College, Aberdeen, and LOUIS H. GRAY, M.A., Ph.D., Sometime Fellow in Indo-Iranian Languages in Columbia University: New York. Volume VIII, *Life and Death—Mulla*. Royal 8vo. pp. xx, 910. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1916.

The eighth volume of the great *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* makes the same appeal to the scholarly world as its predecessors. Some hundred and eighty-five writers have taken part in its preparation. Of these about twenty-two are Americans; and the scope of the work is illustrated by the circumstance that only some half dozen of these can be, with the utmost stretch of the term, called theological writers—G. A. Barton, G. A. Coe, T. C. Hall, H. E. Jacobs, L. B. Paton, W. A. Shedd. The volume is, however, peculiarly rich in articles of distinctively theological interest. It opens with one of those extensive composite articles of which this *Encyclopaedia* makes a speciality—on Life and Death. Thirteen authors here cooperate to tell us how life and death have been conceived in various ethnic groups and they occupy forty-four double-columned pages in doing so. The closing article of the volume is a brief account of what a Mullah is.

When we open it at its exact centre we find ourselves in the midst of a very comprehensive composite article on Marriage, in twelve parts, covering nearly fifty pages.

The first section of the opening article treats of Life and Death from the Biological point of view. It is written by Professor J. Arthur Thomson of Aberdeen, and there is no writer engaged in popularizing biological speculation who writes more attractively. He combines breadth of view with detailed information, sympathy with balance, suggestiveness with pellucid clearness. This article is a model of what such an article ought to be. The position Professor Thomson occupies as to the main subject, he describes as that "of descriptive or 'methological' vitalism." It is really an agnostic attitude. He recognizes that the behavior of organisms cannot be adequately expressed in physico-chemical terms. There is something more: we call this something more "life." But what this "life" is remains a mystery. Once, it is true, he seems inclined to describe it as a "relation": at least he warns us not to lose sight of the fact that life is a relation. But he cannot mean that it is no more than a relation; and in another place he more adequately speaks of it as "one term in a relation," or in a whole series of relations perhaps we would better say. When he comes to speak of the question of variability, he says we must just take this power of producing distinctively new characters as "given." We have no account of it: "we can hardly do more at present than assume that the organism is essentially creative." Would it be possible to do "more" than this in any circumstances or at any time? To assume that the organism is "essentially creative" is a tremendous assumption which quite staggers the ordinary intelligence.

It is possible that Professor Thomson does not intend the word "creative" in its full sense; we are sure for our own part, at all events, that we shall never get out of any organism in the form of effect more than was already in it in the form of cause. We gladly revert, therefore, to an earlier statement which tells us that "development" is the expression of latent possibilities and brings out only "the intrinsic manifoldness of some primordium." We stand by the axiom that what is patent in the issue was latent in the conditions. But we fear Professor Thomson would not be satisfied with that. "We share in a moment," he says, "which is not the unrolling of something originally given but a creative evolution in which time counts." What he means by this is not, indeed, quite clear: but for our part, we are thoroughly assured that no time, however extended, can bring out of a primodium anything which was not previously in it. It is a suggestive remark which Professor Thomson drops by the way: "It looks as if a man is individual not only to his finger-prints, but to the elemental molecules."

We regret to say that we do not think that the excellence of Professor Thomson's article is sustained in the subsequent ones on the Hebrew and the Christian conceptions of Life and Death, the former

by Professor J. T. Marshall and the latter by Mr. W. F. Cobb. Each of these is dominated by a fad of its author's. The former is really a word-study—a word-study on the two words *Nephesh* and *Hayyim*: and the study of the former word is a sustained attempt to read the ideas of "primitive peoples" into the Hebrew record. The latter is largely occupied with an attempt to Gnosticise the idea of "aionian life."

The most interesting section of the great component article on Marriage, to the average reader at least, will naturally be Mr. W. M. Foley's discussion of Christian Marriage. This is founded on adequate knowledge and is written in a singularly free style. On the matter of divorce, unexpectedly liberal notions are sustained: on the basis of I Cor. vii it is suggested that Paul would permit divorce on the ground of "incompatibility of temper," and indeed it is somewhat broadly hinted that in such matters our own common sense rather than any prescribed rules must govern conduct. The passage in which this hint is dropped is sufficiently interesting from another point of view to warrant directing attention to it. Mr. Foley is writing of our Lord's teaching as to divorce and is naturally led to speak of the effect of recent Gospel criticism upon the matter. "The passages in the Synoptic Gospels," he writes, "have been treated as they stand in the New Testament, without any reference to the results of modern criticism; it will be generally admitted that such treatment is justified in dealing with ethical or doctrinal questions." For so remarkable a deliverance he naturally seeks support; and he finds it in some letters to *The Guardian* by W. C. Allen, who "though holding the critical view," yet "protests against making use of critical results to decide dogmatic questions." Is criticism then only an idle game which scholars amuse themselves with, fully understanding that its "results" are not to be depended on in the realm of truth? Or is it rather that dogmatic and ethical questions are *per se* independent of authority—even the authority of Jesus—and that therefore the ascertainment of His teaching has no significance for them? It is the latter horn of this dilemma that Mr. Foley takes. He goes the length of declaring that no settlement of the critical question is likely to affect very much the existing state of opinion on the matter involved: "the acceptance of the critical view will simply bring into greater prominence the fact that questions in this field have never really been decided on grounds either of exegesis or of authority, pure and simple, but that our interpretation of our Lord's teaching has always been guided by moral and theological considerations." That is to say, instead of building our dogmatics and ethics upon His teaching, we frame our own dogmatics and ethics first and then bend our Lord's teaching to them as best we may. So far as this is merely a historical statement of what men calling themselves Christian teachers have been accustomed to do, it must be sorrowfully confessed that it has only too much truth in it. So far as it is a commendation of a method of procedure, however, it deserves the profoundest reprobation. That, adopting such a principle of action, we should trouble to refer to

Christ at all betrays the essential dishonesty of the procedure. Obviously, we seek the appearance of following Him while declining to do so in reality. And this means of course that we formally give in our adherence to the dogma that Christ is authority in His Church,—for all ethical and dogmatic questions as well as others. If nevertheless we refuse to follow that authority when critically ascertained, that is the proof of our duplicity. We have no other organon except criticism to determine trustworthiness of transmission; we desert Christ Himself when we refuse to follow our critical results.

Our attention has been attracted to a series of related articles on Matter, Materialism, Monism, Mind. The former two are written by Dr. F. R. Tennant. The article on Matter contains a good brief account of the recent discussions on the ultimate constitution of matter. In assigning the article on Materialism to Dr. Tennant the custom often followed by this Encyclopaedia of committing subjects to sympathetic hands is broken. Not on this occasion, it must be confessed, with very good results. For, although Dr. Tennant very properly undertakes to refute Materialism, he does so on assumptions as one-sided as its own, and leaves the reader less instructed on Materialism than on Dr. Tennant's own doctrine of Spiritualism with its quite ungrounded equating of *esse* and *precipi*. The article on Monism, by R. Eucken is written with more careful objectivity. It is marred by the employment of the terms, nature, natural, naturalism, naturalistic as the opposites of spirit, spiritual, spiritualism, spiritualistic—a confusing usage which is fast growing into the accepted one. The proper opposite of spirit is, however, not nature but matter; of spiritualistic, is not naturalistic but materialistic. Dr. Tennant knows at least this. The most interesting of these articles, however, is that on Mind by Josiah Royce. It is given over almost entirely, however, to an epistemological discussion, the hinge of which is again, as in the author's *The Problem of Christianity*, derived from Charles Pierce's insistence on the recognition of a third mode of knowledge side by side with the perceptive and the conceptional, that is to say, the interpretative. So predominantly is mind kept in this discussion before the thought as object, that it falls pretty completely out of thought that it is always presupposed as subject. The reader who is not so fortunate as to forget this with the completeness of the author, is more puzzled than the author seems to be with the suggestion that the mind may be conceived "as an object whose being consists in the fact that it is to be interpreted thus and so." Nor is the reader much enlightened when it is explained to him that "this Alter, with which I have to deal, both in reflecting on my own mind, and in securing new light from my neighbor's, is never a merely single or separate, or merely detached or isolated individual, but is always a being which is of the nature of a community, a 'many in one and one in many'." Of course the whole discussion debouches into Professor Royce's particular brand of Idealism in which the idea of the self and the idea of a community of selves so interact that they coalesce. At one point, Professor

Royce makes the interesting remark that as mind "is essentially a being that manifests itself through signs, and the only being of signs consists in their demanding interpretation," there can be no such thing as an isolated mind: "the relations of mind are essentially social, so that a world without at least three minds in it,—one to be interpreted, one the interpreter, and the third the one for whom and to whom the first is interpreted—would be a world without any real mind in it at all." The force of this pluralistic reasoning is somewhat marred, it is true, by the concurrent tendency to find this requisite multiplicity within the bounds of the single mind—whether all at once or successively. We hear, for example, of "the past, present and future selves of one who is from another point of view, the same man"; and of one of these selves interpreting another of them for the benefit of the third. But there are some, no doubt, who will object as much to being betrayed into a pluralistic individuality as to being immersed in a pluralistic universe. Professor Royce writes also the article on Monotheism on the theory that the point of discussion concerns purely the matter of unity—so that, for example, pantheism is superlatively monotheistic. His contention is that any worthy idea of God must synthesize the types which may somewhat conventionally be called the Hebraic, the Hellenic and the Hindu. This is another instance of committing an important topic to a not very friendly hand.

The volume contains an unusually large number of articles describing great religious movements or sects. Here is a series of articles, for example, on Mohammed and Mohammedanism, dominated by D. S. Margoliouth, from which we learn, on the whole, how bad Mohammed and Mohammedanism are. Then W. Brandt tells us all that is known about the Mandaeans, and perhaps something more besides. A. A. Bevan gives a good summary of the present state of knowledge of the Manichaeans, and H. Stuart Jones deals somewhat externally with Mithraism. G. Krueger, a skeptic, has been called upon to give accounts of Monophysitism and Monothelism, and Hugh Pope, a Romanist, of Monarchianism—with the expected results. Of Protestant sects we have articles on Luther and on Lutheranism by Henry E. Jacobs, on the Moravians by E. R. Hasse, and on Methodism by John S. Simon and George G. Findlay: even the Muggletonians (W. T. Whitley) are not forgotten. The rule has been followed in dealing with the major Protestant sects, it will be observed, of committing the subjects to sympathetic hands, and in these instances with excellent results. We have been particularly interested in Professor Findlay's brief account of the Doctrine of Methodism. He represents in effect this doctrinal system as an ellipse revolving around the two foci of "the attainability of the salvation in Christ" both in an extensive and in an intensive sense; that is to say around the two doctrines of the universal atonement and the perfectibility of the human heart. "The current orthodoxy," says he, "limited the salvation of Christ in the degree of its attainability as well as in the persons by whom it is attainable." Methodism lifted these limitations: salvation, it proclaims, is attain-

able by all, and is completely attainable. We may all, here and now, be "*freed from the last remains of sin.*" Professor Friday omits to observe that this ellipse very readily resolves itself into a circle, and that the centre around which this circle revolves is an inevitable IF. Salvation is attainable by all—if; if, that is, all will in their own freedom of action accept it. Salvation is perfectly attainable—if; if, that is, all, in their own freedom of action elect to pursue it diligently to the end. Salvation, once attained, once perfectly attained, is retainable—if; if, that is, those who have attained it elect in their own free action to retain it. How many of these all will in the circumstances in which they act, elect to attain this attainable Gospel, to attain it perfectly, to retain it, if perchance it is once attained? We must sorrowfully answer, None. For the Gospel has been sent into a world not of universal will but of universal won't. Now in a world of universal won't something more is needed than that the door of salvation should be thrown open to all, however widely. What is needed is the bringing of men into it. That it is God and God alone who can and does do this we are very pleasantly reminded by the excellent article on Molinism by Professor Aelred Whiteacre in which we have been more interested than in any other of the articles on particular theological parties. It is an admirable example of the good results which may be attained by committing a topic to an inimical hand, when that inimical hand is at the same time a just one. Writing from the Dominican standpoint, Professor Whiteacre nevertheless gives a very carefully exact account of Molinist teaching and opposes to it with eminent success the Thomist doctrine of salvation by the sovereign grace of God alone.

The commitment of Molinism to unfriendly hands has been very fairly compensated for by the commitment of Loyola to the very friendly, but at the same time, very competent hands of Herbert Thurston. The same writer gives us also the very apologetical article on Liguori. Liguori's ethical system is defended, apparently on the single ground that the Church of Rome is committed to it. The gross Mariolatry of *Le Glorie di Maria* is defended on the ground that it was written for Mariolatrous Neapolitans, and further "as a protest against what Liguori considered to be a veiled attack on the simple and childlike devotion to the Blessed Virgin which he shared, and which is a very important factor in the religion of his countrymen." This seems to amount to saying not that we ought to teach only what is true and right, but that it is right to teach whatever those whom we address consider to be true. Meanwhile, whether what Liguori teaches concerning Mary is true and right seems to be left undetermined: for the fact that Neapolitans believe it is not demonstration that it is true. Herbert Thurston also writes the articles on Loreto and Lourdes. Of course he cannot withstand the systematic refutation of the whole legend of the Holy House of Loreto which U. Chevalier published some ten or fifteen years ago. But he enters the lists for Lourdes. Even so, however, at the end he seems half inclined

to listen to a suggestion made by Alexis Correl to the late Monsignor Benson to the effect that the cures at Lourdes may be due to "a transference of vitalizing force either from the energetic faith of the sufferer, or from that of the bystanders." He does not tell us how this explanation differs from the despised "suggestion" which he rejects out of hand. Is it more than a guess as to how "suggestion" works? Nor does he tell us how it saves the miraculous character of the cures.

Nobody, however, believes in real miracles any longer. We say this with our eye on the article "Miracles" in this Encyclopaedia. It is written by Dr. John Arnott MacCulloch, a distinguished clergyman of the Scottish Episcopal Church, and author of a work of value on *The Religion of the Ancient Celts*. He is one of the voluminous writers in this volume of the Encyclopaedia, supplying articles, not only on Miracles, but also on the Primitive Notion of Light and Darkness, Locks and Keys, Lycanthropy, Celtic Magic, Metamorphosis, Monsters, Mountains and Mountain Gods, and Mouth. His studies, we see, have led him chiefly to the exploration of topics in natural religion. This has broadened the field which he surveys in his article on Miracles, very much to its advantage. Yet it gives him also a tendency to conceive of what we call miraculous, no matter how mysterious, as always at bottom natural,—“the reign of law is not set aside, for the ways in which miracle is brought about are still in accordance with law, even if the miracle happens but once.” We are inclined to set C. W. Emmet’s important article “Messiah,” by the side of MacCulloch’s “Miracles,” as marked on the whole by the same general tone. Mr. Emmet is fully informed on the investigations of the new History of Religion school into the development of Israelitish Eschatology; but he does not permit himself to be moved by it from the general position arrived at by the school of psychological criticism. He still minimizes the Messianic hope in the Old Testament, considers it late in origin and assigns it but a small and inconspicuous place in the religion of Israel. This leaves him in some difficulty with the developed Messianic hope not only of the post-Biblical Judaism but of New Testament presupposition. But when we are once embarked on the minimizing path we can ordinarily deal with such things very well.

We have read with pleasure the informing articles on Pseudo-Messiahs (A. M. Hyasom) and Mahdi (D. S. Margoliouth) and the great collection of articles on Magic (fifteen sections, covering nearly a hundred pages). We admire very much the excellent historical sketch—from its start to its finish,—of Modernism by A. W. Lilley. And no one surely will have this volume very long in his hands before he turns to the extended article on Missions (fifty pages). Here he will find an adequate condensed history of Christian Missions in three sections—Early and Mediaeval, Roman Catholic, and Protestant,—and good brief parallel accounts of the Missionary activities of Buddhists, Mahommedans and Zoroastrians. We cannot hope to give any impression, however, of the value of the volume by thus noting a few of its

articles, which we have by hazard been led to read. It must suffice to say that its vocabulary is well-nigh exhaustive in its special field, and its articles are uniformly written with learning and care. It has a general tone, it is true, which is not in all respects agreeable to us. This tone, for lack of a better phrase, may be spoken of, perhaps, as "Liberal." Every point of view is certainly, on occasion, admitted to its pages. But the point of view which is least in evidence in them—shall we say, is least welcome in them?—is the point of view of Evangelical Christianity.

B. B. WARFIELD.

Princeton.

EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY

Der Märtyrer in den Anfängen der Kirche. Von D. A. Schlatter, Professor in Tübingen. Gütersloh, Druck und Verlag Von C. Bertelsmann. pp. 86. (Beiträge zur Förderung Christlicher Theologie, XIX, 3, 1915).

Dr. Schlatter tells us in the preface that the impulse for writing this treatise was received from an article published by Karl Holl in the *Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Alterthum* for 1914 and entitled "The Martyr-Conception and the Acts of the Martyrs in their Historical Development." In many respects he finds himself in agreement with Holl, notably so in discovering a strong Jewish factor among the influences that shaped the martyr-conception in the early Church. Geffken's judgment that the word *μάρτυς* is of purely philosophical, and therefore of Hellenic, origin is set aside by both. On the other hand Schlatter differs from Holl in denying that the element of "enthusiasm" was to any conceivable extent concerned in the origin of the phenomenon or the formation of the idea. While both seek the beginning of the movement in the Maccabaeian crisis, Holl finds it significant that its rise coincides with the emergence of "enthusiasm," whereas Schlatter simply denies that "enthusiasm" played any part in that struggle or was a characteristic feature of the Jewish life of the period at all. It is interesting to note this, because of late Kennedy and others, in their desire to reduce the influence of the mystery-religions on Paul, have sought out and made as much as possible of whatever might seem to offer an analogy to Hellenistic "mysticism" and "enthusiasm" in Jewish religious life. According to Schlatter, to be sure, a connection between "enthusiasm" and the martyr-idea exists, but it exists only on Hellenistic-Jewish ground. Palestinian Judaism is positively conscious of the absence of the prophetic-enthusiastic element. As to the apocalyptic literature, the author rejects the explanation of this phenomenon from "enthusiasm." The summary judgment: "Apocalyptic belongs to the category of Midrash and Midrash is exegesis, not prophecy," seems to us an overstatement; it fails to explain the peculiar character of the literature in

question, which may not be prophecy but certainly presents features sufficiently different from the ordinary Midrash. It was not, according to Schlatter, through a reproduction of prophecy in Judaism, but through a carrying back of the idea of martyrdom into the life of the ancient prophets, that the two ideas became interwoven. Here in fact lies the origin of the designation of those who sacrificed their lives for the sake of religion as "martyrs," "witnesses," for in the case of the prophets their death at the hand of the enemy, had been a part of their witness borne for God to the truth of His cause. In Christian circles this became even more influential, because here the consciousness was alive of the revival of prophecy in the experience of the disciples. Consequently the Christians' death inflicted by the world became in the full sense of the word a witnessing death. At this point again the author takes issue with Holl who would explain the idea of "witnessing" from the fact that the martyr in the course of his sufferings enjoyed ecstatic intercourse with Jesus and therefore in this sense "witnessed" supersensual realities. Schlatter does not entirely deny the coefficient of this idea, but rightly insists upon it that the other element, that of the active witness-bearing, ought to receive the main emphasis, and further gives this idea distinctly forensic associations: it is born out of the legal trial in which the persecuted Christian upheld against the authorities the cause of Christ and God. The formula *εἰς μαρτύριον αὐτοῖς*, at least where it occurs in the Gospels in contexts speaking of legal persecution, is to be explained from this.

The reverence paid to the graves of martyrs also had its root in the sacredness of the graves of the prophets to which the Gospels bear witness. The analogy with the martyrdom of the philosophers, Schlatter observes, here gives out, because of any religious reverence paid to the grave of a philosopher nothing is known. The antecedents of the Christian martyr-cult here also are purely Jewish. In the grave the prophet was conceived as present with the people and as still taking interest in their affairs. Schlatter compares for this from the Gospels Math. II, 17, 18. The immanent-Christian development as such cannot explain the continuous attachment of the martyr to his grave, because that would have yielded the idea of the martyr's presence with Christ. On a basis of the Jewish resurrection-belief the notion becomes intelligible.

A further association traceable to the same source is that of the meritoriousness of the martyr's experience. Here again, however, Hellenistic Judaism exerted its influence rather than the other branch. Schlatter assumes that in general the predominance of the idea of merit among Rabbinical Judaism was in part due to the contact with Greek ethics. This will be a novel idea to many, who have been accustomed to look upon the doctrine in question as one of the most specific Jewish products. The author seeks in the development of the martyr-conception at this point the solution of the difficult problem how in the Christian Church this fundamental principle of Jewish belief could penetrate so as to set aside genuinely Christian

habits of thought of earlier validity, and this although the two organizations, that of Judaism and of Christianity, stood in hostile relation to each other and were wholly separated. The passing over of the conception of martyrdom from the one to the other points out one way, if not the only one, in which this could happen. From the story of Polycarp's martyrdom the idea of meritoriousness is still absent, whereas in the letter of the Lyonese Christians it is already clearly suggested.

The last thing which the Jewish and Christian conceptions have in common, is the occurrence of the protecting miracle in the martyrdom either before or after death. This is intended to relieve the tension between the reliance on God's omnipotence as shielding His own and the apparent contradiction to this in the martyr's death. He dies but is not forsaken. In illustration of this the author points to the popular belief recorded in the Gospels that the Baptist had risen from the dead, and to the account of Jesus' own passion.

In several of the points touched upon the historian cannot but recognize a corrupting, deteriorating influence upon the Christian mind, which gained in force greatly through its entrance into the martyrdom-literature. The chief outcome in this direction was that religious eudæmonism, which made individual salvation the chief aim, became the governing motive.

More than half of the Heft is occupied by the notes which offer rich material in the way of proof and illustration of the views developed and will prove in the highest degree suggestive for further study of an interesting subject.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

Princeton.

The Social Legislation of the Primitive Semites. By HENRY SCHAEFFER, Ph.D., Member of the American School for Oriental Study and Research, Syria, 1908-09. New Haven: Yale University Press. London: Humphrey Milford. Oxford University Press 1915.

This volume is stated in the Preface to be the outgrowth of a Doctor's thesis presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Pennsylvania in 1912. In it the author discusses the following main topics: Matriarchy, Patriarchy, Agnation, The Goel or next of kin, Slavery, Interest, Pledges and Security, The Social Problem as viewed by the Prophets, Poor Laws, Sabbatical Year, The Year of Jubilee, Ezekiel's Plan of Allotment, Taxation and Tribute, and The Development of Individual Landownership in Israel.

In view of the title of the volume it may be noted in passing that Dr. Schaeffer devotes himself to the study of the customs of three Semitic peoples, the Hebrews, the Babylonians and the Arabs; also that the word 'primitive' is to be taken in a loose sense. For while starting with the earliest data available the writer frequently traces the development of the 'social legislation' to a period—e.g. post-exilic Judaism, or the Neo-Babylonian Empire—which cannot strictly speaking be regarded as primitive.

It will be clear even to the cursory reader that Dr. Schaeffer has been at great pains in the gathering of material bearing upon the subjects which he discusses. That a large part of his data is 'second hand' he frankly admits; and in view of the character and scope of the work, it is to be expected. At the same time there is much in his work which is original and his grouping and discussion of the materials which he has gathered are interesting and instructive. The frequent footnotes acquaint the reader with the sources which have been used.

It is apparent that Dr. Schaeffer's interest centres in the Old Testament. This is evident not only from the fact already alluded to that he places the discussion of the Hebrew customs first in order, but even more from the nature of the topics discussed. The discussions of Agnation, the Goel and the Year of Jubilee derive their interest almost wholly from their bearing upon Old Testament problems and the writer would hardly devote a chapter to a subject so distinctively Jewish as the "Allotment of Ezekiel" were he not mainly concerned with the problems of the Old Testament.

Such being the case it is important to notice carefully the point of view from which Dr. Schaeffer approaches this complex and difficult subject. Briefly stated it is that of the evolutionist and higher critic. This can be inferred not only from the names of the authors whom he quotes—Robertson Smith and Wellhausen are among those most frequently cited—but even more clearly from the topics discussed and the manner of their treatment.

It is safe to say that were Dr. Schaeffer not an evolutionist he would not have treated of 'matriarchy' in his first chapter. This chapter is, as he practically admits, the weakest in the entire book; and it is weak because there is relatively so very little evidence which can be produced bearing directly on the subject treated. The passages in the Old Testament which he cites as possibly favoring the view that matriarchy prevailed among the Hebrews in very ancient times have been cited again and again, and are so unconvincing that they really help to show how essentially and pronouncedly patriarchal the family was as portrayed in the Old Testament. For the existence of matriarchy in Arabia he cites little evidence; and he admits that the Babylonians seem to have known nothing of this custom, although he regards it possible that the Sumerians did. This chapter of six pages is placed before the chapter on patriarchy which contains fifty pages simply because the logic of the evolutionary system demands it. To quote Professor Eberharder of Salzburg whose "*Ehe-und Familienrecht der Hebräer*" (Münster i. W. 1914) is one of the latest discussions of this much debated subject: "The ethnologists of the evolutionist school regard it as an established fact that a period of matriarchy preceded patriarchy." The chief reason for this is found, Professor Eberharder contends, not in any established facts, but in the generally accepted theory that matriarchy constitutes an intermediate and necessary step between promiscuity, which the evolutionist regards as primitive, and monogamy.

Professor Eberharter exposes the weakness of the evolutionary view, and after citing the opinion of Westermarck and several others he makes the bold assertion: "Ethnological research is, as is evident from these statements, far removed from demonstrating the untenability of the Biblical narrative regarding the institution of monogamous marriage in Paradise (Gen. 2: 18-25); on the contrary it is able to confirm it. Supported by the Bible and Science we are able to affirm: the oldest, the original form of marriage was single-marriage [Einzelehe]=Monogamy."

Dr. Schaeffer seems to be in hearty accord with the view dominant in critical circles as to the development of religion and culture in Israel. He accepts the Wellhausen hypothesis and finds three distinct codes of law in the Pentateuch. This fact vitiates many of his conclusions as far as those who do not share his preconceptions are concerned. Space will not permit us to point these out in detail. A good example in point is found in the chapter on Agnation or the Levirate.

Dr. Schaeffer has no definite theory to advance regarding the origin of this ancient custom. He thinks it was originally religious. "To die without offspring is a calamity for the reason that the deceased is thereby deprived of the only medium by which he might continue his post-mundane existence" (p. 62). One is tempted to believe that with Stade Dr. Schaeffer finds the origin of the "Levirate" in ancestor worship. But he quotes Stade's view as well as that of Nowack who sees in it a relic of matriarchy, without committing himself to either. According to Dr. Schaeffer the custom was restricted by the law in Deut. 25: 5, 9 "to brothers dwelling together on the same paternal estate." The following passage (Pp. 61-62) is significant, "Before the exile only agnates could be heirs. After that event daughters are invested with property rights in the case of a man dying without male issue (P). With such a modification in the law of inheritance the Levirate necessarily loses some of its former importance. Leviticus (H) seeks to destroy it altogether by forbidding marriages between persons closely related to each other (Lev. 18:6). This, of course, precludes marriage with a brother's wife (widow. Lev. 18:16; 20:21). But in spite of the priestly code the custom continued to exist (Math. 22:24f.) until post-Talmudic times (Baentsch, Ex. p. 394)."

There are two important questions raised in the above quotation, namely, 'inheritance of daughters' and 'levirate marriage.' We will discuss them in the inverse order. Dr. Schaeffer tells us that Lev. 18:16 "of course" prohibits marriage with a brother's wife or widow. It is to be observed that in the next sentence he admits that the custom continued none the less "until post-Talmudic times." This is practically an admission that the Rabbis did not interpret Lev. 18:16 as annulling Deut. 25:5. It is preposterous to suppose, in the entire absence of any definite evidence in support of such a view, that the Sadducees, however lax their views on certain doctrinal points, would have stultified themselves by proposing as a 'hard question' a problem, which if this inter-

pretation is a correct one could simply be ruled out by a reference to by the Early Church may be inferred from the fact that Eusebius in his *Ecclesiastical History* quotes at considerable length Julius Africanus' attempt to explain the divergences between the genealogies of Jesus as given in Matthew and Luke by the assumption of a number of levirate marriages, with seeming approval and without the slightest intimation that such marriages were regarded as illegal. In view of these facts the critics have been somewhat slow in accepting the 'annulment theory' advocated by the radicals (cf. *Encycl. Bib. Art. 'Marriage'*), and the 'moderates' (cf. *Hasting's Dictionary of Bible Art 'Marriage'*) prefer to hold to the traditional view that Deut. 25: 5 formulates a carefully guarded exception to the general law contained in Lev. 18: 16. That subsequently the levirate was regarded with disfavor and is now no longer observed is doubtless due in great measure to the fact that polygamy, with which it has much in common, is no longer practised. And since polygamy, though definitely permitted in the law, gradually ceased to be practiced, it is not necessary to account for the failure to observe the levirate by making Lev. 18: 16, prohibit it. In view of the difficulties which beset this interpretation of Lev. 18: 16, Dr. Schaeffer's "of course" seems decidedly out of place.

The assertion that before the Exile only Agnates, i.e. male relatives on the father's side, could be heirs rests primarily upon the strict construction of Deut. 25: 5 "and have no son (*bēn*)"; for in the story of Tamar there is nothing to indicate that there were daughters born to her; and in the Book of Ruth, as Dr. Schaeffer admits, Boaz is probably to be regarded as a *goel* (Ruth 3: 9, 12) and not a *levir* in view of the fact that Obed was looked upon as his own son and not treated as the son of Chilion. This law was, it is claimed, annulled by the provision of the priestly code (Numb. 27) which allowed daughters to inherit. But the sweeping inference drawn from the case of the daughters of Zelophehad and the legislation based upon it is not warranted by the facts. That Zelophehad had no sons and in default of sons his daughters were allowed to inherit their father's property is clear. The real question is: why were there no sons? Dr. Schaeffer tells us that this was owing to the abolition of the levirate. This does not follow. If Deut. 25 restricted the levirate to brethren dwelling together—it might well be argued that this law made the levirate obligatory on them as the next of kin, without necessarily debarring all others—a case might readily arise in which there was no one to act as *levir*. It is certainly possible that Zelophehad had no brothers. Or it might be that the widow was barren or past age. In the case under discussion it seems probable that she was dead, since no mention is made of her and no provision is made for her support or the return of her dowry. It is consequently perfectly admissible to argue that Num. 27, in no wise annuls Deut. 25 but merely provides for an exception which might arise and which if Deut. 25 be taken in the restricted sense

would be certain to arise, viz. the case where there were daughters, where there were not and could not be any sons.

It should be noted in this connection that while the translation "and have no son" is the more natural one from the standpoint of usage there is good warrant for the rendering of the A. V. "and have no child." The LXX renders it 'seed' (cf. Matt. 22), clearly taking 'son' in the broad sense (cf. Gen. 38). On such an interpretation the levirate contemplates only the case of the childless widow and has nothing to do with the question of the inheritance of daughters.

We will cite one other example which illustrates Dr. Schaeffer's views and methods. Speaking of slavery he tells us (p. 89): "The acuteness of the social problem no doubt led to the compilation of a considerable portion of the earliest Hebrew code known to us (Ex. 20: 22-23: 33). There can be no question as to the antiquity of its contents in spite of the fact that the book was not published until some time after the reign of Solomon. . . . The code provides in such a case [viz. that of the perpetual slave] that the slave shall be brought by his owner unto the *elohim* (Household gods, or *Penates*, kept and worshipped near the door of the house. Baetsch *Ex.*, 190) of the house in whose presence the "master shall bore his ear through with an awl" as a sign of perpetual slavery (Ex. 21:6)." Speaking of the "Deuteronomic legislation" bearing on the same subject he says (p. 90): "The appropriate ceremony performed by the master prior to the reception of the slave into his household corresponds in every particular to that of Ex. 21:6 (for obvious reasons no allusion is made in this connection to the household gods of more ancient times, the word *deleth* (door) being the only survival)." Thus it appears that in a code (J) published, as he supposes, "sometime after the reign of Solomon" polytheism is deliberately sanctioned. But in the age of Josiah "for obvious reasons no allusion is made to the household gods of more ancient times." This gives us a pretty clear idea of Dr. Schaeffer's attitude toward "Mosaic monotheism," and of his conception of the development of Hebrew ideas and institutions. That Dr. Schaeffer is an evolutionist is clear as was pointed out above. Whether or in what sense he may be called a supernaturalist, it is difficult to determine. The discussion is entirely upon the plane of naturalism. The institutions of Israel are placed upon the same footing as those of Babylon and Arabia. That they had a superior sanction is nowhere maintained. The book is not of course a theological treatise but its "tendency" is very evidently determined by its author's acceptance of the critical theories regarding the origin and development of the social and religious ideas and institutions of the ancient Israelites. And it is because of this that we are forced to take exception to many of the arguments used and conclusions reached by Dr. Schaeffer while welcoming the material which he has gathered.

OSWALD T. ALLIS.

Princeton.

Miscellaneous Inscriptions in the Yale Babylonian Collection by Albert T. Clay. Yale Oriental Series. Babylonian Texts, Vol. I. Published from the fund given to the University in memory of Mary Stevens Hammond. New Haven: Yale University Press. London: Humphrey Milford. Oxford University Press. 1915. Quarto, pp. ix, 108. Plates 55.

This volume is the first of a series of publications, through which it is the purpose of Yale University to make its Babylonian Collection, "numbering at present about eight thousand Sumerian and Accadian inscriptions and other antiquities, belonging to all periods in Babylonian history" accessible to the "Assyriological world". It is proposed to accompany the 'autographe text as far as is practicable and possible with an interpretation'. And in accordance with this plan almost all of the inscriptions contained in the present volume have been translated and discussed more or less in detail by Professor Clay. As a consequence of this, the volumes of this series will appeal directly to a much wider circle of readers than would be the case were they to be devoted exclusively to the publication of Babylonian texts.

The character of the inscriptions is, as the title implies, quite varied. It embraces "historical texts, votive and building inscriptions, a dynastic list, date lists, a tablet containing the most ancient laws known, a fragment of the Hammurabi Code, and also of a boundary stone, a mortuary inscription, a syllabary, etc".

Among the most important of the historical texts is the Larsa Dynastic List, which gives the names and reigns of 14 kings, who ruled over Larsa (Ellasar) prior to its conquest by Hammurabi, ending with his reign and that of his successor Samsuiluna, thus covering a period of 289 years. This list is a valuable addition to the material published hitherto (notably the Ur-Isin Dynastic List published by Professor Hilprecht a decade ago) bearing upon the chronology of the period immediately preceding the founding of the First Dynasty of Babylon, and it helps to clear up some disputed questions. Among other things it proves that Warad-Sin and Rim-Sin are the names of two brothers and not as has been suggested, merely different names of one and the same king. The List assigns to the former a reign of 12 years and to the latter one of 61 years. Professor Clay discusses this tablet at considerable length and Dr. L. W. King of the British Museum, to whom he sent a copy of the inscription prior to its publication, has made use of it in his recently published *History of Babylon*. Other texts give us: the name of a son of Naram-Sin, the name of a new king of Gutium, the name of a new king of the Fourth Dynasty of Babylon and a number of other items of historical and archaeological interest.

The fragment of the Code of Hammurabi is small and does not help to fill up the big gap in the Codex. But it is of value as supplementing our very meagre fund of information regarding the existence and distribution of copies of the Laws, and also as strengthening the hope that through the help of such copies the gap may eventually be

filled. The Sumerian Prototype of the Hammurabi Code is a fragment and contains only nine laws. It is undated. But Professor Clay feels that there is little doubt that it is older than the Code. It is important because it shows "not only that the Code of Hammurabi, written a little prior to 2000 B. C. was preceded in point of time by a Sumerian code or codes, but, as has been naturally inferred, also that the Babylonian lawgiver actually based his laws upon existing codes". The similarities and differences between the two codes of Laws are noteworthy. One of the Sumerian laws is as Professor Clay points out of especial interest because of its possible bearing upon the legal questions involved in the Parable of the Prodigal Son, in that it has to do with the right of a son to claim his portion of his parents' estate during their lifetime. "If (a son) say unto his father and his mother: (thou art) not my father, (thou art) not my mother, from the house, field, plantation, servants, property, animals, he shall go forth; and his portion to its full amount he (the father) shall give him. His father and his mother shall say to him: (he is) not our son; from the neighborhood of the house shall he go". "The law under consideration shows that a child who renounced his sonship, and received his portion, was legally separated by his parents. This legal banishment was a provision of the greatest importance. It was prudential in character; although it was also, doubtless, a source of relief in certain cases. The son who took this step knew that legally he had no further claim upon the estate. This provision annulled the law which provided a share in the estate to the son after the death of the father. It also protected the parents from any further demands. If the portion was squandered, the son could not legally impose upon them. It was also a wise provision in the interests of the other children. They were really party to the division, which had been made. This law protected their interest in the estate which they and perhaps their own children, were helping to build up. It was a necessary accompaniment to a law that provided for a son's patrimony, and also for his securing his portion during the lifetime of his father". "This legal aspect of the parable does not seem to have been surmised by the commentators. It heightens the contrast between the father, who, on the one hand, complied with what the law permitted the son to demand; and on the other hand, the forgiving father, who rejoiced over his return, not as a legal heir, but as a real son" (p. 18-27).

A group of 23 tablets of which 6 are here published and which contain "monthly receipts for sheep, which were apparently intended for the temple service" is of special interest because most of them contain a reference to what was seemingly a special offering for the recurring 7th, 14th, 21st, and 28th day of the month. The word used is *hitpi* and Professor Clay connects it with the well known Egyptian word *htp*, meaning offering. Should this etymology prove to be correct, it would be not without interest and possible significance as a foreign word used in a technical and ritual sense. It is at least remarkable that in a series of tablets, which "furnish the first actual observance of any-

thing that suggests the existence of a parallel to the sabbath in Babylonia", the word used to designate this offering should be probably an Egyptian loan-word. A cylinder of this same period gives an account of Nabunaid's restoration of E-gi-par "an ancient seat of divination, which was connected with Eghishshirgal, the temple of Nannar, or Sin, at Ur", and of the dedication of his daughter, Bel-shalti-Nannar as a votary to devote herself to divination. A dream portent of the 7th year of Nabunaid refers to Belshazzar, "the son of the king".

The last text is a syllabary of what is known as the third class. It gives the name and the Sumerian and Babylonian values of 321 signs. A great many of these values are new and this syllabary will be of great assistance to the philologist.

It may be remarked in closing that Professor Clay finds in several of the texts here published as well as in many additional facts which have come to light, confirmation of the theory advanced in his *Amurru, the Home of the Northern Semites* 'that the Semitic elements that entered into the composition of the culture known to us as the Babylonian or Akkadian were largely an importation from the region lying west of that country' and feels justified in reaffirming 'even more emphatically' his belief in the correctness of this hypothesis.

Princeton

OSWALD T. ALLIS.

The Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges. The Book of the Prophet Isaiah, Chapters i-xxxix. In the Revised Version. With Introduction and Notes by the REV. J. SKINNER, D.D. Cambridge: at the University Press. [G. P. Putnam's Sons American representatives.] 1915. Pp. lxxxv. 314. 75 cents.

This commentary, by the same author, was published in an earlier form in 1889. In the new edition the text of the English Revised Version is substituted for the Authorized, but otherwise the book is substantially the same. It is gratifying to observe that Professor Skinner has come to a yet firmer grasp than formerly upon the Messianic interpretation of the prophecies relating to Immanuel. It is also gratifying to find that he continues to maintain the genuineness and hence the early date of the prophecies in chapters ix. 1-7 and xi. 1-9 regarding the King. He rejects, indeed, not a few passages in these thirty-nine chapters as spurious, as utterances of prophets who lived after Isaiah and whose words were incorporated with Isaiah's book; but in Professor Skinner's judgment the passages iv. 2-4, vii. 14-17, viii. 5-8, ix. 1-7, xi. 1-9 and 10, xxx. 18-26, xxxii. 1-8, are Messianic, and of these all but two are genuine utterances of Isaiah, only ix. 10 and xxx. 18-26 are "probably to be assigned to other writers than Isaiah" (p. lxxiv; in the first edition xxx. 18-26 was not starred as non-Isaianic). Contrast with this the conclusion of Professor Kent, who holds that vii. 14 and consequently viii. 8 are genuine, but not Messianic; while all the others he declares in accordance with some recent German criticism to be Messianic prophecies, indeed, but not uttered until many generations had come and gone since the time of Isaiah (*The Student's Old*

Testament: The Sermons, Epistles and Apocalypses of Israel's Prophets). Professor Gray inclines to the same opinion as Professor Kent, but does not always express himself so positively and unambiguously. (*International Critical Commentary: The Book of Isaiah, I-xxvii*).

In this connection the remarks regarding section xi. 11-16 may be noticed. In arguing against the genuineness of this prophecy Professor Skinner and others cite the unquestioned fact that in Isaiah's day Israelites were indeed living in exile in various parts of the Assyrian empire, but it cannot at present be proven that in Isaiah's day exiles of Israel and Judah were in all the other lands named in verse 11, in Assyria, in Egypt, Pathros, and Cush, in Elam and Shinar, in Hamath and the isles of the sea. This is a misconception of the prophet's meaning. In passages which all critics admit to be genuine Isaiah clearly foretells a captivity of the nation as a whole (Isa. v. 13, vi. 12). In chapter xi the exile of both sections of Israel, northern and southern, is conceived of as a wide dispersion, wider than Isaiah's earlier contemporary Hosea had expressly indicated for the exile of northern Israel (Hos. viii. 13, ix. 3, 6, xi. 11) and farther to the northeast than he had definitely announced, but not farther in that direction than Isaiah had actually witnessed (2 Kin. xv. 29, xvii. 6. 1 Chron. v. 26). It is a dispersion to the four corners of the earth (verse 12), and the prophet names four countries or groups of countries which made up these four quarters of the world, using the familiar geographical designations and groupings of his day, Assyria, and Egypt, Pathros, Cush, and Elam and Shinar, and Hamath and the coast lands (verse 11), without necessarily implying thereby that Israelites were in his day, or would later be, in each of these lands. It is simply a realistic method employed by the prophet to describe the four quarters of the world then known and thus to foretell a wide dispersion. The men of God who uttered the predictions of Isa. xi. 11-16, Amos ix. 9, Mic. vii. 12, Deut. xxviii. 32, 36 f, 64, are simply picturing, by the various means at their disposal, a scattering far and wide, in the geography of those days a worldwide dispersion of Israel and Judah to come as the result of apostasy from Jehovah.

Professor Skinner holds that the narrative of the Assyrian invasion in chapters xxxvi and xxxvii contains "two versions of the same occurrence"; "the divergence . . . of material importance," however, being in two points only, he says, namely "the answers put into Isaiah's mouth are different" in the two accounts, and in one account "the relief of Jerusalem is attributed to a 'rumour,'" in the other "to a miraculous destruction of the Assyrian host" (pp. 277 f). Consequently Professor Skinner rejects the theory of two invasions of Palestine by the Assyrians during the reign of Hezekiah, of which the first took place in the year 701 B. C. (pp. xlv-xlvii; and see this REVIEW, 1916, pp. 330, 491); the reference to Tirhakah in Is. xxxvii. 9 being no objection to his leadership of the Egyptian army in the year 701 and the title given him, "king of Ethiopia," being ordinary prolepsis (p. 285).

JOHN D. DAVIS.

Princeton.

HISTORICAL THEOLOGY

Les Protestants Anglais réfugiés à Genève au temps de Calvin 1555-1560: leur Église—theurs Écrits. Monographie par CHARLES MARTIN, Docteur en théologie, ancien pasteur à Genève. Avec 3 planches hors texte. Genève: Librairie A. Jullien, éditeur. 1915. 8vo., pp. xv, 354. Prix: Fr. 7.50.

The main sources of this delightful monograph are, of course, *The Works of John Knox*, collected and edited by David Laing, LL.D., and among the archives of Geneva *Les Registres du Conseil* and *Le Livre des Anglois*. This latter precious record is printed in full (pp. 331-338; for the few synopses and earlier editions of it, see Hume Brown, *John Knox*, i. 201 f, footnote).

The author shows this colony in its setting amid the events of Mary's reign and in relation to other bodies of exiles, and he tells of its members and their life at Geneva (pp. 1-78). He has been able to glean but little after his predecessors in this field. He presents an archaeological fact, however, which escaped even Dr. Laing and which clears up the mooted question regarding the year of publication of the constitution and liturgy of the English congregation at Geneva (p. 79, note 1). And to the writer of this notice it was a new and interesting detail (recorded, however, in the registers of the council) that a particular bell was rung to call the English refugees to worship and that the name of this bell was Temousaz (p. 40); new to him was also the recorded apprenticing of two young Englishmen of the congregation, one to a locksmith and the other to the printer Jean Crespin (p. 66, note 1). These bits of information are not mere trifles, but belong to the many slight but welcome particulars which together make vivid the life in Geneva of this small but important company of English refugees, among whom non-conformist Protestantism was becoming conscious of itself, during the years when Mary Tudor occupied the throne of England.

Summaries are given of the writings of the refugees whereby are set forth the characteristics of these treatises, an explanation is offered at times for their tone, and an appraisal is made of their influence. Dr. Martin, following Hume Brown, holds that the second liturgy offered at Frankfort, the liturgy of compromise, which was adopted and regarding which high hopes were entertained that it would secure harmony, would not in the long run have satisfied either party to the dispute. Knox could not go one step further in the way of compromise and toward the full acceptance of the Prayer Book of Edward VI. To do so would have been to abandon the principles which up to this time had inspired his life and regulated his conduct. He took part in preparing this liturgy of compromise solely from the necessity of the hour, as it was all that could be obtained then and there, and was a step forward in the direction of reform (pp. 32-34). The earlier liturgy prepared at Frankfort by a committee of which Knox was a member closely adhered to the Genevan liturgy of 1545, but it was more suited than that to the English national spirit and with

a few changes it was adopted by the English church in Geneva (pp. 26 f). While the leaders evidently believed that this liturgy was adapted for wider use than the needs of the little congregation in Geneva, and might serve as a model for others, there was no wish on the part of its authors to fix a formula and impose it rigidly, but liberty was intentionally allowed the minister for spontaneous variations according to his individual preference and the demands of the moment, so long as he conformed to the Word of God (pp. 86-89).

Although they issued various theological treatises while resident at Geneva, the theological domain was not the place where Knox and his companions rendered their greatest service. They entered a new domain with their politico-ecclesiastical writings. They laid down new principles and affirmed doctrines regarded at that time as subversive, but which have become axioms for all free spirits (pp. 153-155). Everywhere and always in his attitude toward England Knox assumed the rôle of a prophet who listens to the voice of God revealed in his Word, who affirms the rights of God and proclaims God's will without concerning himself about the opinions of the mighty in the land or the hatred excited by his words, leaving it to the people of the country to put the teaching into practice. But toward Scotland his attitude was different. In this his native land his aid was invoked by the nobles and the magistrates, and the responsibility of organizing the church was largely devolved on him. Accordingly he appears as the wise counselor and far-seeing organizer; and he showed more prudence and moderation in his appeals and counsels to his fellow-countrymen than in his writings destined for England, where the bitter persecution that was raging stirred his deepest emotions (pp. 207-213). It was also from Geneva, and in the year when *The First Blast of the Trumpet against the monstrous Regiment of Women* was published, that Knox issued his *Appellation from the cruell and most iniust sentence pronounced against him by the false bishoppes and clergie of Scotland, with his supplication and exhortation to the nobilitie, estates, and comunaltie of the same realme*, and also addressed a letter, not to the nobility and estates, but directly "to his beloved brethren the communalitie of Scotland," a part of the population which up to that time had been left outside of all participation in public affairs. He called upon the common people to join with the nobles and estates in putting an end to the tyranny of the bishops and priests, and justified them before God in doing so. This letter exerted great influence. It awakened in the people the consciousness of their rights while it preached to them their duties. Soon the commonalty became a force to be reckoned with. Its representatives were admitted by the nobility to an assembly for the discussion of the question of refusing obedience to the queen regent (pp. 219-221).

In all their writings the basal principle is the authority of the Word of God; and accordingly it was as natural as it was fitting that from this company of exiles, among whom were numbered men of learning and skilled in the languages, should come forth a new translation of the Scriptures more accurate than its predecessors, the most

scholarly of the early English versions, with the text divided into verses making ready reference easy, and issued in a handy volume convenient for popular use.

JOHN D. DAVIS

Princeton.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

The Holy Spirit in Thought and Experience. By T. REES, M.A. (Lond.), B.A. (Oxon). Principal of The Independent College, Bangor, North Wales. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915. Pp. 221.

We have here a new monograph on the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. There is a lack of works in English upon this subject, especially of books which give any adequate dogmatic treatment of this doctrine. I. F. Wood's *The Spirit of God in Biblical Literature*, 1904, is devoted exclusively to the Biblical basis of the doctrine, and is written from the standpoint of a naturalistic reconstruction of the Biblical history and revelation which is assumed and not proven. Hence its extreme radicalism destroys the value of Wood's book as an aid to understanding the doctrine of the Bible concerning the Holy Spirit. Swete's two books are Biblical and historical respectively, and do not give any adequate doctrinal treatment of the subject. Dr. Griffith Thomas' *The Holy Spirit of God*, 1913, devotes Part III to the theological formulation of the doctrine, but cannot be said to have wholly supplied the desired want of a doctrinal discussion based upon an adequate survey of the Biblical basis and historical development of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit.

The present work of Principal Rees also leaves us without any dogmatic treatment of the subject. It expressly confines itself to the Biblical teaching and the history of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. The first five chapters deal with the doctrine in the Old and New Testaments, including one chapter on the doctrine of the Spirit in the Jewish theology. Chapters six to nine inclusive contain a brief summary of the history of the doctrine in the Christian Church, and the last chapter is a summary and conclusion, summing up the author's view as regards the results of his discussion.

In the historical chapters the division and ordering of the material is not well arranged. Thus for example, chapters six, seven, and eight deal with the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in the Patristic literature, and confine themselves to the questions of the Trinity and of the Personality of the Spirit, but contain little concerning the subject of Grace or the saving work of the Spirit so fully and richly developed by Augustine. Whereas chapter nine on Grace begins with the Reformation period, thus failing to take account of Augustine's epoch making treatment of this subject, and in addition to this, this chapter contains little concerning the Trinity and the Personality and Deity of the

Spirit, and consequently misses Calvin's significance in the development of this doctrine and his masterly treatment of these topics. The significance of Augustine in the history of the doctrine of Grace, and of Calvin in the history of the doctrine of the Trinity, renders this method of division and treatment inadequate and unsatisfactory.

Moreover, in these historical chapters the author writes too much with the fear of Harnack and the Ritschlians before him. It is true, of course, that the terms, Trinity, Nature, Essence, Person, are not Biblical terms. It is also true that the Greek Logos speculation introduced a subordinationism and an entire way of conceiving the subject foreign to the Bible. But it is only because Principal Rees has failed to see how the doctrine of the Trinity is presupposed as a well known doctrine and one that underlies all Christian thought and experience of salvation by the entire New Testament, that he can conclude that it is a product of Greek philosophy. It is too little to say that the New Testament teaches the doctrine of the Trinity. It does do this in specific passages which clearly imply or teach that the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Spirit is God, and that they are nevertheless distinct in Personality and subsistence. But more than this, the whole New Testament rather presupposes and takes for granted this doctrine as well known through the Incarnation of the Son and the outpouring of the Spirit, and as underlying the whole Christian doctrine and experience of salvation. That Principal Rees is blind to this seems due to the fact that he has chosen bad guides and followed them, instead of having carefully and independently studied the Biblical teaching.

This leads us to turn back to the first five chapters and investigate more closely the author's treatment of the development of the doctrine in the Bible.

The first chapter, entitled *The Spirit of Jahweh*, deals with the doctrine of the Spirit of God in the Old Testament. At once we are met with a point of view which is directly opposed to that which the Old Testament itself gives. The Old Testament represents itself as a record of God's self-revelation to the Hebrew people. Principal Rees, on the other hand, regards it as simply an account of what the Hebrew people believed about God. It is, therefore, only a stage in the naturalistic evolution of religious thought. Rees is constantly seeking, therefore, to show what the Hebrew people "believed," rather than to set forth in bold relief what God revealed to them. In accordance with this naturalistic point of view, which he simply assumes without proof, and which is diametrically opposed to the Old Testament's account of itself, Rees asserts that ethical monotheism is a late development, and that the Old Testament conception of God evolved from a primitive polytheism and animism, through henotheism, to monotheism. The speaking of the serpent in Eden, and of Balaam's ass, and the case of Aaron's rod are said to be survivals of animism, while the plural name Elohim for God and plural phrases, said by Rees to be "put into the mouth of God," are supposed to be survivals of polytheism.

Of course the Old Testament itself does not bear out this con-

struction, and Rees can only avoid the contradictory testimony from the exalted idea of God in Deuteronomy and throughout the Pentateuch, by assuming again the late date of these Pentateuchal passages in accordance with the current critical hypotheses made in the interest of the very same evolutionary scheme with which Rees starts out.

In accordance with this, the idea of the nature and work of the Spirit of God is supposed by Rees to have gone through a parallel development, being at first regarded as the cause of abnormal and strange phenomena, and later in a "more ethical medium," coming to be regarded as an inward and ethical abiding principle in man, as the immanent activity of God, and finally, in a system of more abstract ideas, the Spirit came to be considered as a mediating "hypostasis" or person, external to both God and man.

In working this out more in detail Rees outlines the Old Testament doctrine of the Spirit as the cause of prophecy, as inspiring the action of the warrior, judge, and prince, until finally the entire ethical and spiritual life of the individual is ascribed to the Spirit, and lastly the work of producing order in the cosmos, since Rees supposes, in accordance with his critical assumptions, that Gen. I² is post-exilic.

Turning from the work to the nature of the Spirit, Rees says that the Spirit was always conceived of as a mighty force, and never as a mere physical force. He rightly says that the Spirit of God in the Old Testament was never regarded as a merely subjective or immanent principle in man, but always as a transcendent power. He supposes that this was not at first identified with the power of God. It appeared first as a kind of independent power, like "a ghost of primitive animism," and came at last to be identified with the efficiency of God Himself.

Now if we examine the Old Testament for ourselves, we shall find in it nothing to support this construction of the Old Testament doctrine of the Spirit of God.

In regard to the work of the Spirit, it is true that the theocratic or official work of the Spirit of God in fitting the leaders of the theocracy for their peculiar tasks, is more prominent than the work of the Spirit as the cause of the ethical and spiritual life of the individual. It is also true, broadly speaking, that it comes out earlier in the delivery of Old Testament doctrine. But this is not due to any gradual evolution of a more ethical idea of God; it is, in part at least, due to the fact that the promise of the outpouring and indwelling of the Spirit to be the author of the spiritual life of the individual was especially to be the characteristic of the Messianic age, and hence this feature of the Spirit's work is usually connected with the great Messianic prophecies in Isaiah and the prophecy concerning the Messianic age in Joel. Rees is correct, however, in asserting that this work was attributed to the Spirit in the Old Testament dispensation, as for example in the fifty first Psalm and the sixty third chapter of Isaiah. He assigns a late date, however, to this part of Isaiah, and denies the Davidic authorship of the fifty first psalm, assigning it to a late date, and he completely overlooks the passage in I Sam. X⁶ where the

Spirit of God is represented not only as the cause of Saul's prophesying, but also as making him "another man," and Nehemiah IX²⁰ where it is taught that the Spirit was with God's people in the wilderness. It may be said in general, however, that the Spirit is first revealed as the source of life and order in the cosmos, Gen. I², and that this cosmical work of the Spirit is continued in the work of preservation and government in Isaiah, Job, and the Psalms. Then the chief emphasis is placed on the work of the Spirit of God in the new creation from the effects of sin, and the spirit is revealed as the producer of a new order and life. This appears in the official or theocratic work of the Spirit, which Rees rightly emphasizes and in the work of the Spirit in the individual. This latter work is mainly brought out in the prophetic literature, but it is also clearly taught that the Spirit was always with God's people as the source of their spiritual life.

When we turn to Rees' conception of the development of the idea of the nature of the Spirit in the Old Testament, we find no evidence to bear out his idea that the conception of the Spirit developed from being differentiated from God in essence, to being next conceived of as "a ghostly denizen of the realm of Jehovah," being finally identified with the activity of Jehovah Himself. On the contrary, from the beginning to the end of the Old Testament, the Spirit of God is a divine Spirit, always identified with God. He is the executive of the Godhead. There can be no question as to the unitary and pervasive testimony of the Old Testament to the deity of the Spirit of God. The passages which Rees cites as differentiating between the Spirit and Jehovah, such as Gen. VI, 3, Is. LIX, 21, XLII, 1, Ezek., XXXVI, 27, and many similar ones, constitute no exception to this idea of the deity of the Spirit. They may indicate or hint at a differentiation of hypostasis or personality, when read in the light of the New Testament, but they in no way bear out the contention of Rees. It may be an open question how far the Old Testament hints at or teaches the distinct Personality of the Spirit of God, but there is no question that from first to last the Spirit is God's Spirit, God acting, the executive of God.

After a chapter which outlines the doctrine of the Spirit in Palestinian and Alexandrian Judaism, Principal Rees turns to the doctrine as it lies in the New Testament. To this subject he devotes chapters four and five. The former of these is occupied with the phenomena which are attributed to the operation of the Holy Spirit, while the latter seeks to define the sphere of the Spirit's work according to the New Testament view, and then discusses the New Testament teaching concerning the nature of the Holy Spirit and His relation to God. No attempt is made to unfold the teaching of Jesus, and no full or adequate account of Paul's doctrine is given. The author's method is to outline the phenomena ascribed to the Holy Spirit's working, to delimit the sphere of his operation, and to outline the New Testament teaching as to His nature.

The phenomena are divided into two classes, abnormal and normal. The first class includes such extraordinary occurrences as the casting

out of demons, the gift of tongues, and prophecy, while the normal phenomena attributed to the Spirit are the Christian life and all its graces. Concerning the former we can only stop to call attention to the fact that Rees follows those who would distinguish between what actually occurred at Pentecost and what the Author of Acts supposed had happened. The narrative in Acts, Rees supposes, combines and confuses two different things, the writer's idea that the gift was one of speaking foreign languages, and "a fading primitive tradition" concerning ecstatic utterances like the Corinthian Glossolalia. (p. 68). Rees supposes that what really happened was something like the latter. But the narrative in Acts gives no warrant whatever for the idea that it confuses or combines these two things, and the assumed and unwarranted identification of the Pentecostal event with that discussed by Paul in the first Epistle to the Corinthians, is the sole reason for the above erroneous supposition concerning the narrative of the book of Acts.

In dealing with the doctrine of the Holy Spirit as the Author of the Christian life and all its graces, Rees follows again the prevalent idea, represented for example by Gunkel for whose opinions he seems to have too much regard, that this idea was first introduced into Christian thought by Paul. It is true that this is one of the chief points of Paul's doctrine of the Holy Spirit. It is also true that Paul works out this idea more fully than any other New Testament writer. But the idea that Paul first introduced it as a novelty into Christian thought is a mistaken one. In order to make this out it is necessary to neglect the Old Testament teaching on this subject, to pass unnoticed the Synoptic saying of Jesus in Luke XI, 13, to deny the historicity of all the Johannine discourses of our Lord including that with Nicodemus, to fail to bring out the full meaning of Pentecost for the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, and to misinterpret a number of statements concerning the Spirit in the book of Acts.

In attempting to determine the New Testament idea of the nature of the Holy Spirit, Principal Rees finds three different and conflicting views. The first and earliest is that which conceives of the Spirit as a heavenly being, distinct from God, subordinated to God, and co-ordinated with Christ. "It was, therefore," he says, "somewhat vaguely conceived as a heavenly being issuing from God and Christ, and on occasion assuming a personal character and entering into personal relations," (p. 92). The Spirit's personality, Rees thinks, was neither vividly nor consistently conceived. The Spirit's relations to men were conceived as personal, Rees supposes, but not men's relations to the Spirit. But this is not in accordance with the facts of the New Testament. No traces of any subordination of the Spirit to God can be found, and as concerns men's relations to the Spirit, Rees overlooks those passages where men are said to vex the Spirit, to grieve Him, and to lie to Him. In point of fact, Rees abandons this first view as really a characteristic New Testament one, for he expressly says that in primitive Christianity the Spirit is conceived as God acting.

The other two views of the nature of the Spirit he finds lying side by side and unassimilated in the teaching of Paul. Paul, he supposes, thought of the Spirit as identical with God acting, as a person, but not as a distinct person from God. This, he says, is the old Hebrew idea which Paul inherited. Along with this and springing from Paul's personal experience, is found the idea that the Spirit is identical with the living and exalted Lord. This identification of the Spirit and the exalted Christ, which he finds in 2nd Cor. III 17, Rees interprets as a personal identity, and thus reaches the above conclusion. Where the Spirit is represented as standing over against God, as in Rom. VIII 26 sq., this is supposed to be the Spirit as identified with the exalted Christ.

Here again we find a grave misinterpretation of Paul. According to the Apostle's teaching, the exalted Lord at His resurrection was endowed with the Holy Spirit, so that from that time He became the life giving Spirit, soteriologically speaking. Thus in 2 Cor. III 17, the identification of the Lord and the Spirit is soteriological, not personal. Moreover, the two classes of passages—those which clearly identify the Spirit with God and represent Him as Divine, and those which distinguish the Spirit from God in a personal sense simply show the Trinitarianism which underlies the whole of Paul's thought. It is the failure to see this which causes Rees so to misunderstand Paul's doctrine on the subject.

This same failure also leads him to his own conclusion which he states in the concluding chapter. He thinks that Trinitarianism is a product of Greek thought, and foreign to Christian experience. He concludes, therefore, that we must abandon it and go back to Christian experience and to the idea that the Spirit is somehow just the living Christ. Along this line of thought, Rees thinks, a new theology of the Spirit is now needed. But if he had only realized the vital relation of the doctrine of the Trinity to Christian experience, and how it underlies and pervades the manifestation of God for man's salvation, and also how it runs through the entire New Testament, he might have reached a more satisfactory conclusion, and one more in harmony with historical Christianity.

C. W. HODGE.

Princeton.

Theology in Church and State. By PETER TAYLOR FORSYTH, M.A., D.D. Principal of Hackney College, London. Hodder and Stoughton, New York and London. 1915; pp. 328.

This volume deals with the question of dogma in relation to the Church and Christianity, and with the relation between the Church and the State. It is divided into two parts. Part I treats of Dogma, Doctrine, Theology, Variations of Dogma, and Creed Subscription and Unity. Part II discusses the question of the relation of Church and State.

Dr. Forsyth begins by showing what he means by dogma, and by distinguishing it from doctrine and theology. By dogma he says, that

he does not mean an expression of the Christian consciousness. This is merely subjective. Dogma is objectively revealed truth, and is creative of the Christian consciousness. Neither does he mean a revealed doctrine which the Church has stated and to which it has given authority. Dogma has made the Church; the Church has not made dogma. Dogma, according to Dr. Forsyth, is just the central Gospel revelation which has made the Church. It is an authoritative truth which is the self-revelation of God.

Taking dogma in this sense, Dr. Forsyth shows very well its absolute necessity for the Christian Church, and points out the impossibility and absurdity of an undogmatic Christianity.

Doctrine he regards as the scientific expansion of dogma by the Church. It is the Church's "grasp" of dogma. Theology, again, is doctrine "in the making," a tentative expression of Christian truth by individual theologians, which is a necessary preparation for doctrine or the Church's creed. Theology and doctrine, therefore, would seem to differ from dogma both in point of authority and in point of extent.

In reference to this we would remark first that the idea of dogma as truth which derives its authority from God's revelation, and which is simply recognized and confessed by the Church, is satisfactory. It is also true that the Church's creeds and theology are not infallible nor authoritative in the same sense as is the revelation of God in the Bible. But the Church's doctrine and theology should aim to state the truth content of divine revelation, and hence should be dogmatic in the sense of aiming at and claiming to state absolute truth.

In the second place, the distinction which Dr. Forsyth makes as to the different extent of dogma and doctrine is a very doubtful one. Where does dogma leave off and doctrine begin? What is the criterion of dogma? Dr. Forsyth would reply—the criterion is God's revelation. But is not this revelation the basis and criterion of doctrine and theology in the above senses? Dr. Forsyth quotes Paul, and gives as the content of Christian dogma the truth of reconciliation through Christ. But are there not other dogmas equally authoritative and essential to Christianity? The fact is that Dr. Forsyth has adopted the rationalizing principle of seeking a Gospel within the Gospel, and a divine revelation within the Bible which, according to him, contains much that has not this primary authority. It is well that he has seized upon so essential a truth of Christianity but he has given no objective criterion of truth, and his hitting upon the center of Christianity is due to his Christian consciousness after all rather than to any adequate idea of the nature of revelation and authority.

Part II deals with the relations of Church and State. Dr. Forsyth's position can be summed up in three statements which he makes (p. 200). First, the absolute "neutrality" of Church and State is morally and spiritually impossible. Secondly, there must be freedom and independence both for Church and State. Thirdly, this independence of the Church must be one that is freely recognized by the State as an inherent right of the Church, and not a freedom conferred by the State, which would be really a denial of freedom as an inherent

right of the Church. If, moreover, the Church is to obtain this recognition from the State, it must itself realize and make the State realize that it is not a mere covenanting society, but a "corporate personality," a supernatural institution indwelt by Christ.

In regard to this it should be said that if we accept the New Testament idea of the Church as the body of Christ, the communion of those indwelt by the Spirit of Christ, this will constitute an entirely adequate basis for the recognition of the rights of the Church. It is not necessary to attempt to ascribe a personality to the Church and to the State in some mystical and scarcely defensible manner.

Dr. Forsyth concludes with a long chapter in which he applies his principles to the question of theological faculties in Universities controlled by the State.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

Catholic Library. Dogmatic Series. By RODERICK MACEachEN, Priest of Columbus Diocese. Five Volumes. Catholic Book Co. Wheeling, West Virginia, 1915.

These five small volumes give a popular summary of the theology of the Roman Catholic Church. The style is admirably clear; the doctrinal statements are as accurate as possible where all technical theological terms are avoided as far as may be; and the faith of the orthodox Roman Catholic is presented in a form intended and adapted to spread the knowledge of it among laymen.

Volume I is entitled *God, Man, Revelation*. It deals with the ideas of Dogma, Religion, and Revelation, setting forth the Roman Catholic doctrine of the Rule of Faith, the doctrines of God, of Man, the Fall, Sin, the Atonement, and Miracles. In the treatment of Sin we miss any clear and accurate statement of the Roman Catholic doctrine of original sin, though the author's Semi-Pelagianism is manifest. This volume contains 198 pages.

Volume II, entitled *Christ, The Church*, contains 231 pages dealing with the life of Christ, the Person of Christ, the Kingdom of Christ, and the Church. It sets forth clearly the doctrine of the Two-Natures of Christ, and expounds the Romish doctrine of the Church as the infallible teacher of truth and as the sole dispenser of salvation.

Volume III, containing 242 pages, treats of Grace and the Sacraments, discussing Baptism, Confirmation, The Eucharist, and Mass. Volume IV completes the discussion of the Sacraments, taking up Penance, including Indulgences, Extreme Unction, Holy Orders, and Matrimony. This volume contains 226 pages.

Volume V contains 229 pages. It is entitled *Sacramentals, The Blessed Virgin, Last Things*. The last 64 pages contain a full index of subjects, and the first 165 pages deal with the subjects of Sacramentals, the Virgin Mary, and Eschatology.

Cardinal Gibbons has written the Preface commending these volumes to laymen, and there is a very good reproduction of a photograph of the Cardinal at the beginning of the first volume.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

Faith and Life. "Conferences" in the "Oratory" of Princeton Theological Seminary. By BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD, a Professor in the Seminary. New York and London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1916. Crown 8vo, pp. VIII, 458.

As intimated on the Title-Page, this volume consists of addresses made in the "Oratory" of Princeton Seminary at the weekly "Conferences," which, during the first century of the Seminary's life, were accustomed to be held on Sunday afternoons for the purpose of familiar discussion of Scripture passages. Forty-one of these "Conference Talks on Bible Texts" are printed here. They are in the main expository in intention. The passages discussed are drawn at random from all parts of Scripture, but the reader will perceive at once that the needs of young men preparing for the ministry of the Gospel have been primarily in view. An effort has been made to bring into prominence the deeper currents of Christian faith and life. The addresses are here printed in the hope that they may prove useful in wider circles than those to which they were first spoken.

BENJ. B. WARFIELD.

Princeton.

The Afflictions of the Righteous as Discussed in the Book of Job and in the New Light of the Gospel. By W. B. MACLEOD, Minister of the Candlish United Free Church, Edinburgh. George H. Doran Co. pp. XIV. 297. \$1.50 net.

The Preface indicates the purpose and method of the book. "So far as I am aware the present work endeavors to conduct the study of this ancient book along lines which have never been followed by any previous writer on the subject. Hitherto it has been the usual practice to examine each speech in detail in the order in which they occur, a method which is admirably adapted to the minute exegetical study of the text, but which has several obvious disadvantages when the object in view is to obtain a comprehensive grasp of the great questions discussed, and to make a just and true estimate of the comparative value of the opposing arguments as a whole.

Now the chief feature in the new method which is introduced in the following pages consists in this, that while due consideration is given to the individual characteristics of each speaker, and to the original elements which he contributes to the debate, and while the difference between Job's method of arguing with his friends and his remarkable way of expostulating with God concerning the same high themes is brought into clear relief by separate treatment, yet the different groups of arguments which represent the different positions discussed with reference to the problems of human suffering and the normal government of the world are each focussed into a unity, and finally condensed into a series of propositions."

No thoughtful study of this wonderful book which deals with the profoundest problems of life can fail to yield some measure of inter-

est and profit to the careful reader. But whatever originality of method may be claimed for the present volume, it must be said that there is little originality in treatment. No new light is thrown upon the great questions with which Job is engaged. In point of style and of literary allusion the book is distinctly inferior to Strahan's *Book of Job*, published three years ago. But the spirit of the book is sympathetic, reverent, devout; the thought is clear and well expressed; and "an earnest effort is made to show the supreme worth of the Christian interpretation of those otherwise inexplicable problems." There are better books on Job, but this is good. *Peotic* for *poetic* occurs on p. 243.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

Princeton.

Selections from the World's Devotional Classics—Edited by ROBERT SCOTT and GEORGE W. GILMORE, Editors of the Homiletic Review. In Ten Volumes, Funk & Wagnalls Co. 1916.

The volumes are well printed and bound, pleasant to the eye and convenient to the hand. The arrangement is simple and judicious. A brief but scholarly sketch of each author quoted is given, and then extracts from his writings are presented. The selections cover a wide field, ranging from the Book of Tobit, 200 B. C., to George Matheson. "All periods between the old Jewish congregation and the modern Christian Church, all branches of the historic church—Western and Eastern, Latin, Greek, Coptic, Jacobite, and Protestant—have been drawn upon." Each volume contains portraits of some of those who have furnished material for the work. A number of prayers are also included. Upon what principle they are distributed it is difficult to discover, unless it be the convenience of the printer; for no chronological order is observed. A prayer of Dr. J. R. Miller, for example, appears in Vol. 2, following extracts from Bernard of Clairvaux; though his name does not appear in the general index. Nor do they seem ordinarily to be inserted where they are especially appropriate.

How rich is the feast provided may be indicated by mentioning a few of those who speak to us from these glowing pages: Athanasius, Chrysostom, Augustine, Anslem, Bernard of Clairvaux, Francis of Assissi, Thomas Aquinas, Tauler, Thomas à Kempis, Luther, Loyola, Calvin, Knox, Andrews, Boëhme, Jeremy Taylor, Baxter, Pascal, Bunyan, Molinos, Madam Guyon, Law, Doddridge, Woolman, Beecher, Matheson.

A series of this nature has certain inevitable defects. The extracts are at times of disappointing brevity. And there is always room for wide difference of opinion upon the question what should be included and what should be omitted. No volumes of this kind can meet the desires of every reader, but there are some omissions which it seems hard to justify. Why is no place found for Origen, or John Wesley, or Fox, or Spener, or Jonathan Edwards? These are names illustrious in the annals of devotion. Is it true that the extracts from Augustine's Confessions, covering twenty-seven pages, "comprise practically all of

a strictly devotional flavor in the Bishop of Hippo's best-known work?" (Vol. 2 p. 58). The Confessions is saturated with the spirit and expressed in the language of devotion throughout its whole extent; and in the midst of the most profound philosophical or metaphysical discussion, as in his treatment of memory, he constantly breaks out in prayer and praise.

The essential unity of believers in Christ is beautifully illustrated. Differing widely in their theology, they are one in their devotion, in their desire to know God and be found in him.

The volumes furnish rich treasure to the soul that would enter into closer fellowship with God. They will prove to be of priceless value if they lead the reader to search more deeply in these mines of spiritual wealth. The work is heartily commended to all who would kindle the spirit of devotion by breathing the atmosphere of prayer.

Princeton.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

Devolution in Mission Administration. By DANIEL JOHNSON FLEMING, Ph.D. Organizing Director of the Department of Foreign Service, Union Theological Seminary. New York, Fleming H. Revell Company. Cloth, 12 mo. pp. 310. \$1.50 net.

The very existence of the questions discussed by the writer is a source of genuine gratification to all who are interested in the progress of world-wide evangelization. The questions concern the transfer of power and responsibilities from foreign missions to indigenous organizations in the various fields of missionary enterprise; and it is, of course, the establishment and growth of native or national churches that have brought such problems into being. The problems then are the results and evidences of missionary success. However gratifying they may be, from this point of view, they must be solved, in case missionary work is to be rapidly advanced and the growth of national Churches is to be furthered.

The problems presented by the writer are of two classes, the first relating to ecclesiastical, and the second to administrative evolution; or, to express his purpose more plainly, he considers first the relation between the Churches in the home lands and the Churches established by them on foreign fields, and further the difficult question of the ecclesiastical relation of foreign missionaries, in view of their possible membership in Churches at home or on the foreign field. He next considers the relation between the various "missions," and the Churches they have established, including the question of admitting natives to membership in the "missions," and the relative functions of "missions" and native Churches.

It will thus be apparent that the questions are by no means academic but intensely practical.

It may be of further interest to note that the discussion is not theoretical but historical. The author shows what has been the practice of five American missionary societies now working in India. He reviews the legislative acts and the declared principles of these societies and their respective church courts. While we are thus given facts

relative to only one great field, and while little attempt is made at original discussion or suggestion, we are enabled to understand the complexity of the problem and the difficulty of the task of adjusting, on all mission fields, the relations between the missionary societies and the growing national churches; and we further have suggested to us the lines along which such adjustment will probably be made. We thus have presented a problem of present practical interest and importance, in the solution of which the whole Church of Christ has a deep concern.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Suggestions for a Church Class in Psycho-Therapy. By C. BERTRAM RUNNELLS, Rector of the Church of the Good Samaritan, Cornwells, Oregon. Milwaukee, The Young Churchman Co., Cloth 16 mo. pp. 75. 75 cents.

The Emmanuel Movement has already occasioned so much remark, and its points of strength and weakness have been so frequently presented, that this little book possesses little interest excepting for the fact that it so naively sets forth the underlying principle, the purpose, and the fallacy of the movement it is designed to aid. The principle is clearly stated in the very title by the use of the term "Psycho-Therapy"; and it is of course true that Dr. Worcester is attempting to cure disease by mental suggestion, and is relying upon the law of the effect of mind upon matter. His special purpose, and that of his followers, is to treat the depressed, the unhappy, the fearful, the sick, by suggesting to them appropriate Christian truths; and this little book shows how ministers may conduct classes for the treatment of such cases. The fallacy of the system is expressed in the statements that the supposed miracles of Christ were really cases of mind cure; that the power granted to the apostles was only of this nature, and that it is the duty of every Christian minister "to claim the right and the power to heal the sick."

There can be no question that the conduct of such classes as is proposed, would bring relief and comfort to many troubled minds, and would relieve some functional nervous disorders which are caused by wrong mental habits; nevertheless, it is also true that, as the cures effected by Christ were far more than cases of mental healing, so it is true that most bodily diseases, and many mental disorders of the present day, are to be traced to physical causes, and can only be cured by physical treatment and material remedies. The great weakness of the Emmanuel Movement lies in its failure to recognize adequately the supernatural elements of Christianity and to appreciate the scientific principles of rational therapeutics.

Within certain narrow limits, and when safe-guarded by a careful study of Scripture, the laws of mental suggestion may be wisely employed by the Christian minister, and under these conditions some help might be found in these rather novel and not altogether profound suggestions for a church class.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Literary Primacy of the Bible. By GEORGE P. ECKMAN, New York, The Methodist Book Concern. Cloth 16 mo. p. 269. \$1.00 net.

The chapters of this book concern subjects which are always interesting to the student of Scripture. While little claim could be made to originality, the simplicity of statement and the popular style suggest that the discussions must have been well adapted to the audience of students to whom they were addressed in the form of lectures, being the second series delivered at De Pauw University on the Mendenhall Foundation. In addition to the theme suggested by the title of the volume, the lecturer discusses The Poetry, the Oratory, The Fiction, The Persistent Force and the Ethical and Spiritual Values of the Bible. The last chapter, which deals with the Bible as Inspired Literature, is perhaps least satisfactory of all; for, in dealing with "inspiration," the author seems unable to conceive of any theory except one of mechanical dictation, which he of course rejects, and one of "continuous inspiration" which he accepts, even declaring that "modern believers" have "this endowment as surely as the men of old, 'who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost?'" To most readers, mere "literary primacy" will appear of less interest and value than a true theory of unique divine inspiration, and less worthy of demonstration and proof.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Princeton.

A Nation-Wide Preaching Mission. Milwaukee, The Young Churchman Company. Cloth, 12 mo. pp. 139. 50 cents.

This manual, issued by a special commission appointed by the Protestant Episcopal Church to further a nation-wide mission, is designed to guide and assist the clergymen of that communion in fulfilling their important task as preachers of the inspired Gospel. It contains the views and suggestions of some ten or twelve different workers who discuss methods of preparation, publicity, sermonizing, the cooperation of laymen, mission music, and related matters. While embodying some repetition, and although obviously designed for the ministers of one church, the manual suggests the crisis presented to all the churches, and some of the methods which must be employed in the successful prosecution of evangelistic work.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Princeton.

In the Valley of Decision. By LYNN HAROLD HOUGH. New York, The Abingdon Press. 16 mo. Cloth pp. 71. 50 cts. net.

No young person could read the four brief chapters of this little book without recognizing a moving appeal to be true to God and to the higher self, to resist the currents of evil, to sympathize and to serve. The purpose of the author is to encourage such wise decisions in the formative years of life.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Princeton.

To Emmaus and Back. By J. F. STOUT. New York, The Abingdon Press. Paper. 16 mo. pp. 22. 25 cents net.

The message for Easter-tide, contained in this little booklet, is embodied in an account of "the walk to Emmaus," which is given in blank verse, in a reverent spirit and with a large use of Scripture quotation.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Breve Compendio De Doctrina Christiana, Philadelphia, Pa., Casa De Publicationer De La Iglesia Presbyteriana.

Under this title the Presbyterian Board of Publication has issued an edition of the "Intermediate Catechism," "El Catecismo Intermedio De La Inglesia Presbyteriana," single copies of which can be secured for five cents each.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Westminster Superintendent's Service Book. By E. MORRIS FERGUSON. Philadelphia, Presbyterian Board of Publication. Paper. 16 mo. pp. 66. 25 cents net.

A calendar is here provided, for each Sunday of the year, and "orders of service" for the sessions of the Sunday-School differing for each quarter of the year, a list of the international lessons, and blanks for weekly statistical reports. Many features of this "service book" will be suggestive to the active and alert superintendent.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Ten-Minute Lessons on the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America. By E. MORRIS FERGUSON. Philadelphia, Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath School Work. Paper, 24 mo. pp. 104. 15 cents.

This manual is intended as a text-book for senior classes in the Sunday-School, for young people's societies, Westminster Guilds and other groups of Presbyterian young people; but will be of service to students of any age, who desire a brief, clear and comprehensive course on Presbyterianism. It consists of three parts, the first dealing with the organization, the second with the history and doctrine, and the third with the boards and administrative agencies of the church. Ten lessons are included in each of the separate parts, and each lesson is followed by questions for review. The material of each lesson is succinctly stated, and also suggests a line for further study and investigation.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Presbyterian Christian Endeavor Manual. By AMOS R. WELLS. Philadelphia, The Westminster Press. Paper, 24 mo. pp. 212. 10 cents net.

This pocket manual contains helpful hints for the use of members of Christian Endeavor societies who desire to make the weekly meeting of their societies a source of real spiritual benefit. The book contains

suggestive thoughts, illustrations and quotations in relation to the topic announced for each week of the year.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Princeton.

The Leadership of the Spirit. By E. W. HICKS. Chicago, Glad Tidings Publishing Co. Paper, 16 mo. pp. 51. 10 cents.

The plea is here made that the Church should recognize more fully the leadership of the Holy Spirit, and should depend less upon human means and worldly methods in the conduct of its work. Not all the statements will be accepted by Bible students but the main contention is serious and important.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Princeton.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE

American Journal of Theology, Chicago, July: ARTHUR C. MCGIFFERT, Progress of Theological Thought during the past Fifty Years; WILLIAM H. P. FAUNCE, Religious Advance in Fifty Years; E. F. SCOTT, Hellenistic Mysticism of the Fourth Gospel; CHARLES G. SHAW, Two Types of Liberalism; JAMES W. THOMPSON, The German Church and the Conversion of the Baltic Slavs; ERNEST D. BURTON, Spirit, Soul, and Flesh; CLAYTON R. BOWEN, Was John the Baptist the Sign of Jonah?

Bibliotheca Sacra, Oberlin, July: HORACE M. RAMSEY, Sketch of the Early History of the Dogma of the Virgin Birth; CHARLES E. SMITH, Progress of Doctrine in the New Testament; HANS C. JUELL, The Johannine Problems; FREDERICK P. NOBLE, Negative Criticism of the Destructive Critics; E. S. BUCHANAN, More Light from the Western Text; FRANCIS B. PALMER, Resurrection of Jesus; HAROLD M. WIENER, Date of Exodus.

Catholic Historical Review, Washington, July: OWEN B. CORRIGAN, Episcopal Succession in the United States; EDWIN RYAN, Diocesan Organization in the Spanish Colonies; J. B. CULEMANS, A Revaluation of Early Peruvian History; GERARDO DECORME, Catholic Education in Mexico (1525-1915).

Church Quarterly Review, London, July: BISHOP OF MADRAS, Church and State in India; F. B. JEVONS, Science, Ethics and Art: A Synoptic Philosophy; ELIZABETH WORDSWORTH, Wordsworth and His Influence; W. H. FRERE, The English Rite; P. V. M. BENECKE, Clement of Alexandria; WILBERFORCE JENKINSON, Old London Churches before the Great Fire; The Crisis of the War; ARTHUR C. HEADLAM, The Virgin Birth.

Constructive Quarterly, New York, September: W. P. DUBOSE, Incarnation: W. R. INGE, Justice of God in History; S. PARKES CADMAN, Organic Unity of Christ's Church; C. H. ROBINSON, After

the War What; F. J. McCONNELL, Aggressiveness in Christian Advance; ARCHBISHOP EVODKIM, Mystery and Might of the Word; HERBERT SYMONDS, Catholicity; W. E. ORCHARD, Future of English Nonconformity; J. W. PONT, Lutheran Church in Holland; H. L. STEWART, Religious Consciousness as a Psychological Fact; ADELINE M. BEDFORD, Place of Suffering in Christian Life; W. L. BEVAN, George Cassander: a Reformation Champion of Reunion.

East & West, London, July: MARGARET STEVENSON, Original Investigation in the Mission Field; AURELIO PALMIERI, Russian Missions and Missionaries in Siberia; J. H. MOULTON, Parsis in India; R. E. DENNETT, Mission Work in West Africa; F. JOHNSON, Mesopotamia from a Missionary Standpoint; W. S. HUNT, Misconceptions of the Missionary Motive; C. B. YOUNG, Missionary Half-truths; J. DOBBS, A South African Problem; E. H. DAY, Burmese Buddhists: Ulfilas and the Conversion of the Goths.

Expositor, London, August: G. G. FINDLAY, Ministry of Reconciliation: a Study of 2 Corinthians iii-v; J. E. MACFADYEN, Mosaic Origin of the Decalogue: Relation of Decalogue to Prophecy, The Decalogue and Individualism; MAURICE JONES, Christian Ministry in the Apostolic Church: a New Theory; C. J. CADOUX, St. Paul's Conception of the State; RENDEL HARRIS, Origin of Prologue of St. John's Gospel. *The Same*, September: RENDEL HARRIS, Origin of Prologue of St. John's Gospel; H. T. ANDREWS, Faith in the Primitive Church; R. A. C. MACMILLAN, Religion without a Creed; JOHN MACASKILL, A Transformation in Socratic Criticism—with an Analogy; A. C. DEANE, "As Having Authority;" J. E. MACFADYEN, Mosaic Origin of Decalogue: Unique Distinction of the Decalogue; E. C. SELWYN, A Personal Reference to St. Paul in the Fourth Gospel; W. H. GRIFFITH THOMAS, Study of 1 Peter iii, 19ff.

Expository Times, Edinburgh, July: WILLIAM SANDAY, A Short Sermon on Shakespeare: J. S. BANKS, Eastern Religions in the West; ADELA M. ADAM, Mysticism of Greece; W. M. RAMSAY, The Denials of Peter. *The Same*, August; JAMES H. MOULTON, 'The Things which Jesus Did'; ADELA M. ADAM, Mysticism of Rome; R. M. WOOLLEY, Ordination; T. G. PINCHES, Early Babylonian Chronology of the Book of Genesis. *The Same*, September; J. M. E. ROSS, Preaching of Justice; W. M. RAMSAY, The Denials of Peter; C. W. EMMET, Fourth Book of Esdras and St. Paul: W. MORISON, Christ's Confidence in His Perpetual Presence; H. B. WORKMAN, Retardation of the Beatific Vision.

Harvard Theological Review, Cambridge, July: G. A. COOKE, Driver and Wellhausen; EDWARD T. WILLIAMS, Confucianism and the New China; RICHARD C. CABOT, Current Developments in Medical Ethics; JOHN W. BUCKHAM, Contribution of Professor Howison to Christian Thought; GEORGE F. KENNGOTT, Effect upon the Churches of the Social Movement.

Hibbert Journal, Boston, July: STOPFORD A. BROOKE, A Discourse on

War; HAROLD BEGBIE, *Spiritual Alliance of Russia and England*; A. SHADWELL, *German War Sermons*; ALEXANDER DARROCH, *Education and Humanism*; J. A. R. MARRIOTT, *The Educational Opportunity*; W. B. SELBIE, *The Problem of Conscience*; ALFRED E. GARVIE, *The Christian Ideal and its Realisation*; Race Suicide; AMBROSE W. VERNON, *A Modern Confession of Faith on Jesus Christ*; W. MACNEILE DIXON, *Shakespeare, the Englishman*; C. G. MONTEFIORE, *Perfection of Christianity*; J. H. HERTZ, *Jewish Mysticism*; HUGH ELLIOTT, *Defence of Scientific Materialism*.

International Journal of Ethics, Concord, July: BERTRAND RUSSELL, *Marriage and the Population Question*; ELSIE C. PARSONS, *Feminism and Sex Ethics*; CHARLES G. SHAW, *Pessimism of Jesus*; ALFRED H. LLOYD, *The Doctrinaire in Time of Christ*; GERTRUDE B. KING, *The Servile Mind*; BERTRAM M. LAING, *Origin of Nietzsche's Problem and Its Solution*; MORRIS R. COHEN, *Recent Philosophical Legal Literature in French, German and Italian*.

Irish Theological Quarterly, Dublin, July: J. M. FLOOD, *Dante and Catholic Philosophy*; DAVID BARRY, *Disposal of Lost Property*; T. J. WALSHE, *Alma Mater Studiorum*; DENIS O'DOHERTY, *Religion in Primary Schools of Spain*; M. J. O'DONNELL, *Domicile: The Canon Law at Present*.

Jewish Quarterly Review, Philadelphia, July: HARRY A. WOLFSON, *Crescas on the Problem of the Divine Attributes*; HARTWIG HIRSCHFELD, *Fragments of Sa'adyah's Arabic Pentateuch Commentary*; ISRAEL I. EFROS, *Problem of Space in Jewish Mediaeval Philosophy. II*; ISRAEL LEBENDIGER, *The Minor in Jewish Law. IV*; JOSEPH JACOBS, *Jewish Immigration in United States*; ALEXANDER MARX, *Margoliouth's Catalogue of Miscellaneous MSS. and Charters in the British Museum*.

Journal of Theological Studies, London, July: A. SPAGNOLO, *Maximus of Turin against the Pagans*; C. H. TURNER, *Papal Chronology of the third Century*; P. BATIFFOL, *L'Église cathédrale de Paris au VI^e Siècle*; H. B. SWETE, *The Disciple whom Jesus Loved. II. John of Ephesus*; F. H. COLSON, *μετεσχηματιστα 1 Cor. 4:6*; W. E. BARNES, *Textual Criticism of the Old Testament*; F. C. BURKITT, *On Celtis 'a chisel': a study of Textual Criticism*; A. NAIRNE, *Prayer for the Consecration of a Bishop in the Church Order of Hippolytus*; L. E. BROWNE, *Jewish Sanctuary in Babylonia*; T. H. ROBINSON, *Structure of the Book of Obadiah*.

London Quarterly Review, London, July: W. T. DAVISON, *Wordsworth-Seer and Patriot*; ST. NIHAL SINGH, *Lord Hardinge's Indian Administration*; GEORGE JACKSON, *Modern Political Oratory and its Lessons for the Preacher*; T. H. S. ESCOTT, *How to Make our Empire Fit for its Work in the World*; E. C. COOPER, *Yuan Shih Kai and the Monarchical Movement in China*; R. MARTIN POPE, F. W. H. MYERS; JOHN TELFORD, *The War Through Many Eyes*.

Lutheran Church Review, Philadelphia, July: T. E. SCHMAUK, *Luther and Reformation Literature of the Last Fifty Years*; T. E.

SCHMAUK, Discussion of Reformation Literature for the Quadri-Centennial; JACOB FRY, The Seventh Jubilee of the Reformation. Some Reminiscences; A. SPAETH, The Luther Jubilees; H. E. JACOBS, Celebrations of the Reformation; Claus Harms' Ninety-Five Theses; T. E. SCHMAUK, Doctrine of Justification in the Three Hasting' Dictionaries; ADOLF HULT, Standpoint of the Church Historian; LEANDER S. KEYSER, Moral Character of the Old Testament Yahveh. A Defense of it against an Assailant; T. W. KRETSCHMANN, Holy Zeal in the Ministry.

Lutheran Quarterly, Gettysburg, July: E. D. WEIGLE, The Church; LUTHER A. FOX, Elements of Bergson's Philosophy; V. G. A. TRESSLER, Church History through Church Statistics; CHESTER H. TRAVER, Historical Sketch of St. Paul's Lutheran Church, Rhinebeck, New York; J. C. JACOBY, Brief Study in Christology; FREDERICK G. DEMPWOLF, Lutheran Church Architecture; GAUIS G. ATKINS, Spirit of Jesus in International Relationships.

Methodist Review, New York, July-August: H. R. CALKINS, Personalism and Property; B. G. BRAWLEY, Lorenzo Dow; EDWARD VOORHEES, Shelley: for Personal Reasons Only; GLADSTONE HOLM, Norman MacLeod—a sketch; WILLIAM B. WINTERS, The Serene Valley; F. C. LOCKWOOD, Shakespeare's Art; IRWIN R. BEILER, Christian Religion and the Scientific Method; J. W. HAMILTON, Criminal Neglect of the Immigrant's Children; W. C. POOLE, Billy Sunday and Business Men; W. P. EVELAND, When Men Prayed. *The Same*, September-October; H. C. STUNTZ, Browning's Indictment of Roman Catholicism; LYNN H. HOUGH, The Preacher as a Reader of General Literature; EDWIN LEWIS, Aspects of Scholasticism; JAMES MUDGE, A Methodist Onomasticon; W. O. SHEPARD, The Golden Age of the English Pulpit; H. A. REED, Religion and Philosophy of the Man on the Street; G. B. WINTON, Matter of Loyalty.

Methodist Review Quarterly, Nashville, July: H. M. DUBOSE, Epistle to Galatians; P. T. FORSYTH, Christ: King or Genius; NEWMAN SMYTH, Are the Churches Prepared for the Day after the War?; S. B. HERRICK, Protestant and Roman Catholic Versions of the Bible; J. E. GODBEY, Christianizing Society; CARLTON D. HARRIS, "The Cloud from the Desert"; S. PARKES CADMAN, Decline of Monasticism in the Christian Church; BISHOP TIGERT, "Jesus Christ as the Saviour of the Lost," JAMES CRUTCHFIELD, John Huss, Martyr; E. V. GHIDONI, Defense of Orthodox Christianity; A. D. BETTS, A Study in Benedictions.

Monist, Chicago, July: GEORGE SARTON, History of Science; LOUIS D. COVITT, The Anthropology of the Jew; JAMES B. SHAW, Logistic and the Reduction of Mathematics to Logic; PHILIP E. B. JOURDAIN, Richard Dedekind.

Moslem World, London, July: L. BEVAN JONES, Educated Moslems in Bengal; S. M. ZWEMER, The 'Akika Sacrifice; W. A. RICE, Transfer of Allegiance; The Bible in Moslem Lands; W. J. W. ROOME, Islam on the Congo; P. NYLAND, Woman in Judaism and Islam; J. W. INGLIS,

Islam in Manchuria; CHARLES L. OGILVIE, A Mohammedan Conference at Peking.

Reformed Church Review, Lancaster, July: HENRY S. COFFIN, "God Gave unto Us the Ministry of Reconciliation"; GRANT W. BATDORF, Reverend Philip William Otterbein; DAVID DUNN, Glimpses of Leaders and Trends of Europe's Religious Thinking; JOHN C. RAEZER, The Church and Social Service; J. I. SWANDER, Psychological Theology; A. T. G. APPLE, The American Pulpit—Its Influence upon the National Life during the Nineteenth Century; JESSE F. STEINER, Count Leo Tolstoy.

Review and Expositor, Louisville, July: FREDERICK W. EBERHARDT, Shakespeare's Value to the Minister of To-Day; A. D. MARTIN, "He shall not speak from himself"; R. E. GAINES, The Layman and his Home; JOHN A. FAULKNER, Luther's First Trial; J. E. WALTER, Objective Religion; W. P. WILKS, Origin of Evil; W. C. TAYLOR, Moral Difficulties of the Old Testament.

Union Seminary Review, Richmond, July: ERNEST THOMPSON, The General Assembly, 1916, at Orlando; ROCKWELL S. BRANK, Christian Leadership; R. C. REED, Nature and Limitations of the Authority of the Church; RICHMOND A. MONTGOMERY, Value of Acquaintance with Mark Rutherford; MAURICE G. FULTON, Shakespeare and Holy Writ; ROBERT E. SPEER, Some Aspects of the Religious Conditions in the Philippine Islands.

Yale Review, New Haven, July: ARTHUR S. DEWING, Our Economic Peril; GEORGE B. ADAMS, British Imperial Federation; RAPHAEL ZON, Industrial Future of Italy; HIRAM BINGHAM, Watch Therefore!; HENRY P. FAIRCHILD, Americanizing the Immigrant; A. LAWRENCE LOWELL, Liberty and Discipline; MAURICE LAVARENNE, A Great French School in the War; KUNO FRANCKE, German Autocracy; WILLIAM L. PHELPS, Henry James.

Bilychnis, Roma, Giugno: ANTONIO DE STEFANO, I. Tedeschi e l'eresia medievale in Italia; CARLO WAGNER, L'Evangelo e gli intellettuali; ERNESTO RUTILI, Vitalità e vita nel cattolicesimo. *The Same*, Luglio; FELICE MOMIGLIANO, Il giudaismo di ieri e di domani; ROMOLO MURRI, La lotta per il diritto.

Ciencia Tomista, Madrid, Julio-Agosto: G. PELÁEZ, El Criterio Ético en la Narración Histórica; J. M. VOSTÉ, Erasmus natura filii irae; BELTRÁN DE HEREDIA, La enseñanza de Santo Tomás en la Universidad de Alcalá; JOSÉ DE LA MANO, El P. Francisco Jiménez Campaña; G. ALONSO-GETINO, Historiadores del convento de San Esteban de Salamanca.

Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie, Lausanne, Janvier- Avril: ARNOLD REYMOND, L'hypothèse héliocentrique et la condamnation de Galilée; GUSTAVE JÉQUIER, Le Sinaï et l'Exode; HUGO GRESSMANN, L'archéologie de l'Ancien Testament; ED. PLATZHOFF-LEJEUNE, La propagande antiecclesiastique et l'exode organisé en Allemagne. *The Same*, Mai Août; PIERRE BOVET, L'instinct combatif dans l'expérience

chrétienne; CHARLES DUTOIT, Déterminisme moral; HENRI L. MIÉVILLE, Pourquoi cherchons nous à justifier nos opinions?; CHARLES SCHNETZLER, Martin Bucer.

Theological Study, Tokyo, August: MORRIS JASTROW, The Sumerian View of Beginnings; WILLIAM A. BROWN, Theological Leadership; FLEMING JAMES, Indispensableness of Bible Study; Pagan Elements in the Making of the Christian Religion.

Theologisch Tijdschrift, Leiden, 50: 4 en 5; H. U. MEYBOOM, De Kerk; F. M. TH. BÖHL, Ausgewählte Keilschrifttexte aus Boghaz Köi; C. PEKELHARING, Eenige woorden over het begrip "Bekeering"; P. ELDERING, De wetenschappelijke waarde van het Spiritisme; J. L. PALACHE, Drie Plaatsen uit het boek Job; E. ITALLI, Dooven, stommen en doofstommen in de Joodsche oudheid; K. F. PROOST, Adam—Christus—Satan; B. D. EERDMANS, De Onderwijsvraag en de Volksontwikkeling.

Theologische Studiën, Utrecht, XXXIV: 4 en 5; F. W. GROSHEIDE, Matthew 28:19; F. E. DAUBANTON, Ter inleiding tot de Didaktiek des Nieuwen Verbonds.

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